On 7/21/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 19-juil.-12, à 21:46, Stephen P. King a écrit :
Dear Bruno,
I need to slow down and just address this question of your as
it seems to be the point where we disconnect from understanding
each other.
On 7/19/2012 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
At this stage I will ask you to define "physical".
The physical is the represented as the sum of incontrovertible
facts that mutually communicating observers have in common. It is
those facts that cannot be denied without introducing
contradictions, thus such things as "hallucinations" and "mirages"
are excluded.
?
We can accept the physical facts, without accepting the idea that
physics is the fundamental science, or that primary aristotelian
matter makes sense (which is not the case in the comp theory).
Dear Bruno,
Could you explain what you mean by this in other words? What
exactly is meant by "primary aristotelian matter"? Are you thinking of
"substance" as philosophers use the term? There is a very nice article
on this idea here <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/>.
"There could be said to be two rather different ways of characterizing
the philosophical concept of/substance/. The first is the more generic.
The philosophical term ‘substance’ corresponds to the Greek/ousia/,
which means ‘being’, transmitted via the Latin/substantia/, which means
‘something that stands under or grounds things’. According to the
generic sense, therefore, the substances in a given philosophical system
are those things which, according to that system, are the foundational
or fundamental entities of reality. Thus, for an atomist, atoms are the
substances, for they are the basic things from which everything is
constructed. In David Hume's system, impressions and ideas are the
substances, for the same reason. In a slightly different way, Forms are
Plato's substances, for everything derives its existence from Forms. In
this sense of ‘substance’ any realist philosophical system acknowledges
the existence of substances. Probably the only theories which do not
would be those forms of logical positivism or pragmatism which treat
ontology as a matter of convention. According to such theories, there
are no real facts about what is ontologically basic, and so nothing is
objectively substance.
The second use of the concept is more specific. According to this,
substances are a particular kind of basic entity, and some philosophical
theories acknowledge them and others do not. On this use, Hume's
impressions and ideas are not substances, even though they are the
building blocks of—what constitutes ‘being’ for—his world. According to
this usage, it is a live issue whether the fundamental entities are
substances or something else, such as events, or properties located at
space-times. This conception of substance derives from the intuitive
notion of individual/thing/or/object/, which contrast mainly with
properties and events. The issue is how we are to understand the notion
of an object, and whether, in the light of the correct understanding, it
remains a basic notion, or one that must be characterized in more
fundamental terms. Whether, for example, an object can be thought of as
nothing more than a bundle of properties, or a series of events."
I guess that this definition might seem tautological, but it seems
to me to be the explanation that has the longest reach in its
power to explain what is meant by the word. Additionally, physical
refers to "objects of the word" that have the qualities of
persistence in type and location.
One might notice that if one only considers a single observer
then the notion of the physical that would be associated with that
singular observer becomes degenerate. Maybe this explains how it
is that you come to the conclusion of UDA step 8, that, as you
wrote in SANE 04 "...not only physics has been
/epistemologically/ reduced to machine psychology, but that
“matter” has been /ontologically/ reduced to “mind” where mind is
defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology."
The idea that "matter" is ontologically reduced to "mind" is true
but but only for the singular mind.
Again, if you prove this you just refute comp (or you make comp into
solipsim, which is about the same for me).
It is well known that computer science's abstraction of computation
applies to closed systems only. It therefore does not allow for any
notion of interaction between multiple but different computers. This
makes bisimilarity as an exact equivalence, etc. I am not even trying to
"refute comp". I am merely trying to explain that is cannot do what you
think it can. You are glossing over the need to explain interactions.
Peter Wegner <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Wegner>'s research
<http://www.cs.brown.edu/%7Epw/> is all about this problem and possible
solutions. Please read his papers for yourself. It was from reading his
papers and having long conversations with him that I came to my
conclusions long ago. The books that you have referenced offer only an
abstract mathematical description that completely ignores the problems
that I am trying to get you to see.
One must reach outside of this singularity to escape the automatic
solipsism that is induced.
No worry, given that the preliminary results justify we will find
quantum physics including a first person plural view of physical reality.
Cannot you see that this "plurality" is meaningless in the
convention that you are using? There is no such thing as multiple
computers in the Sigma_1 model as the bisimulation relation is exact
equivalence. This is even explained in the wiki article on Turing
completeness <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_complete>:
"Two computers P and Q are called Turing equivalent if P can simulate Q
and Q can simulate P. Thus, a Turing-complete system is one that can
simulate a Turing machine; and, per theChurch-Turing thesis
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church-Turing_thesis>, that any real-world
computer can be simulated by a Turing machine, it is Turing equivalent
to a Turing machine."
Logically, solipism is still a possible drawback of comp, but this has
to be shown. You do not invalidate an argument by speculating on
future drawback of a theory.
If the computer is defined as a closed system then solipsism
automatically follows. This is already in the texts. It has just been
overlooked because no one, until you, has considered "machine
psychology" in a formal way.
Andrew Soltau's work, IMHO, is an exploration of this escape.
What I have been proposing is that the illustration in your
SANE04 paper "Physical stuff" -> 1 map that you have is the dual
of a 1 -> "Physical Stuff" map as per the Stone Duality. The duals
both emerge simultaneously from a neutral primitive: "Nothingness"
as per Russell Standish's definition. The ambiguous statement of
this emergence is: Everything emerges from Nothing as Dual aspects.
This is too much vague and wordy. Some interpretations of those words
can fit very well the comp theory, and others might contradict it/ You
might elaborate on this. The term "nothing" is very ambiguous on this.
The duality you mention is already recovered in the arithmetical
points of view. You still avoid the argument per se, also.
The word "Nothing" as I am using it is faithful to the definition
that Russell Standish gives in his book. I have been elaborating on it
for several years now. You seem to just not see the Gestalt
<http://www.google.com/webhp?source=search_app#hl=en&q=meaning+of+gestalt+effect&revid=1229906123&sa=X&ei=0OwKUPKBBoHo9ATfqcHiCg&ved=0CGYQ1QIoAA&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=d0885a1bd80304c5&biw=1680&bih=937>
of it.
--
Onward!
Stephen
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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