Le 19-juil.-12, à 18:56, John Clark a écrit :
On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Complete information is NEVER available,
That is false. usually we make choice with (relative) complete
information. I want tea, and I do have tea, I know the price, etc.
but there is ALWAYS enough information to make a choice OR there is
not enough information to make a choice;
so we end up making no choice at all or we make a choice based on
nothing, in other words at random.
I don't believe we can make choice at random. Very often, when people
hesitate, I suggest to make a choice with a coin or dice. usually
people hate to do that, and if we do it, hesitate even more after the
dice has rolled.
The following is not deep but it is true: You are aware that sometimes
you are not aware of the cause of your action and you are also aware
that you don't know what the result of a calculation is until you have
finished the calculation. Is this pap the marvelous new definition of
the free will noise that you claimed you had yesterday, the one you
said that "many of us have given new precise, and compatibilist,
definition of" ?
It is close. It has been defended by Popper, I.J. Good and some others,
and it suits well mechanism.
The hesitation is needed to finish the calculation or needed to see
which number the ball on the roulette wheel will fall on; random
number generators just like computers do not work at infinite speed.
Is this sorry shit a example of the "new precise" understanding of the
free will noise that yesterday you claimed many on this list had?
It is close, but to make it more precise we would have to dwelve deeper
in the logic of self-reference.
Yes it is premature to say, but it's not just limited to the free
will noise, in general before we say we do or do not have something it
might be helpful to know what the hell we're talking about.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at