On 7/13/2012 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Jul 2012, at 21:53, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 7/12/2012 5:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Jul 2012, at 02:39, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 7/11/2012 4:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/11/2012 7:32 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
In your work you seem to posit that numbers have minds (thus
they can dream) and that their ideas are passive and yet can
reproduce all phenomena that would be explained as being the
result of physical acts in materialism. You argue that this
reduces all phenomena to passive hypostatization, but I argue
that this is a fallacy of misplaced concreteness as per the
*fallacy of misplaced concreteness*
you have severed all ties to physical implementation. Please
understand that it seems that the only place where there is
disagreement between you and I is on the postulation of primacy.
I am arguing that neither matter (atoms) nor ideas (numbers) can
be taken as primitives as they are devoid of causal efficacy.
But you are assuming that is some fact-of-the-matter as to where
'concreteness' is placed. I think this is a mistake (a theological
mistake). The scientific attitude is to hypothesize whatever you
want as the basic ontology and to see if the resulting model is
consistent and predictive of the epistemological (subjective)
facts. So you may take tables and chair as basic objects
interacting through gravity, electromagnetic, and contact forces -
this is the model of Newtonian physics. It obviously leaves out a
lot and ultimately was found to be applicable only in a limited
domain of its own ontology. You may start with atoms of conscious
thoughts (aka observer moments) and try to recover the
intersubjective world from that. And there is no proof known that
would prohibit these different bases from making overlapping or
even identical predictions. There may be no *unique* basis.
If QM is correct then there is no *unique* basis! This is the
"basis problem" of MWI rit large!
It seems to me that Everett shows convincingly that the "MW" does
not depend on the basis, even if the partitioning of the mutliverse
depends locally on the base used in some measurement. Then, once
brain appears, they will defined some local relative base, but this
does not change the universal wave, which will give the same
observation for all possible observers, whatever base is used for
the universal wave. There is no unique base, but physics, globally,
does not depend on the choice of that base. A base choice is really
like the choice of a map. Locally the base are defined by what we
decide to measure, but of course "nature" has made the choice for
us, and Brent mentions paper explaining how such fact is possible,
and why the position base can be justified for measurement by
entities of our type. The point is that such a justification can be
made *in* any base chosen.
Umm, you are considering a different aspect of MWI and yet I
think we agree here, as what you are pointing out is not a
contradiction. The paper that Brent mentioned is quite good and I am
taking into account there. The point that I am trying to make is that
we cannot let a particular local situation lead us into thinking that
the conditions that are true for the local conditions are true
universally. I am trying to get more into the details of how " a
justification can be made *in* any base chosen". This hints of an
invariance that we can use to define the notion of Locality in more
general and not problematic way.
My contention is that the "world" as perceived by an observer is
a integral whole that contains no contradictions (that can be found
in some finite time), this is just another way of arriving at the
notion of an "Observer moment". This definition requires that we take
into consideration the notion of physical resources that are
available for computations to occur. In your scheme, resources play
no role at all and thus my definition cannot be made.
Computation is a mathematical notion. You are confusing levels.
Nothing in comp prevents resources to have a rôle in physics. On the
contrary evidences already exists that comp implies linearity,
symmetry and resources in physics. But it explains it from the non
physical notion of computation. But even if this was not yet found,
the problem is that comp makes this obligatory. Just study the proof
and criticize it.
How exactly does one make a connection between a given set of
resources and an arbitrary computation in your scheme? I am not sure
what you mean by "explanation" as you are using the word. Again, AFAIK
abstractions cannot refer to specific physical objects unless we
consider an isomorphism of sorts between physical objects and "best
possible computational simulations thereof" as I am suggesting, but you
seem to not consider this idea at all. Your statement "just study the
proof and criticize it" begs the question that I am asking!
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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