Le 24-juil.-12, à 18:10, John Clark a écrit :

On Tue, Jul 24, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

 > You just evade the definition of free will that I gave to you,

You're going to need to be a lot more specific than that. I'd need to use scientific notation to count the number of definitions of the "free will" noise I've heard over the last few months, but every single one of them turns out to be just translations and paraphrasing of the original gibberish.

I gave one. You need only to look at it. It is a compatibilist one, and actually it is the same as the usual "gibberish" exc ept that I substitute the absolute indeterminacy with the relative one.

 > And I don't give a damn if its "compatibilist" or "incompatibilist" (whatever the hell that means),

 > Those are the standard terms used in the literature.

And the "literature" has all the intellectual depth of a child's finger painting. The word "compatibilist" means everything happens for a reason and "incompatibilist" means some things do not, and the "free will" noise makes no sense under either worldview, no sense whatsoever.

Compatibilist don't oppose reason and (free) will.

> Everything happens for a reason.

And you call me religious?! There is no law of logic that demands that must be true, and there is considerable experimental evidence that seems to indicates it probably is not; so for you to state the above without qualification is nothing but a act of religious devotion. 

Yes. Although it is debatable if 0 ≠ s(0) happens for a reason or not.

> Again, I have to insist that I defend a notion of compatibilist free will. The fact that someone can determine in advance what I will do does NOT entails that I am not doing it with my own (free) will,

You did X because you wanted to, but you're a compatibilist so you must believe that something caused you to want it and that something were different you would not want it. Fine, that might even be true (although it probably is not) but then what's the point of the "free will" noise?

You betray that you give sense only to the definition you call gibberish. I take thing like consciousness and free will as first person data that we have to explain, and relate to third person describable hypotheses, not as term introduced to explain something else.

You say you don't insist on the "free" in "free will" but I don't quite believe it, if you just said "will" we wouldn't be having this debate, but you still use it.

I don't see how you can accept will and not free-will.

As I've said many times I have absolutely no problem with the word "will" because it's perfectly clear that we want some things and don't want others, but from context I know that "free will" is supposed to mean something more than that but I'll be damned if I know what. 

I agree with you on this (we are really in a pure vocabulary discussion, as often).

All I'm saying is that our will is in the state it is in for a reason or it is not, and to claim otherwise is idiotic.

So we have the same religious devotion.

> This is called reductionist thinking

Reductionist thinking is the practical idea that we don't have to understand everything to understand something, and without it there would be no hope of knowing even approximately how the world works. If we had to know everything to know anything we would live in perpetual ignorance.

That's methodological reductionism, not ontological, nor epistemological, so you don't answer.

>> Obviously we don't know what the result of a calculation will be until we finish the calculation,

 >Certainly not "for all" computations, of course.

WHAT?! If you already know what the result of a calculation is what's the point of doing the calculation?


 > From this and Good's definition, we (Me, Pooper) can show that free will and thus consciousness

Apparently both you and Pooper think the relationship between the "free will" noise and consciousness is obvious, but for me it is about as far from obvious as you can get.

Free will necessitate consciousness or awareness (of our local ignorance).

> has an important role: the role of speeding up the computation in the environment.

If we're willing to forgo a little certainty computation in the environment can be sped up considerably by making use of things like probability and rules of thumb; in the real world we don't just use if X and Y then Z, we also use if X and Y then probably Z. And induction is at least as important as deduction maybe more so because, although nobody knows why, it is a fact that in the real world things usually continue.   

Comp explains this, or at least makes that problem into a math problem.

> In some paper Good will even (re)define free will

You mean he even redefines the "free will" noise so that it actually means something? That I'd like to see.

Search I.J. Good and free will on Google, or look at the reference of "Conscience et Mécanisme".



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