Le 19-juil.-12, à 15:56, R AM a écrit :

On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 12:33 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Le 18-juil.-12, à 15:28, R AM a écrit :


On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 2:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:


I gave a definition of compatibilist free-will which is not "without
coercion". I define free-will as the ability to make willing-full choice in absence of complete information, and in the presence of the awareness of our ignorance for some near future. I can practice that free-will even alone at
home, like when hesitating between coffee and tea.

Why not call it decision making? or will? why free-will? free from what?

Free from knowledge of the future, for example. But I don't like the "free" in free will. Free will, for some compatibilist, can mean "genuine". It is an emphasis.



I guess you mean by "metaphysical free-will" the usual spurious definition
based on third person indeterminacy.

I think metaphysical free-will implies third person indeterminacy.

That is what I thought, but I have no idea of what that could mean. God does not play dice, or I prefer to be a plumber :)


 But
free-will is perceived by people as some sort of "power" to make
absolutely free decisions.

I believe that is the case, from the first person point of view. It is an "absolute free decision", even if a God can predict it: I cannot. It is relative only from the third person perspective, but absolute from the first person pov, a bit like being unique.



It does not exist if we assume
computationalism. But a slight difference introduced in that definition (replace the 3-indeterminacy by a weaker self-indeterminacy, based on Turing and not on the first person indeterminacy) makes the notion full of sense, and provable for all universal machine having enough cognitive abilities
(Löbian).

Indeterminacy is a consequence of metaphysical free-will,

Here I agree with John Clark. I have no idea of what can be indeterminacy in any third person way, even if comp is false.


but it's not
free-will in itself. Your first-person indeterminacy implies that all
possible decisions are made. I don't think this fits well with the
idea of metaphysical free-will.

In a sense, all decisions are made, but they are not first person decision. They are first person decision only from the point of view of a subject, who is internal to the structure, and so for him, it is a genuine personal decision. It is absolute and real, it is NOT an illusion. In the Outer God's eyes it is not a decision, as all arithmetical sentences are decided in "his" eyes, but the key point is that we are not the outer God. So our decision can be free and are no more an illusion than matter, consciousness and any sort of internal realities.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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