On Apr 27, 11:49 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > Only if there is free will. Without free will, of course compulsion is
> > the same as causation.
>
> Nope. We can define compulsion in terms of conscious choice by
> an agent. THat distiuishes it from blind determinism, even if it
> is deteministic itself.

What is 'conscious choice by an agent' other than free will?

>
> > > If someone weighs up options and makes
> > > a bad choice,
>
> > Then they are exercising free will.
>
> Not necessarily. A computer programme can weight options.

They aren't options if the program is determined to always select the
one which best matches its scripted criteria. It's not a choice.
Nothing is optional. It's mechanical. There is a computation but no
preference or conscious experience of choosing.

>
> > > they have not been compelled and so are responsible
> > > even if the process of choice was metaphysically deterministic.
>
> > Black is white, even though it is black?
>
> Nope. If you are not compelled. you are legally free, irrespective
> of metaphyscial determinism and indeterminism.

It sounds like you are saying that if you have no free will, you are
still free (to exercise your will)?

>
> > > Under determinism, it makes sense to punish a person in order to
> > > modify
> > > their behaviour.
>
> > Under determinism, it wouldn't matter how much sense it does or
> > doesn't make.
>
> In the sense that we might be determined to behave irrationally.
> But that doesn't mean we are. if we can find sense in deterministic
> behaviour, there is no need to regard it as irrational.

What would be the point in finding sense in anything in a
deterministic universe?

>
> >Sense is only causally efficacious if we have the
> > freedom to choose what to do with our understanding. Without free
> > will, we would have no choice but to punish or not punish, just as the
> > criminal would have no choice but to commit or not commit crimes.

> Even if we had no free choice, it can still make sense.

I've just explained why it can't.

Craig

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