On 2/29/2012 8:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 29, 4:45 am, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 28 Feb 2012, at 22:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 28, 3:41 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
The implication of Comp is that there is no "you". "You" are an
abstraction, a fiction,
just another element in a model of the world.
That's why I say comp has only a pseudo-1p conception of
consciousness. It's not difficult to claim that the hard problem isn't
so hard if you allow the hardness of it to be fictional.
It is not fictional in the sense of unreal. But in the sense of
abstract, or immaterial.
You make my point to Brent already.
How does this translate though into answering the very non-abstract
question of 'Doctor, is this treatment any different from me
swallowing the business end of a shotgun?'. If I indeed wake up from
the procedure, it is not clear whether I am arbitrarily limited to one
replacement brain at a time (which means what? that I can kill myself
every day and get a restored brain every night?) or can I wake up as a
massively redundant RAID of disposable brains, or a cluster of
parallel processing identities spread out as identities all over the
world where I would experience my new separate bodies something like
fingers on my hands. I can't think of any plausible restriction
against this in comp. Either you don't become a digital brain at all
or you can become an army of simultaneous selves.
As you suggest, you are already an army of simultaneous selves. At least that's Daniel
Dennett's 'multiple drafts' model in "Consciousness Explained". By that theory, the Borg
just have more multiple drafts before they settle on what they think.
Brent
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