On 13 Jul 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:

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On 7/13/2012 9:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 13 Jul 2012, at 11:55, Stephen P. King wrote:How exactly does one make a connection between a given set ofresources and an arbitrary computation in your scheme?From the measure on all computations, which must exist to satisfycomp, as the UDA explains with all details, and as the translationof UDA in arithmetic (AUDA) makes precise. We still don't have themeasure, but AUDA extracts the logic of measure one (accepting somestandard definitions). And that measure one verifies whatis needed to get a linear logic à-la Abramski-Girard which makes anotion of resource quite plausible. Anyway, we have no choice. Ifthe measure does not exist, comp is false (to be short).Dear Bruno,Why do you seem to insist on a global ("on all computations")measure?

`This is a consequence of the invariance of consciousness (for delays,`

`virtual/real shifts, ...). I do not decide this.`

I think that this requirement is too strong and is the cause of manyproblems. What is wrong with a "on some computations within somebound" measure?

`UD* does noot bound the measure, and so such requirements can't be`

`applied.`

It seems to me that if you would consider the Boolean SAT problemyou would see this... I still do not understand why you are soresistant to considering the complexity issue. Was not Aaronson'spaper sufficient motivation? A possible solution is a "local"measure (as opposed to global measures), but this idea disallows forany kind of global regime or Pre-Hstablished Harmony. (Is this whyyou are so dogmatic?)

This is just an insult in disguise. Please Stephen , just do the math.

It allow also for the possibility of pathological cases, such asomega-inconsistent logical algebras, so long as the contradictionsdo not occur within some finite bound.In other words, it may be possible to achieve the goal of theultrafinitists without the absolute tyranny that they would imposeon the totality of what exists,. but at the small price of notallowing abstract entities to be completely separate ontologicallyfrom the physical systems that can possibly implement them. Pleasenotice that I am only requiring the connection to occur within the"possibility" and not any arbitrary actual physical system! Idistinguish "actual" from "possible".

`In which theory? This cannot work if "we are machine", by the`

`invariance result.`

I am not sure what you mean by "explanation" as you are using theword. Again, AFAIK abstractions cannot refer to specific physicalobjectsIt is better, when working on the mind-body problem, to not takethe notion of physical object as granted, except for assuming thatthe physical laws have to be rich enough to support brain andcomputer execution, that is, to be at least Turing universal.This is a bit hypocritical since it is an incarnated number(upto isomorphism) that is writing this email! (per your result!)

`Not at all. "I", the first person one, is not a number, and cannot be`

`associated to any number.`

How can one ignore the necessity of a (relatively) persistent mediumto communicate? You are still falling into the solipsism trap!

`You make a lot of statement without any justification, and ignoring`

`all previous patient explanations.`

Maybe you are trying to claim some kind of excuse via "semanticexternality"! But that argument is self-stultifying also... Wordscannot exist as mere free-floating entities.

`It seems you come back with primitive (assumed) matter. I have no clue`

`what that could be, and it cannot work by UDA.`

unless we consider an isomorphism of sorts between physical objectsAfter UDA, and the usual weak Occam rule, we *know* (modulo comp)that physical "objects" are collective hallucination by numbers.You must show why some particular class of numbers (orequivalent) is the class of primitive entities capable of having"hallucinations" (or "dreams").

`That is a consequence of arithmetical realism without which Church`

`thesis and the notion of digital machine cannot be defined.`

The fact that they can possibly have hallucinations or dreams mustbe accounted for!

`It is a theorem of arithmetic. All finite pieces of computations exist`

`in arithmetic, the first persons cannot not glue them, by what is`

`explained in the first six step of UDA.`

That they are "collective" is an additional matter. You are glossingover very difficult problems!

I formulate them in a way we can test precise answer.

You have more than once acknowledge that the physical reality isnot primitive (= cannot be assumed), so I am not sure to see whyyou come back with it to challenge the comp consequences.You are not understanding the definition that I have made here.It is not a "matter is primitive claim", it is a limit on the wayyou are defining computational universality.

Here you seem to ignore theoretical computer science.

You say that computations are totally independent of physical systems,

`In the same sense that the content of "17 is prime" is independent of`

`physics. You have fail to explain the dependence that you suggest.`

therefore computations have the same properties and actions if weeliminate the physical systems altogether. Is this correct?

