Brent (and Stephen): (while I could not 'locate' the relation "on pain of circularity" - whether it is to explain <Ccness>, or <for an observer>?) I identify an *'observer'* ANY*THING* accepting - A N Y info/relation, while *conscious(*ness) is generalized (IMO) to responding to such in ANY way. I agree with NOT assuming "AN" observer (person?) only. A question: I recalled Descart's sentence as "COGITO..." not "COGNITO..." which makes a difference. I identified his proof as ANY thinking procedure, while the "N" inclusion makes it into "percipi" - i.e. being aware of. Last time I talked to him I did not perceive the 'n'. (Proof: how the little scoundrels further dismembered the sentence in the old country (very strong on classical culture) into leaving out the "G" as well: '*coito ergo sum'*. It makes a lot of sense). JohnM
On Sat, Jul 14, 2012 at 8:47 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 7/14/2012 9:48 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: > > No, the reverse is the case. The "belongs to an infinity of > computations making you singling out some stable patterns" requires the > prior existence of the "you" to select it. The observer (you here) > effectively is the measure via a self-selection rule. I cannot discount my > own existence given the immediate fact that I am experiencing myself as > existing. Descartes' Cognito ergo Sum is a pointed statement of this > unassailable fact. We cannot put the observer on a level that is emerging > from the computations if the observer is the one that is selecting the > class of computations that are generating said observer. > > > How does this comport with Everett's QM which has it that there is no > unique, persistent "you" to do the selecting. It seems a simple matter of > logic that any theory which sets out to explain consciousness cannot assume > an observer, on pain of circularity. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
