On 2/29/2012 5:47 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/29/2012 12:50 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/28/2012 9:40 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/28/2012 3:41 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/28/2012 12:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciaux<allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any
difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was
substituted for a digital brain.
What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both
copies yourself at once and still not feel any difference? If not, and
you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A
off?
Disembodied consciousness is silly.
Craig
The implication of Comp is that there is no "you". "You" are an abstraction, a
fiction, just another element in a model of the world.
Brent
Hi,
Just a question about the semantics. What difference is there between a "you" and
an abstraction that is indistinguishable from it?
The difference is that there isn't *a* "you", there are arbitrarily many or at least
there will be momentarily. The absraction is tracing just one of these. This is
already a consequence of MWI in which quantum events cause "you" to split into
orthogonal subspaces. To the extent consciousness is realized by classical processes
the splitting only happens when the quantum events have classical level effects.
Hi Brent,
So we could say that the "you" is tied to a particular "world". Would it be
consistent to think of this notion of "realized by classical processes" as an
abstraction of the same kind, i.e. a tracing of individual 1p content, each of which is
generated by a potential infinity of computations? I am trying to tease out the relation
of COMP's ontology picture with that of MWI.
That's roughly the picture I have of how comp is supposed to work. For any given state of
your consciousness there are infinitely many threads of different computations that "go
through" that state. These have different continuations and these result in quantum
uncertainty as to which future you experience. However, I'm not sure how classicality
figures into this. The materialist view is that almost all microscopic quantum randomness
has no effect on consciousness and so 'a conscious state' would correspond to a large
number of similar computational states rather than just one.
Brent
Onward!
Stephen
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