Le 19-juil.-12, à 21:46, Stephen P. King a écrit :

Dear Bruno,

    I need to slow down and just address this question of your as it seems to be the point where we disconnect from understanding each other.

 On 7/19/2012 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
At this stage I will ask you to define "physical".

    The physical is the represented as the sum of incontrovertible facts that mutually communicating observers have in common. It is those facts that cannot be denied without introducing contradictions, thus such things as "hallucinations" and "mirages" are excluded.

We can accept the physical facts, without accepting the idea that physics is the fundamental science, or that primary aristotelian matter makes sense (which is not the case in the comp theory).

I guess that this definition might seem tautological, but it seems to me to be the explanation that has the longest reach in its power to explain what is meant by the word. Additionally, physical refers to "objects of the word" that have the qualities of persistence in type and location.     One might notice that if one only considers a single observer then the notion of the physical that would be associated with that singular observer becomes degenerate. Maybe this explains how it is that you come to the conclusion of UDA step 8, that, as you wrote in SANE 04 "...not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that “matter” has been ontologically reduced to “mind” where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology." The idea that "matter" is ontologically reduced to "mind" is true but but only for the singular mind.

Again, if you prove this you just refute comp (or you make comp into solipsim, which is about the same for me).

One must reach outside of this singularity to escape the automatic solipsism that is induced.

No worry, given that the preliminary results justify we will find quantum physics including a first person plural view of physical reality. Logically, solipism is still a possible drawback of comp, but this has to be shown. You do not invalidate an argument by speculating on future drawback of a theory.

Andrew Soltau's work, IMHO, is an exploration of this escape.

    What I have been proposing is that the illustration in your SANE04 paper "Physical stuff" -> 1 map that you have is the dual of a 1 -> "Physical Stuff" map as per the Stone Duality. The duals both emerge simultaneously from a neutral primitive: "Nothingness" as per Russell Standish's definition. The ambiguous statement of this emergence is: Everything emerges from Nothing as Dual aspects.

This is too much vague and wordy. Some interpretations of those words can fit very well the comp theory, and others might contradict it/ You might elaborate on this. The term "nothing" is very ambiguous on this. The duality you mention is already recovered in the arithmetical points of view. You still avoid the argument per se, also.



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