`The "therefore" is too quick. the independence is a consequence of`

`strong Occam + step seven, or weak occam + step 8.`

My claim is that universality entails that any universalcomputation is not restricted to a particular physical system, butthere must be at least one physical system that can implement it.

`That is Putnam functionalism, and is part of comp. What I say go well`

`beyond that. To make your claim valid you have to tell me what is not`

`valid in UDA.`

I am putting computations (the abstract bit strings)

`Computations are not bit strings. You confuse a computation with a`

`description of computation.`

at the same ontological level as the physical systems. Neither istaken as primitive.

`So what is your theory? Don't tell me "existence", for that means`

`nothing at all.`

Only the neutral ground of necessary possibility is primitive.

`"necessary" and "possibility" are high level notion, and we don't even`

`have a clue to hat you apply it.`

To rephrase this in more philosophical terms: neither minds norbodies can be ontologically primitive.

Like in comp. But numbers (or combinators, ...) can be.

They co-emerge from the undifferentiated Being-in-itselfsimultaneously and equally.

`That is the kind of jargon which gives philosophy its bad reputation.`

`You can't use this to invalidate proof.`

This is just a restatement of the duality that I am advocating.I previously wrote: "[there exists a] isomorphism of sortsbetween physical objects and "best possible computationalsimulations thereof" ".

That does not make sense. Sorry.

This is the link between mind and body that Descartes was unable todefine in his substance dualism. Descartes' dualism failed becauseit could not see process; it saw minds and bodies strictly as"things" that somehow had to interact on each other and thus it wasthe substance assumption is what blew up Rene's beautiful project.

I partially disagree, but that is another debate.

and "best possible computational simulations thereof" as I amsuggesting, but you seem to not consider this idea at all.Because such an idea has been shown to be inconsistent with comp(UDA).No! It most certainly has not. You are taking liberties withdefinitions, particularly in the MGA and strobe argument, to makeclaims that are simply wrong. You cannot communicate nor even referto any kind of "action" if there is no means to by-pass the Identityof indiscernibles. It is not permissible to assume multiple orplural cases of identical entities unless there is some means thatallows for an "external" differentiation between them.

You contradict again yourself.

For example, we can have multiple electrons in physics because thereis a possible variation in their possible location relative to eachother in some "space". If there is no space (up to isomorphism)assumed to exist at the same level as numbers, how can there existmultiple versions of the same numbers?

Category confusion. Numbers are not located in any space.

How is the notion of a plurality of possible versions of the samenumber represented in your primitive arithmetic? (+, *, N) does nothave enough room unless you are appending additional structure to itand if you are going to do this then you must withdraw the claim ofprimitivity of numbers (or equivalents) because all of the structuremust be at the same level if only for the sake of access.

`Space and location emerge from arithmetical relations. You reject the`

`arithmetical realism, which makes you coherent, but non`

`computationalist.`

Your statement "just study the proof and criticize it" begs thequestion that I am asking!It does not. UDA *is* the explanation why if the brain (or thegeneralized brain) works like a digital universal machine, (even aphysical one, like a concrete computer) then the laws of physicsHAVE TO emerge from the laws of the natural numbers (addition andmultiplication) law.NO! You cannot rest all of the necessity of the physical worldon just one brain and its actions. You are completely neglecting theimportant and none negligible role of interactions between manyphysical systems.

`I have answered this many times, and you did not make any specific`

`critics.`

You might study any textbook in mathematical logic to see that acomputation is a purely arithmetical notion (accepting the Church-Turing thesis). I am currently explaining this in FOAR, so you canask a precise question for anything you would have some problemwith in that list (that you already follow). I can no more explainthis here, as I have done this more than once before.I am studying the materials that I can access. The problem isthat I have questions that the authors do not consider. Theexceptions are those authors, like Vaughan Pratt and David Deutsch,that you are discounting. Therefore I have to address you directly.

`But then do it. What i say has been explained consistent with what`

`Pratt says. Not Deutsch, who indeed, reify the physical reality, and`

`makes it primary, as he want keep physicalism intact. He just`

`contradict elementary computer science, and makes a sort of`

`revisionism of the Church Turing idea.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.