On Apr 26, 1:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 26 Apr 2012, at 16:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Apr 25, 11:44 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> This means only that you have a reductionist conception of machine.
> > I think that reductionism is mechanistic by definition.
> I guess you mean mechanism is reductionist by definition.
No, I am saying that reductionist thinking is mechanistic. They are
inseparable. How can you have a reductionist approach which is not
> But that is
> the old pregodelian conception of mechanism.
> Today we know more. we know that we can only scratch the surface of
> the machine's possibilities. And if we assume mechanism, we know, for
> all machine looking inward can know (bt not necessarily) that she can
> only scratch the subject.
Whatever the potential for mechanism, I think the potential for non-
mechanism will always be much greater. The idea that mechanism has any
potential at all I think already presumes a non-mechanistic valuation
of the realization of such potential. Machines don't care about their
own possibilities. All of their potentials are worthwhile only because
they interest us or other organic entities.
> > What does it mean to behave like a machine or to be robotic? Why
> > should it mean that? This doesn't prove that all machines must all
> > behave like early machines that we have manufactured thus far, but I
> > think that taken with the other clues that we have about
> > inauthenticity in digital simulation, trouble with speech synthesis
> > and emotion with AI, symbol grounding problem, etc.. I think there is
> > a clear basis to presume that in fact there is something fundamentally
> > different about assembled machines and autopoietic living organisms
> > which may in fact limit their potential.
> Then you have to find something non-Turing emulable,
It's circular reasoning, because reducing things to the level of
Planck-Turing digitization already flattens all qualia to quanta,
leaving meaningless quanta as the only possibility. Nothing other than
numbers are Turing emulable. Emulation is entirely subjective and
perspective-driven. Emulation is not an objective possibility.
> and non "first
> person indeterminacy Turing recoverable" in Nature. But you might also
> have to explain why such feature would be better to explain emotion,
> speech, etc. It really looks like explaining the difficult by adding
> more difficulties.
I don't have to explain anything. Turing has to explain me.
> What you take as evidence is what the theory already explain. The
> theory of machine (computer science) already explain why a machine
> cannot feel to be machine, and indeed cannot even know which machines
> she is.
And I have already explained that computer science theories can only
prove that computation is provable. Awareness cannot be detected
objectively by evidence, so refinements to logical processes related
to evidence take us further and further from awareness, even while
discovering ever more sophisticated patterns which remind us of our
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