On 7/22/2012 7:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Le 21-juil.-12, à 19:57, Stephen P. King a écrit :

    On 7/21/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

        Le 19-juil.-12, à 21:46, Stephen P. King a écrit :

            Dear Bruno,

                I need to slow down and just address this question of
            your as it seems to be the point where we disconnect from
            understanding each other.

            On 7/19/2012 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

                At this stage I will ask you to define "physical".

                The physical is the represented as the sum of
            incontrovertible facts that mutually communicating
            observers have in common. It is those facts that cannot be
            denied without introducing contradictions, thus such
            things as "hallucinations" and "mirages" are excluded.

        We can accept the physical facts, without accepting the idea
        that physics is the fundamental science, or that primary
        aristotelian matter makes sense (which is not the case in the
        comp theory).

    Dear Bruno,

        Could you explain what you mean by this in other words? What
    exactly is meant by "primary aristotelian matter"? Are you
    thinking of "substance" as philosophers use the term? There is a
    very nice article on this idea here.

    "There could be said to be two rather different ways of
    characterizing the philosophical concept of /substance/. The first
    is the more generic. The philosophical term ‘substance’
    corresponds to the Greek /ousia/, which means ‘being’, transmitted
    via the Latin /substantia/, which means ‘something that stands
    under or grounds things’. According to the generic sense,
    therefore, the substances in a given philosophical system are
    those things which, according to that system, are the foundational
    or fundamental entities of reality. Thus, for an atomist, atoms
    are the substances, for they are the basic things from which
    everything is constructed. In David Hume's system, impressions and
    ideas are the substances, for the same reason. In a slightly
    different way, Forms are Plato's substances, for everything
    derives its existence from Forms. In this sense of ‘substance’ any
    realist philosophical system acknowledges the existence of
    substances. Probably the only theories which do not would be those
    forms of logical positivism or pragmatism which treat ontology as
    a matter of convention. According to such theories, there are no
    real facts about what is ontologically basic, and so nothing is
    objectively substance.

    The second use of the concept is more specific. According to this,
    substances are a particular kind of basic entity, and some
    philosophical theories acknowledge them and others do not. On this
    use, Hume's impressions and ideas are not substances, even though
    they are the building blocks of—what constitutes ‘being’ for—his
    world. According to this usage, it is a live issue whether the
    fundamental entities are substances or something else, such as
    events, or properties located at space-times. This conception of
    substance derives from the intuitive notion of individual
    /thing/ or /object/, which contrast mainly with properties and
    events. The issue is how we are to understand the notion of an
    object, and whether, in the light of the correct understanding, it
    remains a basic notion, or one that must be characterized in more
    fundamental terms. Whether, for example, an object can be thought
    of as nothing more than a bundle of properties, or a series of

I use primitive for the basic term of the ontological theory.

Hi Bruno,

Please be patient with me. I think that we are merely misunderstanding each other for the most part. I blame my terrible writing for most of that. I found a nice article about Ontology written by a coder: http://www-ksl.stanford.edu/kst/what-is-an-ontology.html

In it "an Ontology is a systematic account of Existence". It is a theory of the nature of Existence. It is consistent with my thinking. A primitive is thus an irreducible element within some scheme.

With comp we can take a tiny formal arithmetic, defining just the laws of addition and multiplication, so what exists primitively can be just 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.

OK, you are using "primitive" in the sense of being irreducible or "atomic". It is not a reference to a metalevel per se. One problem that I have noticed in natural languages is that they do not index the metalevel in which phrasings are operating relative to each other.

Usually I restrict "substance" for physicalist primitive ontology, like atoms, particles or strings, which does not exist primitively in the comp theory, but should be derived (by the conclusion of the UDA).


