On Tue, May 1, 2012 at 5:12 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
> If awareness is primordial,
I think it's fundamental.
> > there is really nothing more or less to say about it other than that it
> is primordial orientation itself.
So awareness is the feeling data has when it is being processed, and there
is not much more you can say about it.
> You don't seem to get that color doesn't exist outside of our awareness
> of it.
Of course I get it, it's not as if it's a new or profound idea
> No, you don't need a reason to act on the reason that you create.
That makes not one bit of sense. If you act on the reason you created then
it's deterministic, if you don't then it's random and "the reason that you
create" is totally irrelevant to the question of why you acted as you did.
Read what you wrote above and then spend at least 5 seconds thinking about
it and I think you will find this is one of those sentences we were talking
about that were written for no reason whatsoever, in other words gibberish.
> You are creating it for no other purpose.
Then it's deterministic caused by these nameless "other purpose" things.
> You are making up your mind.
And if you ask a computer to find the prime factors of a very large number
you may have to wait a long time to see what it decides to do while the
machine makes up its mind.
>> So your preference for X was caused by your preference for X.
> > Yes,
Then what you are saying is not very deep.
> the idea of cause is redundant. You just prefer something
If your preference had no cause then it's random.
> You can use that preference as a cause of actions
> > and the preference itself arises from entangled ensembles of causes
Then it's deterministic.
Let me now summarize the argument you've been making over the last week or
so, on Monday Wednesday and Friday you say all human actions are
deterministic, on Tuesday Thursday and Saturday you say all human actions
are random, and on Sunday you're a bit confused and say it's not caused by
X and simultaneously not not caused by X.
John K Clark
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