# Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

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On 14 Jul 2012, at 18:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:```
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```On 14.07.2012 11:52 Bruno Marchal said the following:
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On 14 Jul 2012, at 11:16, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

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```On 14.07.2012 11:00 Bruno Marchal said the following:
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On 14 Jul 2012, at 10:42, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
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...

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If to speak about your theorem, it is unclear to me, how the
first person view accesses numbers and mathematical objects.
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Like a digital machine, which can access numbers encoded in
their memory, through logical gates, and so one. More details are
given currently on the FOAR list, but the idea is simple, with
comp our bodies are statistical first person constructs related
to infinities of number relations, so we access to them a bit
like a fish can access water. The price of this is that we have
to abandon physicalism eventually.
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I am not sure if I understand. I would like to have an explanation
for a phenomenon, for example

1) I see a cat;

2) I see a piece of paper with 2 + 2 = 4.

Yet, when you start explaining, the phenomenon seems to disappear.
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1) I see a cat. This is explained by the fact that your current
computational state belongs to an infinity of computations making you
your previous experience as being cat. The qualia itself is explained
by the fact that when you refer to the cat, you are really referring
to yourself (with the implicit hope that it corresponds to some
relatively independent pattern), and the math shows that such a
self-reference involves some true but non rationally communicable
feature. The math explained why, if this justification is correct,
machines/numbers will not be entirely satisfied by it, for the first
person is not a machine from its own first person view.

2) The same with "2+2=4 written on some paper". It is also a stable
pattern in the computations going through your state. Here you might
just refer to what you have learned in school, and you might
considered that the truth referred by that sentence on a paper is
more stable than a cat, but the conscious perception of cat or ink on
paper admits the same explanation: some universal number reflect a
pattern belonging to almost all computations going through your
state. You have to take the first person indeterminacy into account,
and keep in mind that your immediate future is determined by an
infinity of computations/universal number, going through your actual
state. For example, all the Heisenberg matrices computing the state
of the galaxy at some description level for some amount of steps.
They all provably exist independently of us in a tiny part of
elementary arithmetic, and admit at least as many variants as there
are possible electron location in their energy level orbitals.

I cannot be sure if this helps you as it relies to some familiarity
with the first person indeterminacy and the fact that our comp states
are distributed in an infinity of distinct, from a third person pov,
computations (existing in arithmetic).

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Bruno,

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Thank you for the answer. I am definitely far away from to comprehend it,
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You can ask any question on any step. UDA1-8 does not require more than a passive understanding of elementary computer science (universal machines, computers).
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but it looks like that your motive is also close to the Game of Life. What difference do you see in this respect?
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With comp, after UDA, and supposing it is 100% valid, the choice of the universal system for the ontology is arbitrary. The laws of physics and the laws of mind are independent of it. So it is better to use one which is far from looking physical so that when we derive physics we diminish the possible confusions of level. The game of life already used a two dimensional grid, and has a notion of "physical" interaction build it, so I prefer to use the numbers. But the GOL is quite OK in principle.
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Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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