On Mar 7, 12:40 pm, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Then when I said "you have been duplicated" there is something very
> important about "you", the most important part in fact, that is missing
> because for unknown reasons it has not been duplicated. What can it be,
> what is lacking in the copy that the original has? let's think, it can't be
> information because that can certainly be duplicated and it can't be matter
> because atoms are generic and we constantly replace our atoms with new ones
> anyway; so I think we both know the only remaining thing it can be, but I'm
> not yet ready to believe in the soul, abandon logic, and embrace
> irrationality.

What is it that is deciding what to abandon or embrace? Why does it
have to be something other than what it is: private personal
experience. Meaning. Sense. Can you transplant a particular flame from
one candle to another? Can you cut a spark down the middle lengthwise
and put half here and half there?

> I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue: You are
> a copy of Bruno Marchal made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows and
> you are now facing the original Bruno Marchal in a symmetrical room, thus
> the two of you are receiving identical sensory input

That's an assumption. A compass duplicated in this way would not be
receiving identical sensory input. We don't consciously use magnetic
sense for navigation like other organisms do, but we can't assume that
our awareness is not influenced by subtle conditions that extend
beyond the immediate area of our body.

We don't know that it is possible to actually duplicate anything, only
that we can make things that seem like they are the same to us.
Someone with an exact copy of my brain might not be able to read
English because they haven't had any history reading it. The brain may
not encode in English or Chinese but in neurotransmitters which don't
know the difference. If we don't see it in a microscope, there is no
reason to assume that our copy made through microscopic analysis will
contain it. Experience may be real, and non-transferable.

> Of course if there were a unsymmetrical change in the environment or there
> was a random quantum fluctuation that made the people different then things
> would evolve, well, differently, but at the instant of duplication they
> would still be identical. So if subjectively it makes no difference and
> objectively it makes no difference and even the very universe itself isn't
> sure if a switch had actually been made or not then I make the very
> reasonable assumption that it just makes no difference, and although there
> are two bodies and two brains in that symmetrical room there is only one
> intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view.
> > Like Everett said, the observer does not feel the split.
> It's against my better judgment but I know you like the word so yes,
> subjectively you do not feel a Everett style split, but God sees it; but in
> my example above if the 2 are really identical and if the exchange is
> really instantaneous then even God Himself doesn't know (or care) if things
> really got swapped or not.
> > You persistently confuse the 1-view from its own perspective (on which
> > the probability/uncertainty bears), and the 1-view than an outsider can
> > attribute to each reconstituted person.
> And you persistently ignore that YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED and thus "the
> 1-view from its own perspective" is no longer singular but has become
> plural.

By plural, do you mean telepathic unity between physically separate
bodies? Do I feel like I have four arms and four legs on two bodies in
two places?

> This is plainly false because BRUNO MARCHAL HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, Bruno
> Marchal's perspective has been duplicated his memory has been duplicated
> his personality has been duplicated his intelligence has been duplicated
> his consciousness has been duplicated, EVERYTHING about Bruno Marchal has
> been duplicated, and yet you continue to insist that "I" is singular when
> very clearly it is not. After the experiment Bruno Marchal will say Bruno
> Marchal feels like Bruno Marchal is in Washington and only Washington and
> after the experiment Bruno Marchal will say Bruno Marchal feels like Bruno
> Marchal is in Moscow and only Moscow, and Bruno Marchal is correct because
> Bruno Marchal has been duplicated.

Then Moscow Bruno can change his name and is no longer a duplicate. By
extension, since he was the one who changed his name, it could be said
that he never was a duplicate as he was destined for Moscow.

> > In fact my body has been duplicated, and for an outsider my 1-view have
> been duplicated, but the Nagel-Everett subjective view on the 1-view are
> not. You confuse 3p discourses on 1-views with 1-p discourse on its 1-view.
> I believe it is you that is confused and that is not surprising considering
> that your implicit or explicit assumption at the start of all your thought
> experiments is "everything about you is duplicated and something about you
> has not been duplicated", it's no wonder you end up with confusing self
> contradictory nonsense. My thought experiments start with "if something is
> identical then it's identical" and my starting point causes much less
> confusion than yours.

My thought experiments start with "if something is real, then it
cannot ever be truly identical to anything else in the cosmos"


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to