On 14 Jul 2012, at 15:47, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 7/14/2012 4:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So then we can think of numbers as "quantities of relative
On 14 Jul 2012, at 06:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 7/13/2012 11:51 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/13/2012 7:31 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Does unpredictability that you have mentioned in another
message will help in this respect? If yes, how?
If you're asking whether unpredictability eliminates
responsibility, the answer is no.
OK, so does the converse hold? Predictability eliminates
responsibility? That sentence looks very wrong....
Right. Predictability is irrelevant to the social concept of
OK, so what is relevant? What action is the determinant of a
given quantity of responsibility? Knowledge? No, that can't be
because that involves predictability. So, I am at a loose. Please
Knowledge of our ignorance. Numbers intrinsic knowledge of their
own relative ignorance.
Not at all. I was thinking of the numbers encoding persons relatively
to universal numbers. Those numbers bears first person views and can
acknowledge their ignorance.
That is much better than the "ghosts of departed quantities" that
Newton had! But how does this answer my question of responsibility?
Because those numbers can hesitate and take decision acknowledging
their ignorance, and develop a notion of responsibility.
You are talking to a different question and assuming a measure
exists where one cannot be defined.
You jump from one subject to another. As I said to John Clark, the
self-indetermination used in free will has nothing to do with the
first person indeterminacy, which is related to the measure problem.
The absence of a property is the complement of the property, no?
In some context.
This is where we cannot avoid some form of set theory and it is
exactly where we get into trouble!
There is no part of Cantor paradise we can really avoid when studying
machine's psychology. Set theory, complex analysis, you name it. I
don't see the problem you are alluding too, beyond the fact that comp
is used here to formulate and make precise some problem indeed.
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