On 7/14/2012 5:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

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On 14 Jul 2012, at 11:16, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:On 14.07.2012 11:00 Bruno Marchal said the following:On 14 Jul 2012, at 10:42, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:...If to speak about your theorem, it is unclear to me, how the first person view accesses numbers and mathematical objects.Like a digital machine, which can access numbers encoded in their memory, through logical gates, and so one. More details are given currently on the FOAR list, but the idea is simple, with comp our bodies are statistical first person constructs related to infinities of number relations, so we access to them a bit like a fish can access water. The price of this is that we have to abandon physicalism eventually.I am not sure if I understand. I would like to have an explanationfor a phenomenon, for example1) I see a cat; 2) I see a piece of paper with 2 + 2 = 4. Yet, when you start explaining, the phenomenon seems to disappear.1) I see a cat. This is explained by the fact that your currentcomputational state belongs to an infinity of computations making yousingling out some stable patterns that you recognize, by access toyour previous experience as being cat. The qualia itself is explainedby the fact that when you refer to the cat, you are really referringto yourself (with the implicit hope that it corresponds to somerelatively independent pattern), and the math shows that such aself-reference involves some true but non rationally communicablefeature. The math explained why, if this justification is correct,machines/numbers will not be entirely satisfied by it, for the firstperson is not a machine from its own first person view.

Hi Bruno,

`No, the reverse is the case. The "belongs to an infinity of`

`computations making you singling out some stable patterns" requires the`

`prior existence of the "you" to select it. The observer (you here)`

`effectively is the measure via a self-selection rule. I cannot discount`

`my own existence given the immediate fact that I am experiencing myself`

`as existing. Descartes' Cognito ergo Sum is a pointed statement of this`

`unassailable fact. We cannot put the observer on a level that is`

`emerging from the computations if the observer is the one that is`

`selecting the class of computations that are generating said observer. A`

`possible escape from this is to allow for non-well founded sets and such`

`things as non-principle ultrafilters`

`<http://mathoverflow.net/questions/15872/non-principal-ultrafilters-on>,`

`but I don't know your stand on their existence.`

`Our observation of the cat is a symmetric (within bounds)`

`relationship, otherwise we fall into solipsism. My claim is that the`

`same thing follows for mathematical entities. We cannot claim that`

`mathematical (or any other "abstract" entity!) is such that we (the`

`observers and understanders thereof) are emerging from them. This would`

`require that the "independence" is not and cannot be an unbridgeable`

`gap at all, but a analytic continuum connecting the particular instance`

`of a physical system with the knowledge and meaning of the abstraction.`

`Maths do not refer explicitly to the physical media that they are`

`represented upon by patterns, but this does not allow us to imagine them`

`as completely independent and thus severable from the physical instances.`

`Even Plato's idea of the Forms as "casting shadows on the wall of`

`the cave" tacitly assumes continuity between the Forms and what we the`

`ideas in our individual minds. If I am not mistaken the idea of conic`

`sections where used to argue the idea. Shadow or projections cannot be`

`severed from the object casting them!`

2) The same with "2+2=4 written on some paper". It is also a stablepattern in the computations going through your state. Here you mightjust refer to what you have learned in school, and you mightconsidered that the truth referred by that sentence on a paper is morestable than a cat, but the conscious perception of cat or ink on paperadmits the same explanation: some universal number reflect a patternbelonging to almost all computations going through your state. Youhave to take the first person indeterminacy into account, and keep inmind that your immediate future is determined by an infinity ofcomputations/universal number, going through your actual state. Forexample, all the Heisenberg matrices computing the state of the galaxyat some description level for some amount of steps. They all provablyexist independently of us in a tiny part of elementary arithmetic, andadmit at least as many variants as there are possible electronlocation in their energy level orbitals.

`This paragraph 2) gets dangerously close to my criticism of your`

`scheme and so it might help us come to some mutual understanding. For`

`me, the "truth of the sentence 2+2=4" (i will denote this as X) is not`

`the same thing as the "piece of paper with the symbols '2+2=4' on it" (I`

`will denote this as Y). What is the "pattern belonging to almost all`

`computations going through [one observers] state" generating in your`

`thinking? Both X and Y? For me, X and Y are duals that are related by`

`the fact that there exists at least one physical instance (experienced`

`by multiple observers in a incontrovertible way) that implements a`

`representation of "2+2=4". Similarly by the duality relation as I am`

`using it, the particular abstract statement, "2+2=4" is true because`

`there exists multiple observers that agree on its truth.`

`Truths are conditional in my accounting. They are only absolute if`

`they are incontrovertible over *all possible* observers. Truths do not`

`exist independent of observers, they are not severable from the`

`possibility of observation of instances of their physical implementation.`

I cannot be sure if this helps you as it relies to some familiaritywith the first person indeterminacy and the fact that our comp statesare distributed in an infinity of distinct, from a third person pov,computations (existing in arithmetic).Bruno

`As I see it, 1p indeterminacy is strictly an a posteriori`

`condition. One's theory must postulate the prior possibility of`

`multiplicity of locations or instances that are distinguishable and that`

`is not possible if there is not an observer (up to functional`

`equivalence!). Does this help you understand my claim?`

-- Onward! Stephen "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.