On 7/12/2012 5:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Jul 2012, at 02:39, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 7/11/2012 4:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/11/2012 7:32 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
In your work you seem to posit that numbers have minds (thus
they can dream) and that their ideas are passive and yet can
reproduce all phenomena that would be explained as being the result
of physical acts in materialism. You argue that this reduces all
phenomena to passive hypostatization, but I argue that this is a
fallacy of misplaced concreteness as per the *fallacy of misplaced
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reification_%28fallacy%29>, since you
have severed all ties to physical implementation. Please understand
that it seems that the only place where there is disagreement
between you and I is on the postulation of primacy. I am arguing
that neither matter (atoms) nor ideas (numbers) can be taken as
primitives as they are devoid of causal efficacy.
But you are assuming that is some fact-of-the-matter as to where
'concreteness' is placed. I think this is a mistake (a theological
mistake). The scientific attitude is to hypothesize whatever you
want as the basic ontology and to see if the resulting model is
consistent and predictive of the epistemological (subjective)
facts. So you may take tables and chair as basic objects
interacting through gravity, electromagnetic, and contact forces -
this is the model of Newtonian physics. It obviously leaves out a
lot and ultimately was found to be applicable only in a limited
domain of its own ontology. You may start with atoms of conscious
thoughts (aka observer moments) and try to recover the
intersubjective world from that. And there is no proof known that
would prohibit these different bases from making overlapping or even
identical predictions. There may be no *unique* basis.
If QM is correct then there is no *unique* basis! This is the
"basis problem" of MWI rit large!
It seems to me that Everett shows convincingly that the "MW" does not
depend on the basis, even if the partitioning of the mutliverse
depends locally on the base used in some measurement. Then, once brain
appears, they will defined some local relative base, but this does not
change the universal wave, which will give the same observation for
all possible observers, whatever base is used for the universal wave.
There is no unique base, but physics, globally, does not depend on the
choice of that base. A base choice is really like the choice of a map.
Locally the base are defined by what we decide to measure, but of
course "nature" has made the choice for us, and Brent mentions paper
explaining how such fact is possible, and why the position base can be
justified for measurement by entities of our type. The point is that
such a justification can be made *in* any base chosen.
Umm, you are considering a different aspect of MWI and yet I think
we agree here, as what you are pointing out is not a contradiction. The
paper that Brent mentioned is quite good and I am taking into account
there. The point that I am trying to make is that we cannot let a
particular local situation lead us into thinking that the conditions
that are true for the local conditions are true universally. I am trying
to get more into the details of how " a justification can be made *in*
any base chosen". This hints of an invariance that we can use to define
the notion of Locality in more general and not problematic way.
My contention is that the "world" as perceived by an observer is a
integral whole that contains no contradictions (that can be found in
some finite time), this is just another way of arriving at the notion of
an "Observer moment". This definition requires that we take into
consideration the notion of physical resources that are available for
computations to occur. In your scheme, resources play no role at all and
thus my definition cannot be made.
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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