On 3/12/2012 9:29 PM, John Clark wrote:
> Indeed, but this makes my point. The 1-view at this stage is unique. We
them, and nothing would have happened.
I'm glad you agree, but then what are we arguing about?
> note that if the reconstitution boxes are different from inside, in W and
in M, then
Then symmetry is broken, the 2 see different things, and are no longer identical and
become different people, I've already said that many times before.
I think you've both lost the thread of the argument. As I see it Bruno's argument is just
that the uncertainty of QM can be modeled by hypothesizing that each possible outcome is
experienced by the potential observer, who becomes a different actual observer for each
outcome. This is consistent with John Clark's position that a person's name is an
adjective and so the hypothetical observers are different but have equal claim to the
adjective. This is all just another explication of Everett's relative state.
Then Bruno further supposes that consciousness is just a certain kind of computation
(which John Clark agrees with - it's one that exhibits intelligence). So if all possible
computations are made they will include the conscious experiences of an observer of a
quantum event. The uncertainity of the experienced event is accounted for by noting that
the same computation up to a given point may have different continuations. These will
realize the different conscious experiences of the observer who was, before the
observation, an undifferentiated consciousness.
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