On 7/11/2012 4:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/11/2012 7:32 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
In your work you seem to posit that numbers have minds (thus they can
dream) and that their ideas are passive and yet can reproduce all
phenomena that would be explained as being the result of physical
acts in materialism. You argue that this reduces all phenomena to
passive hypostatization, but I argue that this is a fallacy of
misplaced concreteness as per the *fallacy of misplaced concreteness*
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reification_%28fallacy%29>, since you
have severed all ties to physical implementation. Please understand
that it seems that the only place where there is disagreement between
you and I is on the postulation of primacy. I am arguing that
neither matter (atoms) nor ideas (numbers) can be taken as primitives
as they are devoid of causal efficacy.
But you are assuming that is some fact-of-the-matter as to where
'concreteness' is placed. I think this is a mistake (a theological
mistake). The scientific attitude is to hypothesize whatever you want
as the basic ontology and to see if the resulting model is consistent
and predictive of the epistemological (subjective) facts. So you may
take tables and chair as basic objects interacting through gravity,
electromagnetic, and contact forces - this is the model of Newtonian
physics. It obviously leaves out a lot and ultimately was found to be
applicable only in a limited domain of its own ontology. You may
start with atoms of conscious thoughts (aka observer moments) and try
to recover the intersubjective world from that. And there is no proof
known that would prohibit these different bases from making
overlapping or even identical predictions. There may be no *unique*
If QM is correct then there is no *unique* basis! This is the
"basis problem" of MWI rit large!
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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