On 3/12/2012 9:29 PM, John Clark wrote:

    > Indeed, but this makes my point. The 1-view at this stage is unique. We 
might fuse
    them, and nothing would have happened.

I'm glad you agree, but then what are we arguing about?

    > note that if the reconstitution boxes are different from inside, in W and 
in M, then

Then symmetry is broken, the 2 see different things, and are no longer identical and become different people, I've already said that many times before.

I think you've both lost the thread of the argument. As I see it Bruno's argument is just that the uncertainty of QM can be modeled by hypothesizing that each possible outcome is experienced by the potential observer, who becomes a different actual observer for each outcome. This is consistent with John Clark's position that a person's name is an adjective and so the hypothetical observers are different but have equal claim to the adjective. This is all just another explication of Everett's relative state.

Then Bruno further supposes that consciousness is just a certain kind of computation (which John Clark agrees with - it's one that exhibits intelligence). So if all possible computations are made they will include the conscious experiences of an observer of a quantum event. The uncertainity of the experienced event is accounted for by noting that the same computation up to a given point may have different continuations. These will realize the different conscious experiences of the observer who was, before the observation, an undifferentiated consciousness.


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