On 7/21/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Le 19-juil.-12, à 21:46, Stephen P. King a écrit :

    Dear Bruno,

        I need to slow down and just address this question of your as
    it seems to be the point where we disconnect from understanding
    each other.

    On 7/19/2012 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

        At this stage I will ask you to define "physical".

        The physical is the represented as the sum of incontrovertible
    facts that mutually communicating observers have in common. It is
    those facts that cannot be denied without introducing
    contradictions, thus such things as "hallucinations" and "mirages"
    are excluded.

We can accept the physical facts, without accepting the idea that physics is the fundamental science, or that primary aristotelian matter makes sense (which is not the case in the comp theory).

Dear Bruno,

Could you explain what you mean by this in other words? What exactly is meant by "primary aristotelian matter"? Are you thinking of "substance" as philosophers use the term? There is a very nice article on this idea here <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/>.

"There could be said to be two rather different ways of characterizing the philosophical concept of/substance/. The first is the more generic. The philosophical term ‘substance’ corresponds to the Greek/ousia/, which means ‘being’, transmitted via the Latin/substantia/, which means ‘something that stands under or grounds things’. According to the generic sense, therefore, the substances in a given philosophical system are those things which, according to that system, are the foundational or fundamental entities of reality. Thus, for an atomist, atoms are the substances, for they are the basic things from which everything is constructed. In David Hume's system, impressions and ideas are the substances, for the same reason. In a slightly different way, Forms are Plato's substances, for everything derives its existence from Forms. In this sense of ‘substance’ any realist philosophical system acknowledges the existence of substances. Probably the only theories which do not would be those forms of logical positivism or pragmatism which treat ontology as a matter of convention. According to such theories, there are no real facts about what is ontologically basic, and so nothing is objectively substance.

The second use of the concept is more specific. According to this, substances are a particular kind of basic entity, and some philosophical theories acknowledge them and others do not. On this use, Hume's impressions and ideas are not substances, even though they are the building blocks of—what constitutes ‘being’ for—his world. According to this usage, it is a live issue whether the fundamental entities are substances or something else, such as events, or properties located at space-times. This conception of substance derives from the intuitive notion of individual/thing/or/object/, which contrast mainly with properties and events. The issue is how we are to understand the notion of an object, and whether, in the light of the correct understanding, it remains a basic notion, or one that must be characterized in more fundamental terms. Whether, for example, an object can be thought of as nothing more than a bundle of properties, or a series of events."

    I guess that this definition might seem tautological, but it seems
    to me to be the explanation that has the longest reach in its
    power to explain what is meant by the word. Additionally, physical
    refers to "objects of the word" that have the qualities of
    persistence in type and location.
        One might notice that if one only considers a single observer
    then the notion of the physical that would be associated with that
    singular observer becomes degenerate. Maybe this explains how it
    is that you come to the conclusion of UDA step 8, that, as you
    wrote in SANE 04 "...not only physics has been
    /epistemologically/ reduced to machine psychology, but that
    “matter” has been /ontologically/ reduced to “mind” where mind is
    defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology."
    The idea that "matter" is ontologically reduced to "mind" is true
    but but only for the singular mind.

Again, if you prove this you just refute comp (or you make comp into solipsim, which is about the same for me).

It is well known that computer science's abstraction of computation applies to closed systems only. It therefore does not allow for any notion of interaction between multiple but different computers. This makes bisimilarity as an exact equivalence, etc. I am not even trying to "refute comp". I am merely trying to explain that is cannot do what you think it can. You are glossing over the need to explain interactions. Peter Wegner <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Wegner>'s research <http://www.cs.brown.edu/%7Epw/> is all about this problem and possible solutions. Please read his papers for yourself. It was from reading his papers and having long conversations with him that I came to my conclusions long ago. The books that you have referenced offer only an abstract mathematical description that completely ignores the problems that I am trying to get you to see.

    One must reach outside of this singularity to escape the automatic
    solipsism that is induced.

No worry, given that the preliminary results justify we will find quantum physics including a first person plural view of physical reality.

Cannot you see that this "plurality" is meaningless in the convention that you are using? There is no such thing as multiple computers in the Sigma_1 model as the bisimulation relation is exact equivalence. This is even explained in the wiki article on Turing completeness <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_complete>: "Two computers P and Q are called Turing equivalent if P can simulate Q and Q can simulate P. Thus, a Turing-complete system is one that can simulate a Turing machine; and, per theChurch-Turing thesis <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church-Turing_thesis>, that any real-world computer can be simulated by a Turing machine, it is Turing equivalent to a Turing machine."

Logically, solipism is still a possible drawback of comp, but this has to be shown. You do not invalidate an argument by speculating on future drawback of a theory.

If the computer is defined as a closed system then solipsism automatically follows. This is already in the texts. It has just been overlooked because no one, until you, has considered "machine psychology" in a formal way.

    Andrew Soltau's work, IMHO, is an exploration of this escape.

        What I have been proposing is that the illustration in your
    SANE04 paper "Physical stuff" -> 1 map that you have is the dual
    of a 1 -> "Physical Stuff" map as per the Stone Duality. The duals
    both emerge simultaneously from a neutral primitive: "Nothingness"
    as per Russell Standish's definition. The ambiguous statement of
    this emergence is: Everything emerges from Nothing as Dual aspects.

This is too much vague and wordy. Some interpretations of those words can fit very well the comp theory, and others might contradict it/ You might elaborate on this. The term "nothing" is very ambiguous on this. The duality you mention is already recovered in the arithmetical points of view. You still avoid the argument per se, also.

The word "Nothing" as I am using it is faithful to the definition that Russell Standish gives in his book. I have been elaborating on it for several years now. You seem to just not see the Gestalt <http://www.google.com/webhp?source=search_app#hl=en&q=meaning+of+gestalt+effect&revid=1229906123&sa=X&ei=0OwKUPKBBoHo9ATfqcHiCg&ved=0CGYQ1QIoAA&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=d0885a1bd80304c5&biw=1680&bih=937> of it.



"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

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