On 12 Jul 2012, at 21:53, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 7/12/2012 5:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Jul 2012, at 02:39, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 7/11/2012 4:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/11/2012 7:32 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
In your work you seem to posit that numbers have minds (thus
they can dream) and that their ideas are passive and yet can
reproduce all phenomena that would be explained as being the
result of physical acts in materialism. You argue that this
reduces all phenomena to passive hypostatization, but I argue
that this is a fallacy of misplaced concreteness as per the
fallacy of misplaced concreteness, since you
have severed all ties to physical implementation. Please
understand that it seems that the only place where there is
disagreement between you and I is on the postulation of
primacy. I am arguing that neither matter (atoms) nor ideas
(numbers) can be taken as primitives as they are devoid of
causal efficacy.
But you are assuming that is some fact-of-the-matter as to where
'concreteness' is placed. I think this is a mistake (a
theological mistake). The scientific attitude is to hypothesize
whatever you want as the basic ontology and to see if the
resulting model is consistent and predictive of the
epistemological (subjective) facts. So you may take tables and
chair as basic objects interacting through gravity,
electromagnetic, and contact forces - this is the model of
Newtonian physics. It obviously leaves out a lot and ultimately
was found to be applicable only in a limited domain of its own
ontology. You may start with atoms of conscious thoughts (aka
observer moments) and try to recover the intersubjective world
from that. And there is no proof known that would prohibit these
different bases from making overlapping or even identical
predictions. There may be no *unique* basis.
Brent
--
If QM is correct then there is no *unique* basis! This is the
"basis problem" of MWI rit large!
It seems to me that Everett shows convincingly that the "MW" does
not depend on the basis, even if the partitioning of the mutliverse
depends locally on the base used in some measurement. Then, once
brain appears, they will defined some local relative base, but this
does not change the universal wave, which will give the same
observation for all possible observers, whatever base is used for
the universal wave. There is no unique base, but physics, globally,
does not depend on the choice of that base. A base choice is really
like the choice of a map. Locally the base are defined by what we
decide to measure, but of course "nature" has made the choice for
us, and Brent mentions paper explaining how such fact is possible,
and why the position base can be justified for measurement by
entities of our type. The point is that such a justification can be
made *in* any base chosen.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Hi Bruno,
Umm, you are considering a different aspect of MWI and yet I
think we agree here, as what you are pointing out is not a
contradiction. The paper that Brent mentioned is quite good and I am
taking into account there. The point that I am trying to make is
that we cannot let a particular local situation lead us into
thinking that the conditions that are true for the local conditions
are true universally. I am trying to get more into the details of
how " a justification can be made *in* any base chosen". This hints
of an invariance that we can use to define the notion of Locality in
more general and not problematic way.
My contention is that the "world" as perceived by an observer is
a integral whole that contains no contradictions (that can be found
in some finite time), this is just another way of arriving at the
notion of an "Observer moment". This definition requires that we
take into consideration the notion of physical resources that are
available for computations to occur. In your scheme, resources play
no role at all and thus my definition cannot be made.
Computation is a mathematical notion. You are confusing levels.
Nothing in comp prevents resources to have a rôle in physics. On the
contrary evidences already exists that comp implies linearity,
symmetry and resources in physics. But it explains it from the non
physical notion of computation. But even if this was not yet found,
the problem is that comp makes this obligatory. Just study the proof
and criticize it.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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