Brent (and Stephen): (while I could not 'locate' the relation "on pain of
circularity" - whether it is to explain <Ccness>, or <for an observer>?) I
identify an *'observer'* ANY*THING* accepting - A N Y info/relation, while
*conscious(*ness) is generalized (IMO) to responding to such in ANY way.
I agree with NOT assuming "AN" observer (person?) only.
A question: I recalled Descart's sentence as "COGITO..." not "COGNITO..."
which makes a difference. I identified his proof as ANY thinking procedure,
while the "N" inclusion makes it into "percipi" - i.e. being aware of. Last
time I talked to him I did not perceive the 'n'. (Proof: how the little
scoundrels further dismembered the sentence in the old country (very strong
on classical culture) into leaving out the "G" as well: '*coito ergo sum'*.
It makes a lot of sense).
On Sat, Jul 14, 2012 at 8:47 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 7/14/2012 9:48 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
> No, the reverse is the case. The "belongs to an infinity of
> computations making you singling out some stable patterns" requires the
> prior existence of the "you" to select it. The observer (you here)
> effectively is the measure via a self-selection rule. I cannot discount my
> own existence given the immediate fact that I am experiencing myself as
> existing. Descartes' Cognito ergo Sum is a pointed statement of this
> unassailable fact. We cannot put the observer on a level that is emerging
> from the computations if the observer is the one that is selecting the
> class of computations that are generating said observer.
> How does this comport with Everett's QM which has it that there is no
> unique, persistent "you" to do the selecting. It seems a simple matter of
> logic that any theory which sets out to explain consciousness cannot assume
> an observer, on pain of circularity.
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> For more options, visit this group at
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at