Le 18-juil.-12, à 15:28, R AM a écrit :
On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 2:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
Well ... you are the one who continue to mock free-will, despite
many of us have given new precise, and compatibilist, definition of
it, and you do this without making precise that you limit yourself to
the non sensical notion.
Dear Bruno, compatibilist free-will is defined as "without coercion".
Metaphisical (non-compatibilist) free-will is a property or ability
people claim to have when making decisions (i.e. they are so
absolutely free that even natural law does not coerce them).
Compatibilist free-will is NOT something people have, since it is
defined by the external situation to the agent (i.e. the agent is not
externally constrained).
I gave a definition of compatibilist free-will which is not "without
coercion". I define free-will as the ability to make willing-full
choice in absence of complete information, and in the presence of the
awareness of our ignorance for some near future. I can practice that
free-will even alone at home, like when hesitating between coffee and
tea.
I think you have also defined free-will as not knowing (even in
principle) what we will finally do. But this is again not something
people have, but just something that happens to us.
We don't really know who or what we are, so it might be premature to
say if free-will is part of us or not.
To reiterate, compatibilist free-will is not a property of the agents
involved, and thus, it is hardly "that something" people claim to
have. Compatibilist free-will is just a way of telling people that
they will be considered responsible even though they do not have
metaphisical free-will.
I guess you mean by "metaphysical free-will" the usual spurious
definition based on third person indeterminacy. It does not exist if we
assume computationalism. But a slight difference introduced in that
definition (replace the 3-indeterminacy by a weaker self-indeterminacy,
based on Turing and not on the first person indeterminacy) makes the
notion full of sense, and provable for all universal machine having
enough cognitive abilities (Löbian).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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