On 7/13/2012 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Jul 2012, at 21:53, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 7/12/2012 5:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Jul 2012, at 02:39, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 7/11/2012 4:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/11/2012 7:32 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
In your work you seem to posit that numbers have minds (thus they can dream) and that their ideas are passive and yet can reproduce all phenomena that would be explained as being the result of physical acts in materialism. You argue that this reduces all phenomena to passive hypostatization, but I argue that this is a fallacy of misplaced concreteness as per the *fallacy of misplaced concreteness* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reification_%28fallacy%29>, since you have severed all ties to physical implementation. Please understand that it seems that the only place where there is disagreement between you and I is on the postulation of primacy. I am arguing that neither matter (atoms) nor ideas (numbers) can be taken as primitives as they are devoid of causal efficacy.

But you are assuming that is some fact-of-the-matter as to where 'concreteness' is placed. I think this is a mistake (a theological mistake). The scientific attitude is to hypothesize whatever you want as the basic ontology and to see if the resulting model is consistent and predictive of the epistemological (subjective) facts. So you may take tables and chair as basic objects interacting through gravity, electromagnetic, and contact forces - this is the model of Newtonian physics. It obviously leaves out a lot and ultimately was found to be applicable only in a limited domain of its own ontology. You may start with atoms of conscious thoughts (aka observer moments) and try to recover the intersubjective world from that. And there is no proof known that would prohibit these different bases from making overlapping or even identical predictions. There may be no *unique* basis.


If QM is correct then there is no *unique* basis! This is the "basis problem" of MWI rit large!

It seems to me that Everett shows convincingly that the "MW" does not depend on the basis, even if the partitioning of the mutliverse depends locally on the base used in some measurement. Then, once brain appears, they will defined some local relative base, but this does not change the universal wave, which will give the same observation for all possible observers, whatever base is used for the universal wave. There is no unique base, but physics, globally, does not depend on the choice of that base. A base choice is really like the choice of a map. Locally the base are defined by what we decide to measure, but of course "nature" has made the choice for us, and Brent mentions paper explaining how such fact is possible, and why the position base can be justified for measurement by entities of our type. The point is that such a justification can be made *in* any base chosen.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>

Hi Bruno,

Umm, you are considering a different aspect of MWI and yet I think we agree here, as what you are pointing out is not a contradiction. The paper that Brent mentioned is quite good and I am taking into account there. The point that I am trying to make is that we cannot let a particular local situation lead us into thinking that the conditions that are true for the local conditions are true universally. I am trying to get more into the details of how " a justification can be made *in* any base chosen". This hints of an invariance that we can use to define the notion of Locality in more general and not problematic way. My contention is that the "world" as perceived by an observer is a integral whole that contains no contradictions (that can be found in some finite time), this is just another way of arriving at the notion of an "Observer moment". This definition requires that we take into consideration the notion of physical resources that are available for computations to occur. In your scheme, resources play no role at all and thus my definition cannot be made.

Computation is a mathematical notion. You are confusing levels. Nothing in comp prevents resources to have a rĂ´le in physics. On the contrary evidences already exists that comp implies linearity, symmetry and resources in physics. But it explains it from the non physical notion of computation. But even if this was not yet found, the problem is that comp makes this obligatory. Just study the proof and criticize it.


How exactly does one make a connection between a given set of resources and an arbitrary computation in your scheme? I am not sure what you mean by "explanation" as you are using the word. Again, AFAIK abstractions cannot refer to specific physical objects unless we consider an isomorphism of sorts between physical objects and "best possible computational simulations thereof" as I am suggesting, but you seem to not consider this idea at all. Your statement "just study the proof and criticize it" begs the question that I am asking!



"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

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