On Apr 27, 9:14 pm, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 4/27/2012 11:57 AM, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Apr 27, 7:13 pm, meekerdb<[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 4/27/2012 11:07 AM, 1Z wrote: > > >>> On Apr 27, 6:50 pm, meekerdb<[email protected]> wrote: > >>>> On 4/27/2012 10:42 AM, 1Z wrote: > >>>>> On Apr 27, 6:13 pm, meekerdb<[email protected]> wrote: > >>>>>> On 4/27/2012 7:29 AM, 1Z wrote: > >>>>>>> On Apr 25, 10:25 pm, meekerdb<[email protected]> wrote: > >>>>>>>> On 4/25/2012 11:45 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > >>>>>>>>> On 24.04.2012 22:22 meekerdb said the following: > >>>>>>>>> ... > >>>>>>>>>> As I've posted before, when we know how look at a brain and infer > >>>>>>>>>> what > >>>>>>>>>> it's thinking and we know how to build a brain that behaves as we > >>>>>>>>>> want, > >>>>>>>>>> in other words when we can do consciousness engineering, the "hard > >>>>>>>>>> problem" will be bypassed as a metaphysical non-question, like > >>>>>>>>>> "Where > >>>>>>>>>> did the elan vital go?" > >>>>>>>>>> Brent > >>>>>>>>> This is a position expressed by Jeffrey Gray as follows (he does > >>>>>>>>> not share it): > >>>>>>>>> What looks like a Hard Problem will cease to be one when we have > >>>>>>>>> understood the errors > >>>>>>>>> in our ways of speaking about the issues involved. If the route > >>>>>>>>> were successful, we > >>>>>>>>> would rejoin the normal stance: once our head have been > >>>>>>>>> straightened out, science could > >>>>>>>>> again just get on with the job of filling in the details of > >>>>>>>>> empirical knowledge. > >>>>>>>>> Evgenii > >>>>>>>>>http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/jeffrey-a-gray > >>>>>>>> I think the main mistake in formulating the 'hard problem' is > >>>>>>>> thinking that we can't > >>>>>>>> explain consciousness with mathematical theories like mechanics, > >>>>>>>> astrophysics, quantum > >>>>>>>> mechanics. The mistake isn't that we can explain consciousness, > >>>>>>>> it's supposing that we > >>>>>>>> can explain physics. We don't explain mechanics or gravity or > >>>>>>>> electrodynamics - we have > >>>>>>>> models for them that work, they are predictive and can be used to > >>>>>>>> control and design > >>>>>>>> things. Bruno points out that *primitive matter* doesn't add > >>>>>>>> anything to physics. When > >>>>>>>> asked what explained the gravitational force Newton said, "Hypothesi > >>>>>>>> non fingo". Someday, > >>>>>>>> consciousness will be looked at similarly. > >>>>>>>> Brent > >>>>>>> Is that any different to regarding cosnc. as fundamental, as dualists > >>>>>>> do? > >>>>>> I think it is. We don't regard elan vital as fundamental, we just > >>>>>> gave up looking for > >>>>>> it. We decided life is a process, not a substance. > >>>>>> Brent > >>>>> So if I decide consc. is a process not a substance, will my pains stop > >>>>> hurting and my food stop tasing and my vision stop being colourful? > >>>> Not unless that stops the process. > >>>> Brent > >>> And will ceasing to look for any kidn of cosnc. beyond the process > >>> mean i can explain > >>> why pains hurt, etc? I seem to recall that we stopped lookign for Elan > >>> Vital after we came > >>> up with better explanations, not vice versa. > >> I said that we'd stop asking the 'hard question' when we had consciousness > >> engineering. > > > There's a HQ *about* engineering. We don't know how to get started on > > engineering qualia, although > > we can get started on memory. cognition, pattern recognition. language > > etc. > > > We can engineer conscious-style behaviour, but there is still the > > doubt that an AI has real > > phenomenality: no behaviour can prove it does. > > >> Being able to manipulate and synthesize something is a 'better > >> explanation' in a different > >> sense of 'explanation'. > > Manipulate and synthesise what? How do you tell that your > > manipulations are having the desired > > effect on phenomenality? Don't you need qualiometers in a properly > > equipped Consciousness Engineering > > lab? > > That's why I said, except for people who believe in philosophical zombies. > > Brent
A quailess AI isn;t a p-zombie. A p-zombie is physically identical to a human. An AI will be made out of silicon or something, which could naturalsitically explain its lack of qualia. That is a different matter. With the possible exception of Craig, we all think our toasters are zombies. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
