On Apr 25, 10:25 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 4/25/2012 11:45 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 24.04.2012 22:22 meekerdb said the following:
>
> > ...
>
> >> As I've posted before, when we know how look at a brain and infer what
> >> it's thinking and we know how to build a brain that behaves as we want,
> >> in other words when we can do consciousness engineering, the "hard
> >> problem" will be bypassed as a metaphysical non-question, like "Where
> >> did the elan vital go?"
>
> >> Brent
>
> > This is a position expressed by Jeffrey Gray as follows (he does not share
> > it):
>
> > �What looks like a Hard Problem will cease to be one when we have
> > understood the errors
> > in our ways of speaking about the issues involved. If the route were
> > successful, we
> > would rejoin the normal stance: once our head have been straightened out,
> > science could
> > again just get on with the job of filling in the details of empirical
> > knowledge.�
>
> > Evgenii
>
> >http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/jeffrey-a-gray
>
> I think the main mistake in formulating the 'hard problem' is thinking that
> we can't
> explain consciousness with mathematical theories like mechanics,
> astrophysics, quantum
> mechanics. The mistake isn't that we can explain consciousness, it's
> supposing that we
> can explain physics. We don't explain mechanics or gravity or
> electrodynamics - we have
> models for them that work, they are predictive and can be used to control and
> design
> things. Bruno points out that *primitive matter* doesn't add anything to
> physics. When
> asked what explained the gravitational force Newton said, "Hypothesi non
> fingo". Someday,
> consciousness will be looked at similarly.
>
> Brent
Is that any different to regarding cosnc. as fundamental, as dualists
do?
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