                One might notice that if one only considers a single
            observer then the notion of the physical that would be
            associated with that singular observer becomes degenerate.
            Maybe this explains how it is that you come to the
            conclusion of UDA step 8, that, as you wrote in SANE 04
            "...not only physics has been /epistemologically/ reduced
            to machine psychology, but that “matter” has been
            /ontologically/ reduced to “mind” where mind is defined as
            the object study of fundamental machine psychology." The
            idea that "matter" is ontologically reduced to "mind" is
            true but but only for the singular mind.

        Again, if you prove this you just refute comp (or you make
        comp into solipsim, which is about the same for me).

        It is well known that computer science's abstraction of
    computation applies to closed systems only.

The contrary is well known. The fact that the computable functions from N to N are closed for diagonalization makes it open. In topological semantics, RE sets (mechanically definable sets) are open set, a fortiori for the universal sets.

    Allow me to quote a paper to demonstrate my claim:

"Martin Davis’s 1958 textbook (Davis, 1958) reflected this mathematical
 worldview that all computation is function-based, and therefore
captured by Turing Machines (TMs). It begins as follows:
“This book is an introduction to the theory of computability and
non-computability, usually referred to as the theory of recursive
functions... the notion of TM has been made central in the development.”
In particular, this view assumes that all computation is closed. /There is
no input or output taking place during the computation; any informa-
tion needed during the computation is provided at the outset as part of
the input./ These assumptions are embodied by the semantics of TMs."

From: http://www.cs.brown.edu/people/pw/strong-cct.pdf

Please note the portion that I highlighted. The computational act is Closed. It must be as proven by Kleene's fixed point theorem <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kleene_fixed_point_theorem>.

    It therefore does not allow for any notion of interaction between
    multiple but different computers.

This is no sense. I can program in arithmetic any form of interaction between any machine. The interaction problem in physics is the one non trivial, either in empiric physics or in the comp physics. Comp naturally is close to the interaction approach of Girard and Abramsky.

It is Peter Wegner, in papers such as the one I just quoted from, that I am using to make this claim that computers as purely abstract representations are closed systems. If you are working outside the parameters of his discussion them OK, I accept your claim, but meanwhile you seem to be saying that a representation of an action is the action without qualification. "Programing in arithmetic" is an action that you perform as a physical entity, we cannot take a representation of this and assume that all of the properties and identities peel-off with it. That is like thinking that an word retains its properties when removed from its defining context and placed in a void.

    This makes bisimilarity as an exact equivalence, etc. I am not
    even trying to "refute comp". I am merely trying to explain that
    is cannot do what you think it can.

But UDA does not give any choice in the matter, and so if you prove that comp cannot done what he has to do, you refute comp (or UDA, but then please show where is the flaw).

It does give a choice at the start, via the Yes Doctor. That is where the physical stuff is all hidden. If we remove the Yes Doctor portion of UDA then we cannot derive the 1p indeterminacy, because the ability to make copies, faithful or not, vanishes.

    You are glossing over the need to explain interactions. Peter
    Wegner's research is all about this problem and possible
    solutions. Please read his papers for yourself.

You don't understand. If there is no flaw in UDA, no amount of literature will ever change that fact. The paper you cite are written by people having not yet realize the existence of the first person indeterminacy, and who rely on some form of physical supervenience thesis which are just incompatible with comp. It is simple stuff which trouble only those who believes they can distinguish a dream from "reality".

I am trying to point out that the 1p indeterminacy requires the ability to make copies; it requires a persistent media into which plurality can be injected. Absent the media and its externality there is no indeterminacy. There is only a singular 1p if we abstract out the possibility of a space. This argument is just another form of the Penrose-Hawking singularity theorem <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose-Hawking_singularity_theorems>.

    It was from reading his papers and having long conversations with
    him that I came to my conclusions long ago. The books that you
    have referenced offer only an abstract mathematical description
    that completely ignores the problems that I am trying to get you
    to see.

            One must reach outside of this singularity to escape the
            automatic solipsism that is induced.

