On 17 March 2012 17:48, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> But why make copies of some "original" object when the program can just > generate many by paralleling running one subroutine or simultaneously > running multiple programs ala UD? But surely (still arguing from comp assumptions, that is) we must guard against mixing "logical levels" in this way when trying to conceptualise what might be going on? Sure, for comp to be true, everything that could happen to us, or that we could witness, would have to be founded, at some level, on the intersection of computation and consciousness, filtered through some complex "measure". But this wouldn't make our experience of, or ability to interact with, physical objects any the less "real", it would mean only that it couldn't ultimately be based on their independent, primitive existence. > I bring this up because it has always bothered me that the concept of > "physical laws" as often discussed in our considerations of COMP seems to > never consider Special or General Relativistic considerations. I think that > this is neglected because the discussions seem to always revolve around > considerations of a single point of view and the views of many observers are > relagated to some ambiguous "plural shared 1p" term that is never exactly > defined. I agree that this is under-defined in discussions of comp, but I'm not qualified to say whether it counts as an argument against it. Again, it seems to me that considerations of "logical levels of description" are crucial here. Certainly, if all the appropriate physical principles couldn't eventually be extracted from comp assumptions, that would be an effective disproof of the theory. But whether the extremely general level at which we tend to discuss it is the appropriate one to look for the detailed emergence of such principles, I can't say. I have a feeling - no more than this - that the single point of view is in fact a non-negotiable feature of comp - hence the "heuristic" I suggested in an attempt to resolve the dispute about identity and localisation. The single point of view seems to play the indispensable and irreducible role of symmetry-breaker of the computational "everything". Only when that symmetry is broken can any finite relation between knower and known emerge from what is otherwise mere noise. This relation may be, in a sense, the duality of which you speak. Also, the symmetry is broken not in one "place", but in infinitely many. If comp is true, it is to this infinity of mutually-exclusive perspectival instances that we must look for the antidote to solipsism, and for the ultimate reconciliation of all consistent points of view. David > On 3/17/2012 8:18 AM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 16 March 2012 21:04, Stephen P. King<stephe...@charter.net> wrote: >> >>> Would it be not wrong to think of ordinary motion of an object through >>> space as a form of repetitive "cut and paste" operation? >> >> You mean on the basis of the same assumptions as the UDA, I assume? > > > Hi David, > > No, I was not thinking of the UD. I was just trying to understand how we > can obtain a model of motions that is invariant with respect to Lorentz > transformations from the constitutionalists ideas. > > >> Well, insofar as movement through space encompasses the stepwise >> evolution of discrete computational states, I suppose that this would >> necessarily be the case. I'm not sure why you say this conclusion >> would be "not wrong", unless it was a slip of the finger. In Bruno's >> thought experiment, in effect the two copies ARE the original after it >> has been "moved through space", albeit by exotic technology. > > > But why make copies of some "original" object when the program can just > generate many by paralleling running one subroutine or simultaneously > running multiple programs ala UD? My intuition is that we need something the > many client model of MMORPGs to get anything like Lorentz invariant physical > laws. I bring this up because it has always bothered me that the concept of > "physical laws" as often discussed in our considerations of COMP seems to > never consider Special or General Relativistic considerations. I think that > this is neglected because the discussions seem to always revolve around > considerations of a single point of view and the views of many observers are > relagated to some ambiguous "plural shared 1p" term that is never exactly > defined. It is my contention that while considering only one observer is > very simplifying for our toy models and "back of the envelope" calculations > but at a price of ignoring many important and, IMHO, relevant concepts in > physics such as the problem of concurrency. > > > >> It is interesting to recall that Bruno's interest in these ideas was >> sparked by consideration of amoebas, which are naturally able to split >> themselves into two identical copies. If human beings were able to >> perform a similar trick, cell-by-cell, and then wander off in >> different directions, the divergence of personal identity from a >> common source would in fact be seen as commonplace, not the stuff of >> obscure logical thought experiments. > > > Yes, Bruno's ideas seemed to start with actual physical systems and > thoughts about how their first person views can be represented in logic. > That his reasoning lead to a sound argument against material monism is not a > surprise to me. I just disagree with the interpretation in term of ideal > monism as such ontological theories render impossible any explanations of > the physical world as something other than causally ineffective illusions. I > have been driven, kicking and screaming, to consider some form of dualism. > The failure of the dualism of Descartes has almost completely poisoned that > well, but I have found a very clever way of rehabilitating dualism that was > found by Vaughan Pratt and explained in this paper: > http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf > > > > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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