On Tue, Mar 13, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>>He can't feel the split in my symmetrical room thought experiment but he
>> can see it, he can see his copy as if in a mirror moving and talking just
>> as he does, and if you exchanged their positions he still couldn't tell
>> that anything had happened
> >There is no problem with that. But the issue on indeterminacy bears on
> the non symmetrical situation, once the copies have different experiences.

As I said it is not difficult to arrange things so that the copy and the
original differentiate immediately after the creation, but that non
symmetrical situation is just not very interesting, you learn nothing from
it, the interesting stuff happens in the symmetrical case. You say the
consciousness or the one view of the two view of the 3 view or whatever the
hell you call it can not be duplicated, you say it can only be associated
with one unique chunk of matter (a body) and no other chunk of matter; but
in my symmetrical room thought experiment I clearly show this is NOT true,
2 chunks of matter (bodies) have consciousness associated with them that
are absolutely identical from ANY point of view. They are so identical that
even the 2 consciousness's can't tell themselves apart, we know this
because when we exchange the two bodies neither consciousness can tell that
anything has happened, so that means there are not 2 consciousness's in
that symmetrical room but only one, assuming assigning a position to
consciousness has any meaning, it probably does not but you are not shy
about doing it in your thought experiments so I don't feel too badly doing
it also.

>>  You the original Bruno Marchal remember walking into the duplicating
>> chamber and then suddenly somebody who looks moves and speaks exactly like
>> you do suddenly appeared right in front of you. And you the copy of Bruno
>> Marchal remembers walking into the duplicating chamber and then suddenly
>> somebody who looks moves and speaks exactly like you do suddenly appeared
>> right in front of you. From any point of view from ANY perspective
>> including their own perspective there is no difference between them, even
>> the original and the copy themselves can't tell who is who, we know this
>> because if we exchange their position neither of them notice that anything
>> has happened.
> > In your symmetrical thought experiment, which is not the original one.

But it's my original thought experiment, in other ones other things would
happen, but I'm talking about this one and it's not illogical, it's not
self contradictory and it doesn't even violate the known laws of physics,
to turn my thought experiment into a actual real concrete experiment you'd
just need hyper advanced technology, new science is not required.

So you have no excuse, if your ideas are valid you should be able to deal
with it, but you can't.

>>  Whenever you, Bruno Marchal, opens a door I don't know for certain what
>> you or I will see, and that is a fact even in a world without duplicating
>> chambers.
> > Straw man. We are in a theoretical frame, assuming a 3- deterministic
> theory of the mind (comp)

Straw man my ass. You're assuming more than a deterministic theory of the
mind, you're throwing external stimuli into the mix, information that comes
from the real non-deterministic world. And even if you assume that
classical physics is the final true reality (obviously it is not) I still
wouldn't have nearly enough information to predict what I will see when I
open a door and look out at Washington or Moscow. So yes I don't know what
I will see when I open that door, welcome to the real world.

And there is a even more fundamental problem, you keep asking me "what is
the probability that X will see..." but you don't seem to feel the need to
clearly explain just who "X" is in your elaborate storylines. But no matter
how elaborate your scenario if you discount real world indeterminacy this
"first person determinacy" invention of yours always yields probabilities
of 0% or 100% ; in other words it's perfectly deterministic.

> Of course, in reality "sh.t happens", but we are reasoning in a theory.

Shit doesn't just happen in practice, it happens in theory too. Why did
that uranium atom decay now rather than then? Because shit happens. Even
pure mathematics is not free of shit, will that Turing Machine I'm looking
at ever stop? I don't know, I'll just have to watch it and see what shit
happens. I'll never know the value of Chaitin's Omega number but it does
have a unique definite value, but why does it have that value, whatever it
is, rather than another value? Because shit happens.

>> Yep, you never know what you will see when you open a door.
> > You trivialize the point.

I'm trivializing the point because its trivial, you're taking a commonplace
observation and acting as if it's a great discovery.

> You forget that Boltzman did not succeed in making his colleagues
> accepting classical statistic in classical physics

Some colleagues like Maxwell accepted it, and after just a few years all of
them did; of course by then Boltzman had killed himself, but shit happens.

> you forget that for Einstein "God does not play dice".

And it seems that Einstein was wrong about that. Considering the existence
of Black Holes Stephen Hawking said "God not only plays dice but sometimes
he throws the dice where they can't be seen".

>>Then tell me exactly what it is about this mystical thing you call "the
>> 3-view on the 1-view on the 1-view" that renders it incapable of being
>> duplicated.
> > The personal perspective. The knower itself. In the math part the "Bp &
> p" modality. In Plotinus: the soul.

But all you did was name it and I already knew various names for this
mystical thing, I asked you to explain to me exactly what it is about it
that renders it incapable of duplication. Show me a law of physics that
would be violated by such a duplication or prove that one consciousness
associated with two distant bodies and brains would be self contradictory.