        No worry, given that the preliminary results justify we will
        find quantum physics including a first person plural view of
        physical reality.

        Cannot you see that this "plurality" is meaningless in the
    convention that you are using?


Many (as implied by the word plural <http://www.google.com/#hl=en&gs_nf=1&pq=domain%20range%20map&cp=10&gs_id=l&xhr=t&q=plural+definition&pf=p&sclient=psy-ab&oq=plural+def&gs_l=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=d0885a1bd80304c5&biw=1680&bih=894>) _is not just a number_. A plurality of 1p is a mapping function from some domain to some co-domain (or range), no? If there is no distinction between the domain and co-domain, what kind of map is it? Maybe it is an automorphism <http://www.google.com/#hl=en&sclient=psy-ab&q=automorphism+definition&oq=automorphism+definition&gs_l=serp.1.0.0j0i5i30.43772.43772.2.44960.,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=d0885a1bd80304c5&biw=1680&bih=894>, but it is not something that allows us to extract a plurality over which variation can occur. You are talking as if the variation <http://www.google.com/#hl=en&gs_nf=1&gs_mss=automorphism%20definition&pq=automorphism%20definition&cp=10&gs_id=1d&xhr=t&q=variation+definition&pf=p&sclient=psy-ab&oq=variation+definition&gs_l=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=d0885a1bd80304c5&biw=1680&bih=894> was present but not allowing the means for that variation to occur! The use of the word "plurality" is thus meaningless as you are using it: "first person plural view of physical reality". You must show first how it is that the plurality obtains without the use of a space if you are going to make claims that there is no space and yet plurality (of 1p) is possible. In the explanation that you give there is discussion of Moscow, Helsinki and Washington. These are locations that exists and have meaning in a wider context. At least there is assumed to be a set of possible locations and that the set is not a singleton (such as {0}) nor does it collapse into a singleton.

    There is no such thing as multiple computers in the Sigma_1 model
    as the bisimulation relation is exact equivalence.

Of course there is. Arithmetic emulates all possible interactions between all possible computers. That is well known in computer science.

Yes, but only in an a posteriori sense. It is only immediate to or after the act of experience that we have knowledge of the experience, never prior. In the same way, computations can never be something prior to their specification. Like the Golem that you mentioned in a previous post, one has to have a complete (or partial) list of the task for it to perform generated prior to the Golem's implementation of it. The mere potential of the actions are not sufficient and neither is the potential to name the actions. A string of numbers N that map to NxN are undefined and can only be assumed to have potential properties unless and until they are actual to some non-singular set of entities to whom those actions have some effect, thus the idea that numbers in and of themselves can "do things" is nonsense.

    This is even explained in the wiki article on Turing completeness:
    "Two computers P and Q are called Turing equivalent if P can
    simulate Q and Q can simulate P. Thus, a Turing-complete system is
    one that can simulate a Turing machine;

That is correct.

OK. Do you see how this relation is static and fixed as it is being used? I am trying to use the notion of bisimulation as a mutual action, the idea of "becoming similar" as opposed to "is similar". It is potential, not actual, when considered this way.

    and, per the Church-Turing thesis, that any real-world computer
    can be simulated by a Turing machine, it is Turing equivalent to a
    Turing machine."

That is typical wiki bulshit. probably due to David Deutsch revisionist "Church Turing" thesis, which is wrong in the comp theory. Comp entails the existence of physical processes which are not Turing emulable (but still UD first person recoverable).

Why are you attacking the medium and not the message? Do I need to quote from your favorite book for you to think about what I am trying to communicate? Why do you not address the " David Deutsch revisionist "Church Turing" thesis" directly? Point out how it fails. Do us all a huge favor! If you are discussing ideas that somewhere and somehow make contact with the "real world" then of relevance are they? How are they different from the imaginary thoughts of Pink Ponies?

        Logically, solipism is still a possible drawback of comp, but
        this has to be shown. You do not invalidate an argument by
        speculating on future drawback of a theory.

