Le 19-juil.-12, à 21:46, Stephen P. King a écrit :
I need to slow down and just address this question of your as it
seems to be the point where we disconnect from understanding each
On 7/19/2012 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
At this stage I will ask you to define "physical".
The physical is the represented as the sum of incontrovertible
facts that mutually communicating observers have in common. It is
those facts that cannot be denied without introducing contradictions,
thus such things as "hallucinations" and "mirages" are excluded.
We can accept the physical facts, without accepting the idea that
physics is the fundamental science, or that primary aristotelian matter
makes sense (which is not the case in the comp theory).
I guess that this definition might seem tautological, but it seems to
me to be the explanation that has the longest reach in its power to
explain what is meant by the word. Additionally, physical refers to
"objects of the word" that have the qualities of persistence in type
One might notice that if one only considers a single observer
then the notion of the physical that would be associated with that
singular observer becomes degenerate. Maybe this explains how it is
that you come to the conclusion of UDA step 8, that, as you wrote in
SANE 04 "...not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to
machine psychology, but that “matter” has been ontologically reduced
to “mind” where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental
machine psychology." The idea that "matter" is ontologically reduced
to "mind" is true but but only for the singular mind.
Again, if you prove this you just refute comp (or you make comp into
solipsim, which is about the same for me).
One must reach outside of this singularity to escape the automatic
solipsism that is induced.
No worry, given that the preliminary results justify we will find
quantum physics including a first person plural view of physical
Logically, solipism is still a possible drawback of comp, but this has
to be shown. You do not invalidate an argument by speculating on future
drawback of a theory.
Andrew Soltau's work, IMHO, is an exploration of this escape.
What I have been proposing is that the illustration in your
SANE04 paper "Physical stuff" -> 1 map that you have is the dual of a
1 -> "Physical Stuff" map as per the Stone Duality. The duals both
emerge simultaneously from a neutral primitive: "Nothingness" as per
Russell Standish's definition. The ambiguous statement of this
emergence is: Everything emerges from Nothing as Dual aspects.
This is too much vague and wordy. Some interpretations of those words
can fit very well the comp theory, and others might contradict it/ You
might elaborate on this. The term "nothing" is very ambiguous on this.
The duality you mention is already recovered in the arithmetical points
of view. You still avoid the argument per se, also.
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