On 25.04.2012 23:25 meekerdb said the following:
On 4/25/2012 11:45 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 24.04.2012 22:22 meekerdb said the following:
As I've posted before, when we know how look at a brain and infer what
it's thinking and we know how to build a brain that behaves as we want,
in other words when we can do consciousness engineering, the "hard
problem" will be bypassed as a metaphysical non-question, like "Where
did the elan vital go?"
This is a position expressed by Jeffrey Gray as follows (he does not
«What looks like a Hard Problem will cease to be one when we have
understood the errors in our ways of speaking about the issues
involved. If the route were successful, we would rejoin the normal
stance: once our head have been straightened out, science could again
just get on with the job of filling in the details of empirical
I think the main mistake in formulating the 'hard problem' is thinking
that we can't explain consciousness with mathematical theories like
mechanics, astrophysics, quantum mechanics. The mistake isn't that we
can explain consciousness, it's supposing that we can explain physics.
We don't explain mechanics or gravity or electrodynamics - we have
models for them that work, they are predictive and can be used to
control and design things. Bruno points out that *primitive matter*
doesn't add anything to physics. When asked what explained the
gravitational force Newton said, "Hypothesi non fingo". Someday,
consciousness will be looked at similarly.
I would agree with you in this sense. The problem what I see that we
need a framework where one can simultaneously describe a thing and its
Stephen has once mentioned Chu spaces along his thoughts about dualism.
Alternatively Bruno's Platonia may do the trick. I do not know.
P.S. You have to be careful by quoting Newton. Does his "Hypothesi non
fingo" implies his God as a cosmic operator?
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