> We are arguing about the fact that the self-duplication entails we are
> indeterminate about a feeling we will personally live in one short instant.

We are ALWAYS indeterminate about how we will feel just one short instant
from now and that has nothing to do with self-duplication and would even be
true if Quantum Mechanics was false and classical physics the law of the

>>>   if today I can predict that tomorrow I will be uncertain of the
>>> outcome of an experience I will do,
> >>  In other words, if tomorrow happens.
> > It looks like you are trying to not understand. PUP is just not "if
> tomorrow happens".

"If tomorrow happens" is all your above quotation means because we are
ALWAYS uncertain, or at least we should be, and my rewording is shorter and
shorter is better.

> Persons are not adjective, or are not *just* adjective. They have feeling
> and first person perspective.

Now that is a assumption. You have feeling and first person perspective,
but as for other people, who knows.

>>  But normal human metabolism does duplicate bodies. One year after the
>> Helsinki man got on that jet for Moscow all his Helsinki atoms will have
>> been replaced by new Moscow atoms. So how is that so different from using a
>> Star Trek transported to go from Helsinki to Moscow? The only difference is
>> that the replacement happened faster in one case than the other, a
>> difference in degree not of kind.
> > You are just reminding that you believe in comp.

No, that has nothing to do with comp and it is not a theory it is a fact,
the atoms in your body DO get recycled in and out, it's been proven in the
lab with radioactive tracer atoms. So one year (6 months would probably do
but I'm being conservative) after the Helsinki man got on a jet to Moscow
it's equivalent to him teleporting from Helsinki to Moscow.

> before opening the door, they don't know what they will see.

So what else is new.

> they know in advance that it must be either M or W, but can't predict
> which one.

If you drugged me in Helsinki and then put me on a jet to Moscow or
Washington and put me in a box when I got there I wouldn't know what I
would see when I opened the door of that box. So what have we learned from
this little exercise? Damned if I know.

> You have avoided the question "where will I feel to be when I will open
> the door?".

I will feel like I am in the city you decided to fly me to, and I don't
know if it's Washington or Moscow because I was sleeping in a drugged
stupor during the flight.

> Turing "indeterminacy" is a long term indeterminacy.

Not necessarily, the deterministic Turing Machine I'm watching might stop
one nanosecond from now and that's not very long term, or it might stop a
hour from now, or a year, or a billion years, or it might never stop; there
is no way to know, all I can do is watch it and see and I might be watching

> So we can go to step 4?

Not if it's foundation is built on something more than "shit happens"
because so far that's all you've shown and I already knew that.

> If you think there is no indeterminacy, just give the algorithm to
> determine in Helsinki if he will live the experience of seeing W or M.

This illustrates the absurdity of your questions, you know the guy has been
duplicated but still want to know what a singular "he" will do, and you
know that there are now two of them but still insist it's a question of
"or" not "and". Then you expect to use the laws of statistics on such a
incoherent glob of misconceptions to produce probabilities that have
meaning. It just ain't gonna happen.

> Apparently you continue to oscillate between false, nonsensical, true,
> obvious,

Yeah that sounds about right. Sometimes you take a true but commonplace
observation and dress it up in convoluted language to make it sound deeper
than it really is. Sometimes what you say is false but that's pretty rare,
most of the time what you say is not even false. But to be fair sometimes
what you say is both true and interesting, as when you corrected me on the
difference between incompressible numbers and incomputable numbers and I
again thank you for that.

> I define the guy in Helsinki by whoever he believes he is, in Helsinki. I
> don't need to "define" who he is,

Yes you do! You are asking me for probabilities but before I can do that I
need to know what you're talking about, I need to know whose probability
you want. That's the problem with all your thought experiments, you set up
these elaborate one act plays and then ask what "I" will experience after
numerous duplications and complications as if we can throw around that
pronoun with the same ease we do in normal conversations that do not
involve exotic duplicating chambers. You've got to be far more careful in
philosophical conversations involving the nature of identity, but if your
question is well stated and you are clear about who "I" is then the
probabilities always reduce to 0% or 100% in all your first person
determinacy stuff, plus regular old indeterminacy of course. For example,
you asked me what the probability is that the Helsinki guy, that's the guy
who gets no tea, will get tea, and I can say without fear of contradiction
that the probability the guy who gets no tea will get tea is zero. I know
this isn't very deep but at least it's true.

>So, if I throw a dice, the probability that I will see a six is zero,
> because the guy who threw the dice is not the same as the guy who looked on
> which face it landed up?

It has nothing to do with who threw the dice, the problem is that before
probability can be used it must be clear who "I" is, If you define "I" in a
way similar with what you did with the tea business and "I" is the guy who
did NOT get a 6 when the dice was rolled then the probability this person
named "I" will get a 6 is indeed zero. And there is not a speck of
indeterminacy in that.

John K Clark

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