On Apr 27, 7:13 pm, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 4/27/2012 11:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
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> > On Apr 27, 6:50 pm, meekerdb<[email protected]>  wrote:
> >> On 4/27/2012 10:42 AM, 1Z wrote:
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> >>> On Apr 27, 6:13 pm, meekerdb<[email protected]>    wrote:
> >>>> On 4/27/2012 7:29 AM, 1Z wrote:
> >>>>> On Apr 25, 10:25 pm, meekerdb<[email protected]>      wrote:
> >>>>>> On 4/25/2012 11:45 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> >>>>>>> On 24.04.2012 22:22 meekerdb said the following:
> >>>>>>> ...
> >>>>>>>> As I've posted before, when we know how look at a brain and infer 
> >>>>>>>> what
> >>>>>>>> it's thinking and we know how to build a brain that behaves as we 
> >>>>>>>> want,
> >>>>>>>> in other words when we can do consciousness engineering, the "hard
> >>>>>>>> problem" will be bypassed as a metaphysical non-question, like "Where
> >>>>>>>> did the elan vital go?"
> >>>>>>>> Brent
> >>>>>>> This is a position expressed by Jeffrey Gray as follows (he does not 
> >>>>>>> share it):
> >>>>>>> What looks like a Hard Problem will cease to be one when we have 
> >>>>>>> understood the errors
> >>>>>>> in our ways of speaking about the issues involved. If the route were 
> >>>>>>> successful, we
> >>>>>>> would rejoin the normal stance: once our head have been straightened 
> >>>>>>> out, science could
> >>>>>>> again just get on with the job of filling in the details of empirical 
> >>>>>>> knowledge.
> >>>>>>> Evgenii
> >>>>>>>http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/jeffrey-a-gray
> >>>>>> I think the main mistake in formulating the 'hard problem' is thinking 
> >>>>>> that we can't
> >>>>>> explain consciousness with mathematical theories like mechanics, 
> >>>>>> astrophysics, quantum
> >>>>>> mechanics.  The mistake isn't that we can explain consciousness, it's 
> >>>>>> supposing that we
> >>>>>> can explain physics.  We don't explain mechanics or gravity or 
> >>>>>> electrodynamics - we have
> >>>>>> models for them that work, they are predictive and can be used to 
> >>>>>> control and design
> >>>>>> things.  Bruno points out that *primitive matter* doesn't add anything 
> >>>>>> to physics.  When
> >>>>>> asked what explained the gravitational force Newton said, "Hypothesi 
> >>>>>> non fingo".  Someday,
> >>>>>> consciousness will be looked at similarly.
> >>>>>> Brent
> >>>>> Is that any different to regarding cosnc. as fundamental, as dualists
> >>>>> do?
> >>>> I think it is.  We don't regard elan vital as fundamental, we just gave 
> >>>> up looking for
> >>>> it.  We decided life is a process, not a substance.
> >>>> Brent
> >>> So if I decide consc. is a process not a substance, will my pains stop
> >>> hurting and my food stop tasing and my vision stop being colourful?
> >> Not unless that stops the process.
>
> >> Brent
> > And will ceasing to look for any kidn of cosnc. beyond the process
> > mean i can explain
> > why pains hurt, etc? I seem to recall that we stopped lookign for Elan
> > Vital after we came
> > up with better explanations, not  vice versa.
>
> I said that we'd stop asking the 'hard question' when we had consciousness 
> engineering.


There's a HQ *about* engineering. We don't know how to get started on
engineering  qualia, although
we can get started on memory. cognition, pattern recognition. language
etc.

We can engineer conscious-style behaviour, but there is still the
doubt that an AI has real
phenomenality: no behaviour can prove it does.

> Being able to manipulate and synthesize something is a 'better explanation' 
> in a different
> sense of 'explanation'.

Manipulate and synthesise what? How do you tell that your
manipulations are having the desired
effect on phenomenality? Don't you need qualiometers in a properly
equipped Consciousness Engineering
lab?

> We never explained where the elan vital was or where it came
> from.  We just came up with a different kind of 'explanation'.
>
> Brent

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