On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 1:30 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> The guy can believe he is split, because he knows the protocol and trust
> the machinery and the people handling it. At no point he can know, by
> personal experience, that he is split.

He can't feel the split in my symmetrical room thought experiment but he
can see it, he can see his copy as if in a mirror moving and talking just
as he does, and if you exchanged their positions he still couldn't tell
that anything had happened

> The fact that the 1-view are not duplicated, from their own 1-view pov,
> can be justified by the fact that the read-cut-reconstitution are not part
> of the experience.

The read-cut-reconstitution is not in the originals memory nor in the
identical copies memory, that is to say neither feels it so  they remain

> those events does not impact on the brain processing [...] It is
> literally trivial.

I could not have said it better myself, so why did you bring it up?

> you confuse the 1-view on the 1-view on the 1-view with the 3-view on the
> 1-view on the 1-view.

That my friend is one hell of a confusing mouthful, and it's confusing
because you do not understand it. Previously in the same Email you make a
point in emphasizing what I already knew, that neither the copy nor the
original can feel the split and so remain identical, but then in the very
same post you say the consciousness of the original and the consciousness
of the copy are different, they feel differently because something in the
original can not be copied, the 1 view of the 2 view of the something or
another view can not be duplicated for some unknown reason. Make up your
mind, can they feel the split or can they not? If they can't then they
remain identical and if they can then tell me how they do it.

> You really avoid putting yourself in the place of one of those
> reconstituted person. But you have to be able to do that for any of them.

OK I'll do that. You the original Bruno Marchal remember walking into the
duplicating chamber and then suddenly somebody who looks moves and speaks
exactly like you do suddenly appeared right in front of you. And you the
copy of Bruno Marchal remembers walking into the duplicating chamber and
then suddenly somebody who looks moves and speaks exactly like you do
suddenly appeared right in front of you. From any point of view from ANY
perspective including their own perspective there is no difference between
them, even the original and the copy themselves can't tell who is who, we
know this because if we exchange their position neither of them notice that
anything has happened.

> With any 3p view, there are no indeterminacy

That is totally untrue. Whenever you, Bruno Marchal, opens a door I don't
know for certain what you or I will see, and that is a fact even in a world
without duplicating chambers.

> The indeterminacy appears when they "open the door" of the reconstitution
> boxes

Yes, but you didn't need to say "reconstitution boxes", it's true of any

> I don't assume QM.

You don't assume the existence of matter either, it seems to me if you
don't make some very basic assumptions you are never going to get anywhere
and your physics will fizz away into pure untestable abstraction that is no
better or worse than a infinite number of other competing theories. If you
can figure out how everything works starting from nothing but matter and
quantum mechanics don't you think that would be a pretty good days work?

> The point is that when opening the door (in the initial thought
> experiment), they break the symmetry and have each a personal different
> experiences,

If the symmetry breaks then they diverge because then they are no longer

> which they were unable to predict before opening the door.

Yep, you never know what you will see when you open a door.

> >  If the 1-views have been duplicated, then their are identical
> > But then there is only one 1-view, as you said yourself.

Yes. Adjectives do not follow the same rules of arithmetic that nouns do,
if I see 2 red cars in a room "red" has not become plural "cars" has, there
is still only one red even if there are 2 cars. And if I destroy one of
those cars red still exists in that room although now there is only one
car. I don't know how many people are on this list but let's say 100, the
list automation sent a copy of your post to 100 different people, but there
is only one post, you did not write 100 posts.

> the 3-duplication has not entailed a duplication of the 1-views.

Then tell me exactly what it is about this mystical thing you call "the
3-view on the 1-view on the 1-view" that renders it incapable of being

>>  Explain to me how the 1-view perspective of anybody has changed from
>> any perspective you care to name, any at all.
> > Without the vertical symmetry. If my face is not symmetrical, I might
> not recognize myself

I did specify symmetry in my thought experiment, if the symmetry is broken
then all bets are off, but in this case it does not matter, if you see
something odd in your copy's face then he sees something odd in your face

> But this is only distracting from the issue.

Distracting?? The fact that you don't understand that THIS IS THE ISSUE is
the reason you're so confused.

>>  and after the switch you, from your first person perspective
>> consciously feel like you are looking at somebody who looks, moves, acts,
>> and speaks exactly like you do, it's as if you're looking into a mirror.
>> What has changed from the original's point of view, what has changed from
>> the copy's point of view, what has changed from a third person observer's
>> point of view, what has changed from the universe's point of view?
>> Absolutely positively nothing. To win this argument all you have to do is
>> explain to me how instantly changing the position of 2 identical objects
>> changes anything from anyone's or anything's point of view. You can't.
> > Indeed, but this makes my point. The 1-view at this stage is unique. We
> might fuse them, and nothing would have happened.

I'm glad you agree, but then what are we arguing about?

> note that if the reconstitution boxes are different from inside, in W and
> in M, then

Then symmetry is broken, the 2 see different things, and are no longer
identical and become different people, I've already said that many times

> the 1-indeterminacy follows from the PUP principle (PUP = Post-posed
> Uncertainty Principle:

Dear god not another homemade acronym that I'm supposed to remember!

