On 13 Jul 2012, at 11:55, Stephen P. King wrote:

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On 7/13/2012 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 12 Jul 2012, at 21:53, Stephen P. King wrote:On 7/12/2012 5:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 12 Jul 2012, at 02:39, Stephen P. King wrote:On 7/11/2012 4:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:On 7/11/2012 7:32 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:In your work you seem to posit that numbers have minds(thus they can dream) and that their ideas are passive and yetcan reproduce all phenomena that would be explained as beingthe result of physical acts in materialism. You argue thatthis reduces all phenomena to passive hypostatization, but Iargue that this is a fallacy of misplaced concreteness as perthe fallacy of misplaced concreteness, since you have severedall ties to physical implementation. Please understand that itseems that the only place where there is disagreement betweenyou and I is on the postulation of primacy. I am arguing thatneither matter (atoms) nor ideas (numbers) can be taken asprimitives as they are devoid of causal efficacy.But you are assuming that is some fact-of-the-matter as towhere 'concreteness' is placed. I think this is a mistake (atheological mistake). The scientific attitude is tohypothesize whatever you want as the basic ontology and to seeif the resulting model is consistent and predictive of theepistemological (subjective) facts. So you may take tables andchair as basic objects interacting through gravity,electromagnetic, and contact forces - this is the model ofNewtonian physics. It obviously leaves out a lot andultimately was found to be applicable only in a limited domainof its own ontology. You may start with atoms of consciousthoughts (aka observer moments) and try to recover theintersubjective world from that. And there is no proof knownthat would prohibit these different bases from makingoverlapping or even identical predictions. There may be no*unique* basis.Brent --If QM is correct then there is no *unique* basis! This isthe "basis problem" of MWI rit large!It seems to me that Everett shows convincingly that the "MW" doesnot depend on the basis, even if the partitioning of themutliverse depends locally on the base used in some measurement.Then, once brain appears, they will defined some local relativebase, but this does not change the universal wave, which willgive the same observation for all possible observers, whateverbase is used for the universal wave. There is no unique base, butphysics, globally, does not depend on the choice of that base. Abase choice is really like the choice of a map. Locally the baseare defined by what we decide to measure, but of course "nature"has made the choice for us, and Brent mentions paper explaininghow such fact is possible, and why the position base can bejustified for measurement by entities of our type. The point isthat such a justification can be made *in* any base chosen.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/Hi Bruno,Umm, you are considering a different aspect of MWI and yet Ithink we agree here, as what you are pointing out is not acontradiction. The paper that Brent mentioned is quite good and Iam taking into account there. The point that I am trying to makeis that we cannot let a particular local situation lead us intothinking that the conditions that are true for the localconditions are true universally. I am trying to getmore into the details of how " a justification can be made *in*any base chosen". This hints of an invariance that we can use todefine the notion of Locality in more general and not problematicway.My contention is that the "world" as perceived by an observeris a integral whole that contains no contradictions (that can befound in some finite time), this is just another way of arrivingat the notion of an "Observer moment". This definition requiresthat we take into consideration the notion of physical resourcesthat are available for computations to occur. In your scheme,resources play no role at all and thus my definition cannot be made.Computation is a mathematical notion. You are confusing levels.Nothing in comp prevents resources to have a rôle in physics. Onthe contrary evidences already exists that comp implies linearity,symmetry and resources in physics. But it explains it from the nonphysical notion of computation. But even if this was not yet found,the problem is that comp makes this obligatory. Just study theproof and criticize it.BrunoHow exactly does one make a connection between a given set ofresources and an arbitrary computation in your scheme?

`From the measure on all computations, which must exist to satisfy`

`comp, as the UDA explains with all details, and as the translation of`

`UDA in arithmetic (AUDA) makes precise. We still don't have the`

`measure, but AUDA extracts the logic of measure one (accepting some`

`standard definitions). And that measure one verifies what is needed to`

`get a linear logic à-la Abramski-Girard which makes a notion of`

`resource quite plausible. Anyway, we have no choice. If the measure`

`does not exist, comp is false (to be short).`

I am not sure what you mean by "explanation" as you are using theword. Again, AFAIK abstractions cannot refer to specific physicalobjects

`It is better, when working on the mind-body problem, to not take the`

`notion of physical object as granted, except for assuming that the`

`physical laws have to be rich enough to support brain and computer`

`execution, that is, to be at least Turing universal.`

unless we consider an isomorphism of sorts between physical objects

`After UDA, and the usual weak Occam rule, we *know* (modulo comp)`

`that physical "objects" are collective hallucination by numbers.`

`You have more than once acknowledge that the physical reality is not`

`primitive (= cannot be assumed), so I am not sure to see why you come`

`back with it to challenge the comp consequences.`

and "best possible computational simulations thereof" as I amsuggesting, but you seem to not consider this idea at all.

Because such an idea has been shown to be inconsistent with comp (UDA).

Your statement "just study the proof and criticize it" begs thequestion that I am asking!

`It does not. UDA *is* the explanation why if the brain (or the`

`generalized brain) works like a digital universal machine, (even a`

`physical one, like a concrete computer) then the laws of physics HAVE`

`TO emerge from the laws of the natural numbers (addition and`

`multiplication) law.`

`You might study any textbook in mathematical logic to see that a`

`computation is a purely arithmetical notion (accepting the Church-`

`Turing thesis). I am currently explaining this in FOAR, so you can ask`

`a precise question for anything you would have some problem with in`

`that list (that you already follow). I can no more explain this here,`

`as I have done this more than once before.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.