Brent (and Stephen): (while I could not 'locate' the relation "on pain of
circularity" - whether it is to explain <Ccness>, or <for an observer>?) I
identify an *'observer'* ANY*THING* accepting  - A N Y info/relation, while
*conscious(*ness) is generalized (IMO) to responding to such in ANY way.
I agree with NOT assuming "AN" observer (person?) only.
A question: I recalled Descart's sentence as "COGITO..." not "COGNITO..."
which makes a difference. I identified his proof as ANY thinking procedure,
while the "N" inclusion makes it into "percipi" - i.e. being aware of. Last
time I talked to him I did not perceive the 'n'. (Proof: how the little
scoundrels further dismembered the sentence in the old country (very strong
on classical culture) into leaving out the "G" as well: '*coito ergo sum'*.
It makes a lot of sense).
JohnM

On Sat, Jul 14, 2012 at 8:47 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  On 7/14/2012 9:48 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>     No, the reverse is the case. The "belongs to an infinity of
> computations making you singling out some stable patterns" requires the
> prior existence of the "you" to select it. The observer (you here)
> effectively is the measure via a self-selection rule. I cannot discount my
> own existence given the immediate fact that I am experiencing myself as
> existing. Descartes' Cognito ergo Sum is a pointed statement of this
> unassailable fact. We cannot put the observer on a level that is emerging
> from the computations if the observer is the one that is selecting the
> class of computations that are generating said observer.
>
>
> How does this comport with Everett's QM which has it that there is no
> unique, persistent "you" to do the selecting.  It seems a simple matter of
> logic that any theory which sets out to explain consciousness cannot assume
> an observer, on pain of circularity.
>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to