        If the computer is defined as a closed system then solipsism
    automatically follows.

It is not define as a close system. that is even why it is natural (but conceptually wrong) to put the infinite tape in the definition of the universal machine. But the universal numbers are open in a lot of sense. Now, even a closed computer, with a finite non extensible memory, can emulate a plurality of observers, defeating solipsim locally, if its memory is enough big.

Ah! Exactly! "...even a closed computer, with a finite non extensible memory, can emulate a plurality of observers, defeating solipsim locally, if its memory is enough big." YES! Defeating _/*solipsism locally*/_. That is exactly what I am trying to discuss with you, that is what the verbosity about "local measures" is trying to convey. The "memory" is a resource, it is the computer's version of space. It is where the plurality is necessary.

Let us recap the idea so far: A Computer, defined abstractly, is a closed system. It must be closed if it has a fixed point identity (ala Kleene theorems) , but this closure causes it to be solipsist. It cannot name anything or have knowledge of anything that is not within the span of its being. How do we solve this problem? We first have to accept the problem. Like the alcoholic that wants rehabilitation, we must accept that we are - as observers - solipsists, but there is a chance that we are not doomed to this misery. If the memory of the computer is "big enough" then there is a non-zero chance that the memory of a separate and different computer has a state of its memory that is identical. This allows for a partial bisimilarity to exist between the two computers. My idea is that if there is sufficient bisimilarity between a disjoint pair of closed computational systems and if there is a smooth transformation that allows homomorphisms <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphism> of arbitrary states within a memory, then the appearance of plurality of computational observers is possible. The Stone duality then implies that if a homomorphism between a pair of Boolean algebras exists then there is a transformation between a pair of Stone spaces that exists. If physics can be defined in terms of Stone spaces and abstract computations in terms of Boolean algebras then the mind-body problem is solved. There is no need to "reduce" the mind-body problem to a body or a mind problem (in the singular sense). There is a reduction to a Minds (plural) or Bodies (plural) problem, and this is the interaction problem that I am trying to explain. If you would only read that article on the Concurrency Problem in Wiki, this might have been an easier journey.

    This is already in the texts. It has just been overlooked because
    no one, until you, has considered "machine psychology" in a formal

            Andrew Soltau's work, IMHO, is an exploration of this escape.

                What I have been proposing is that the illustration in
            your SANE04 paper "Physical stuff" -> 1 map that you have
            is the dual of a 1 -> "Physical Stuff" map as per the
            Stone Duality. The duals both emerge simultaneously from a
            neutral primitive: "Nothingness" as per Russell Standish's
            definition. The ambiguous statement of this emergence is:
            Everything emerges from Nothing as Dual aspects.

        This is too much vague and wordy. Some interpretations of
        those words can fit very well the comp theory, and others
        might contradict it/ You might elaborate on this. The term
        "nothing" is very ambiguous on this. The duality you mention
        is already recovered in the arithmetical points of view. You
        still avoid the argument per se, also.

        The word "Nothing" as I am using it is faithful to the
    definition that Russell Standish gives in his book. I have been
    elaborating on it for several years now. You seem to just not see
    the Gestalt of it.

You are too much vague. Sorry. I have no problem with words like "everything" or "nothing" at some metalevel, to justify or motivate more precise technical definitions, but not as explanation by itself, and still less as invalidating a deductive reasoning. I have no clue on the point you make, except that it seems that you accept a primitive physics, in my sense of primitive. But then it is up to you to show where you might think the flaw can be. But instead, you never mention the reasoning and always start from the consequence like if I was assuming it. I don't.

Maybe I am just asking for you to make too many leaps of faith. I am trying to explain my self in spite of my terrible writing. I hope that you can understand that I am not against you in any way, I just see that there is a mistake that needs to be corrected. This is not to say that there are not many mistakes in my own ideas!



"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

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