> if today I can predict that tomorrow I will be uncertain of the outcome
> of an experience I will do,

In other words, if tomorrow happens.

> then I am today uncertain about the outcome of that experience that I
> will do tomorrow.

In other words, life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what
you're gonna get.

> You just said that the 1-view are the same,


> but by definition of 1-view, being the same makes it not having been
> duplicated

If I duplicate a red car then the red has been duplicated and the car has
been duplicated and now there are 2 cars, but there is still only one red.
As I said adjectives like red, big, Bruno Marchal, fast and John K Clark do
not follow the same rules of arithmetic that nouns like atoms cars bodies
and brains do.

> It is enough to assume that the reconstitution boxes are not identical
> from inside

If you assume that then the thought experiment becomes worthless. You can
certainly arrange things so that the copy differentiates from the original
a instant after its made, but that would demonstrate nothing; the point is
that you can also arrange things so that the copy does not differentiate
from the original for a very long time, indefinitely long if you tweak
things from time to time to compensate for very small random quantum

>>  the Helsinki man's body still exists, only now it's in Moscow and
>> Washington,
> > I can show you the ashes of the guy who was in Helsinki

Fine, all the atoms in those ashes were once part of the body of the
Helsinki man, but there is nothing unusual in that, all the atoms that were
in your body one year ago are now no longer part of you and have gone on
and been recycled into other things. Today the atoms in your new body came
from last year's mashed potatoes. And all this is routine humdrum stuff
having nothing to do with exotic duplicating chambers. So do you think it
would be a satisfactory depiction of reality to say Bruno Marchal's body
has been "annihilated"?

>>  both the Washington and Moscow man remember being the Helsinki man just
>> fine, no information has been lost; true neither of them continues to
>> receive sensory information from Helsinki, but the same would be true if
>> the Helsinki man had just gotten on a jet for Moscow.
> > True but irrelevant. Jet does not duplicate bodies (straw man).

But normal human metabolism does duplicate bodies. One year after the
Helsinki man got on that jet for Moscow all his Helsinki atoms will have
been replaced by new Moscow atoms. So how is that so different from using a
Star Trek transported to go from Helsinki to Moscow? The only difference is
that the replacement happened faster in one case than the other, a
difference in degree not of kind.

> The surprise that you seem to agree with is the 1-indeterminacy.

Does that really surprise you? Do a lot of your friends know exactly what
they will see and do tomorrow?

> The 1-I is well defined by the owner of the diary of memory.

My symmetrical room thought experiment is, well, symmetrical, so the diary
is duplicated too and all past and future entries in it will be identical
also until random quantum fluctuations make things unsymmetrical.

> Yet, this formal stuff is not needed to understand the indeterminacy
> issue. You just seem to avoid this issue, by avoiding the moment they open
> the door

I haven't avoided your questions you just don't like my answers. If they
see the same thing when they open the door then things remain symmetrical
and they remain the same person, if they don't then it isn't and they
aren't. What have I avoided, where have I been unclear?

>>  the ONLY difference between the Helsinki man and the Moscow man is that
>> the Moscow man now gets his external stimuli from Moscow instead of
>> Helsinki, that's it, nothing more;
> > You forget the guy in Washington! (straw man).

What the hell does the Washington man have to do with the price of eggs?
The Washington man can believe he's Joan of Arc for all I the Moscow man or
I the Helsinki man care; what that fellow in Washington does or doesn't do
has no effect on me the Moscow man or me the Helsinki man.

> In the case without duplication, I know what I will see next.

That is incorrect theoretically as Mr. Turing and Mr. Heisenberg have
taught us, and it's even more incorrect from a practical consideration as
everyday experience has taught us. With this "first person indeterminacy"
stuff you're saying nothing new and are just reinventing the wheel.

> the precise indeterminacy I talk about is provided by the
> self-duplication fact. This is needed to be acknowledged to get the next
> step.

In other words your proof falls apart at this point and there is no next

> The question is "which city will I see when opening the door?".

And I don't know what you will see when you open that door. So what else is

> I don't see here anything showing false the 1-indeterminacy.

And I don't see anything here showing a difference between this
"1-indeterminacy" of yours and plain old garden variety indeterminacy that
we've known about for over 80 years.

>  Let me ask you a question. You are told in Helsinki that you (your body)
> will be "read-and-cut" and the information is sent (again) to W and M,
> where your body, or bodies, is (are) reconstituted as usual. But now you
> are told---in advance---that in both cities, the first thing that those
> handling the reconstitution boxes will do is to give you a cup of tea. The
> question is: "what is the probability, for the guy still in Helsinki, just
> before the experience, that he will live the experience of drinking a cup
> of tea?".

You are defining the Helsinki guy as the fellow who receives external
stimuli from Helsinki, and although you don't say it outright I'm assuming
there is no tea in Helsinki for him to drink as there is in Washington and
Moscow, otherwise your thought experiment would be rather pointless. So the
question you're asking is "what is the probability the guy who does not get
the tea gets the tea?". The answer is 0%, but you could have figured that
out for yourself. And now that the Washington man and Moscow man have
experienced something the Helsinki man has not they will have
differentiated and become different people from the Helsinki man.

John K Clark

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