On 09 Apr 2012, at 16:35, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 08.04.2012 21:32 Bruno Marchal said the following:


This is well illustrated in this (one hour) BBC broadcast, featuring
Marcus de Sautoy (who wrote a nice book on the "music of the primes").
(thanks to the salvianaut linking to this in a salvia forum)


Despite being mathematicians, de Sautoy still believes he is flesh and
bones, and that consciousness is neuronal activity. His reasoning are
valid, but uses implicitly both mechanism and the aristotelian
conception of reality. That can't work (cf UDA).


I believe that now I understand what physicalism is. What would you recommend to read about mechanism? Something like this SEP paper about physicalism


Yes, it is a good description of physicalism. For mechanism such type of media are not aware of the UDA argument, so you have to understand it by yourself, by reading my papers, or this list. New idea or result take time to be accepted, especially when they cross different disciplinaries. I can give you many titles of books and papers---or you can find them in the references in my thesis, or papers. But mechanism is defended mostly by materialist and they use the mechanist assumption mainly to burry the mind-body problem. The subject is hot, and authoritative-argument are frequent.

On the contrary, I use computationalism only to *formulate* the mind- body problem, and the UD Argument shows that mechanism (digital mechanism, aka computationalism) is incompatible with physicalism. In fact mechanism provides the conceptual explanation of how the laws of physics have to be generated, if comp is true, but not as applying to some "reality", but as connecting in some way the many minds of numbers (aka digital "machine" in the mathematical sense of Church Turing Post).

I have just sent UDA step 0 to the FOAR list, so you can still climb on the wagon. Except that it is not easy to link to it (how can Google- group be so hard to use?). UDA step 0 is the definition of (digital) mechanism. If you google directly on UDA step 0, you will find the introduction to mechanism I did for an entheogen forum.
Gosh, the new Google group presentation is even worst.
And if I click for Google+, everything is in Dutch ... <sigh> ... I miss so much the old Escribe, where each individual posts get a link. That was simple and efficacious.

I hate to advertize my work, but then, if it is flawless, it is in advance of what you can find in the dictionaries and media. I reduce the mind-body problem to an problem of justifying the number's belief in a physical reality, without postulating it. I guess you have the link to the sane paper:

If you search motivation for mechanism and computationalism, you can find tuns of paper on that issues, in library and on the net. Mechanism is already discussed by the Chinese and the Indians since many thousand of years, and Diderot's definition of rationalism is just mechanism. It is often opposed to superstition or belief in actual divine intervention. Anderson's selected paper on "Minds and Machines" was not bad. It contains the paper by Putnam on functionalism, which is often another name for computationalism. I make a distinction, though, by making explicit that computationalism is defined by the existence of a substitution level, and I explain that the choice of the level does not change the conceptual "reversal" consequence.

Usually, neuro-philosophers assume some high, neuronal, levels, but the consequences I explain can be derived from any levels (even sub- quantum level). Yet, the choice of the level can influence the shape of the physical laws, so that we can indirectly measure our substitution level by comparing the physics "observed" with the indirect consequences of comp on the physical laws, or simply with the physics derived from comp (but this asks for progress in that direction).

Perhaps the book closer to comp, as I understand it, is the book "Mind's I" edited by Hofstadter and Dennett. They missed the reversal, but present good introductory thought experience going in the correct direction with many valid points.

As for movie, they mix everything up, for they presume that consciousness starts at the self level.

I agree. It is my main critics.

This is why I like Gray's book where he distinguish between three different conscious processes.

1) Reconstruction of the external world.

... that he seems to assume.

From what you said, I think Gray is still physicalist. But as I insist, this forces him to postulate some non comp hypothesis, which nobody has ever done, except for the theories based explicitly on fairy tales. To be fair, some people try to develop a notion of analogical machines, but they are all either Turing emulable, or Turing recoverable by using the first person indeterminacy.

2) Feelings.
3) Cognitive conscious experiences.

The third points adds nothing to the first two, hence he ignores it in his book.




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