Le 18-juil.-12, à 15:28, R AM a écrit :

On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 2:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Well ...  you are the one who continue to mock free-will, despite many of us have given new precise, and compatibilist, definition of it, and you do this without making precise that you limit yourself to the non sensical notion.

Dear Bruno, compatibilist free-will is defined as "without coercion". Metaphisical (non-compatibilist) free-will is a property or ability people claim to have when making decisions (i.e. they are so absolutely free that even natural law does not coerce them). Compatibilist free-will is NOT something people have, since it is defined by the external situation to the agent (i.e. the agent is not externally constrained).

I gave a definition of compatibilist free-will which is not "without coercion". I define free-will as the ability to make willing-full choice in absence of complete information, and in the presence of the awareness of our ignorance for some near future. I can practice that free-will even alone at home, like when hesitating between coffee and tea.

I think you have also defined free-will as not knowing (even in principle) what we will finally do. But this is again not something people have, but just something that happens to us.

We don't really know who or what we are, so it might be premature to say if free-will is part of us or not.

To reiterate, compatibilist free-will is not a property of the agents involved, and thus, it is hardly "that something" people claim to have. Compatibilist free-will is just a way of telling people that they will be considered responsible even though they do not have metaphisical free-will.

I guess you mean by "metaphysical free-will" the usual spurious definition based on third person indeterminacy. It does not exist if we assume computationalism. But a slight difference introduced in that definition (replace the 3-indeterminacy by a weaker self-indeterminacy, based on Turing and not on the first person indeterminacy) makes the notion full of sense, and provable for all universal machine having enough cognitive abilities (Löbian).


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