On Apr 27, 4:08 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 27, 10:00 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > That's a rather shallow dismissal of compatibiism. We absolve
> > people of guilt if they are compelled by an agency,
> > but causaiton
> > is not the same as compulsion.
> Only if there is free will. Without free will, of course compulsion is
> the same as causation.
Nope. We can define compulsion in terms of conscious choice by
an agent. THat distiuishes it from blind determinism, even if it
is deteministic itself.
> > If someone weighs up options and makes
> > a bad choice,
> Then they are exercising free will.
Not necessarily. A computer programme can weight options.
> > they have not been compelled and so are responsible
> > even if the process of choice was metaphysically deterministic.
> Black is white, even though it is black?
Nope. If you are not compelled. you are legally free, irrespective
of metaphyscial determinism and indeterminism.
> > Under determinism, it makes sense to punish a person in order to
> > modify
> > their behaviour.
> Under determinism, it wouldn't matter how much sense it does or
> doesn't make.
In the sense that we might be determined to behave irrationally.
But that doesn't mean we are. if we can find sense in deterministic
behaviour, there is no need to regard it as irrational.
>Sense is only causally efficacious if we have the
> freedom to choose what to do with our understanding. Without free
> will, we would have no choice but to punish or not punish, just as the
> criminal would have no choice but to commit or not commit crimes.
Even if we had no free choice, it can still make sense.
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