On 3/13/2012 1:42 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/12/2012 9:29 PM, John Clark wrote:
> Indeed, but this makes my point. The 1-view at this stage is
unique. We might fuse them, and nothing would have happened.
I'm glad you agree, but then what are we arguing about?
> note that if the reconstitution boxes are different from
inside, in W and in M, then
Then symmetry is broken, the 2 see different things, and are no
longer identical and become different people, I've already said that
many times before.
I think you've both lost the thread of the argument. As I see it
Bruno's argument is just that the uncertainty of QM can be modeled by
hypothesizing that each possible outcome is experienced by the
potential observer, who becomes a different actual observer for each
outcome. This is consistent with John Clark's position that a
person's name is an adjective and so the hypothetical observers are
different but have equal claim to the adjective. This is all just
another explication of Everett's relative state.
Then Bruno further supposes that consciousness is just a certain kind
of computation (which John Clark agrees with - it's one that exhibits
intelligence). So if all possible computations are made they will
include the conscious experiences of an observer of a quantum event.
The uncertainity of the experienced event is accounted for by noting
that the same computation up to a given point may have different
continuations. These will realize the different conscious experiences
of the observer who was, before the observation, an undifferentiated
This paper by S. Matthew Liao is relevant to this issue. Your
comments are appreciated.
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