On Sun, Jul 22, 2012 at 6:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> The fact that consciousness and free will can be justified or explained, in some way, in a deterministic framework, does not make those concepts referring to something unreal.

True. Unicorns and Harry Potter are unreal but the words refer to something, just something that does not happen to exist; but "free will" refers to nothing. Fiction is not gibberish, but free will is, it would need to become much more substantial before it could rise to the level of myth.

Again you talk about incompatibilistr free will, which I agree is or can be gibberish. You just evade the definition of free will that I gave to you, and I don't insist on the "free" prefix which I take as an emphasis only.

> It does not elevate the "incompatibilist" notion of free will above gibberish, but this we already agreed on.  It just define free will for the compatibilist, and I don't see why you believe that this is gibberish (as opposed to incompatibilist free will).

Is it really true that you don't see this? And I don't give a damn if its "compatibilist" or "incompatibilist" (whatever the hell that means),

Those are the standard terms used in the literature.

we have been debating this for months and in all that time you have not provided one clear example of something that neither did nor did not happen for a reason, and yet you ask me to believe you're puzzled why I don't accept all your verbiage about the "free will" noise.

Everything happens for a reason. Again, I have to insist that I defend a notion of compatibilist free will. The fact that someone can determine in advance what I will do does NOT entails that I am not doing it with my own (free) will, for I have no access to the reason of such act. We are again in a pure vocabulary discussion, evanding the notion. You do the same mistake than the one again the term "theology": you limit the sense of the notion to the sense given in some theory, instead of searching definition and theories which makes sense of those concept. This is called reductionist thinking, and if you apply it in the comp theory, once you get it, such reductionism entails that everything is gibberish, except 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ....

I find your lack of understanding incomprehensible, and that word has a meaning. 

Nobody understood your "point" making you stop in UDA-step-3, and why you don't tackle step 4. But everybody can understand the notion of compatibilist free will, as I define it. Such conception is not mine, and similar versions exist in the literature.

> you are too quick to sum up the definition of free will by "we don't know what we don't know", for, as you admit yourself, the absence of knowledge, in this setting, is a consequence of Turing-like form of indeterminacy, which is not tautological, and that was my point that I share with Popper and Good.

Obviously we don't know what the result of a calculation will be until we finish the calculation,

Certainly not "for all" computations, of course.

and thanks to Turing we've known for 75 years that in general there is no way to know if the calculation will ever even be finished, so for both reasons we have a feeling of uncertainty about what we will do next, a feeling that the unpredictable external environment only emphasizes. So regarding the "free will" noise, can you think of one thing that Popper or Good or any other philosopher has added to this that was worth more than a bucket of warm spit?

From this and Good's definition, we (Me, Pooper) can show that free will and thus consciousness has an important role: the role of speeding up the computation in the environment. In some paper Good will even (re)define free will by that machine's speeding up ability. This can be used to explain the role of consciousness in the Darwinian context. This is recovered through the use of the modal logics of machine's self-reference and their modal variants.



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