On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 12:33 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Le 18-juil.-12, à 15:28, R AM a écrit :
>> On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 2:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> I gave a definition of compatibilist free-will which is not "without
> coercion". I define free-will as the ability to make willing-full choice in
> absence of complete information, and in the presence of the awareness of our
> ignorance for some near future. I can practice that free-will even alone at
> home, like when hesitating between coffee and tea.

Why not call it decision making? or will? why free-will? free from what?

> I guess you mean by "metaphysical free-will" the usual spurious definition
> based on third person indeterminacy.

I think metaphysical free-will implies third person indeterminacy. But
free-will is perceived by people as some sort of "power" to make
absolutely free decisions.

> It does not exist if we assume
> computationalism. But a slight difference introduced in that definition
> (replace the 3-indeterminacy by a weaker self-indeterminacy, based on Turing
> and not on the first person indeterminacy) makes the notion full of sense,
> and provable for all universal machine having enough cognitive abilities
> (Löbian).

Indeterminacy is a consequence of metaphysical free-will, but it's not
free-will in itself. Your first-person indeterminacy implies that all
possible decisions are made. I don't think this fits well with the
idea of metaphysical free-will.

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