Le 22-juil.-12, à 20:41, Stephen P. King a écrit :

On 7/22/2012 7:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Le 21-juil.-12, à 19:57, Stephen P. King a écrit :

On 7/21/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Le 19-juil.-12, à 21:46, Stephen P. King a écrit :

Dear Bruno,

    I need to slow down and just address this question of your as it seems to be the point where we disconnect from understanding each other.

 On 7/19/2012 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
At this stage I will ask you to define "physical".

    The physical is the represented as the sum of incontrovertible facts that mutually communicating observers have in common. It is those facts that cannot be denied without introducing contradictions, thus such things as "hallucinations" and "mirages" are excluded.

We can accept the physical facts, without accepting the idea that physics is the fundamental science, or that primary aristotelian matter makes sense (which is not the case in the comp theory).

 Dear Bruno,

    Could you explain what you mean by this in other words? What exactly is meant by "primary aristotelian matter"? Are you thinking of "substance" as philosophers use the term? There is a very nice article on this idea here.

"There could be said to be two rather different ways of characterizing the philosophical concept of substance. The first is the more generic. The philosophical term ‘substance’ corresponds to the Greek ousia, which means ‘being’, transmitted via the Latin substantia, which means ‘something that stands under or grounds things’. According to the generic sense, therefore, the substances in a given philosophical system are those things which, according to that system, are the foundational or fundamental entities of reality. Thus, for an atomist, atoms are the substances, for they are the basic things from which everything is constructed. In David Hume's system, impressions and ideas are the substances, for the same reason. In a slightly different way, Forms are Plato's substances, for everything derives its existence from Forms. In this sense of ‘substance’ any realist philosophical system acknowledges the existence of substances. Probably the only theories which do not would be those forms of logical positivism or pragmatism which treat ontology as a matter of convention. According to such theories, there are no real facts about what is ontologically basic, and so nothing is objectively substance.

The second use of the concept is more specific. According to this, substances are a particular kind of basic entity, and some philosophical theories acknowledge them and others do not. On this use, Hume's impressions and ideas are not substances, even though they are the building blocks of—what constitutes ‘being’ for—his world. According to this usage, it is a live issue whether the fundamental entities are substances or something else, such as events, or properties located at space-times. This conception of substance derives from the intuitive notion of individual thing or object, which contrast mainly with properties and events. The issue is how we are to understand the notion of an object, and whether, in the light of the correct understanding, it remains a basic notion, or one that must be characterized in more fundamental terms. Whether, for example, an object can be thought of as nothing more than a bundle of properties, or a series of events."

 I use primitive for the basic term of the ontological theory.

 Hi Bruno,

    Please be patient with me.  I think that we are merely misunderstanding each other for the most part. I blame my terrible writing for most of that. I found a nice article about Ontology written by a coder: http://www-ksl.stanford.edu/kst/what-is-an-ontology.html

    In it "an Ontology is a systematic account of Existence". It is a theory of the nature of Existence. It is consistent with my thinking. A primitive is thus an irreducible element within some scheme.

With comp we can take a tiny formal arithmetic, defining just the laws of addition and multiplication, so what exists primitively can be just 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.

    OK, you are using "primitive" in the sense of being irreducible or "atomic". It is not a reference to a metalevel per se. One problem that I have noticed in natural languages is that they do not index the metalevel in which phrasings are operating relative to each other.

Usually I restrict "substance" for physicalist primitive ontology, like atoms, particles or strings, which does not exist primitively in the comp theory, but should be derived (by the conclusion of the UDA).


not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that “matter” has been ontologically reduced to “mind” where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology." The idea that "matter" is ontologically reduced to "mind" is true but but only for the singular mind.

Again, if you prove this you just refute comp (or you make comp into solipsim, which is about the same for me).

    It is well known that computer science's abstraction of computation applies to closed systems only.

The contrary is well known. The fact that the computable functions from N to N are closed for diagonalization makes it open. In topological semantics, RE sets (mechanically definable sets) are open set, a fortiori for the universal sets.

     Allow me to quote a paper to demonstrate my claim:

 "Martin Davis’s 1958 textbook (Davis, 1958) reflected this mathematical
  worldview that all computation is function-based, and therefore
 captured by Turing Machines (TMs). It begins as follows:
 “This book is an introduction to the theory of computability and
 non-computability, usually referred to as the theory of recursive
functions... the notion of TM has been made central in the development.” In particular, this view assumes that all computation is closed. There is
 no input or output taking place during the computation; any  informa-
tion needed during the computation is provided at the outset as part of
 the input. These assumptions are embodied by the semantics of TMs."

 From: http://www.cs.brown.edu/people/pw/strong-cct.pdf

    Please note the portion that I highlighted. The computational act is Closed.

In the sense here, that is pretty clear, and a trivial consequence of comp.

It must be as proven by Kleene's fixed point theorem.


This is no sense. I can program in arithmetic any form of interaction between any machine. The interaction problem in physics is the one non trivial, either in empiric physics or in the comp physics. Comp naturally is close to the interaction approach of Girard and Abramsky.

    It is Peter Wegner, in papers such as the one I just quoted from, that I am using to make this claim that computers as purely abstract representations are closed systems. If you are working outside the parameters of his discussion them OK, I accept your claim, but meanwhile you seem to be saying that a representation of an action is the action without qualification. "Programing in arithmetic" is an action that you perform as a physical entity, we cannot take a representation of this and assume that all of the properties and identities peel-off with it. That is like thinking that an word retains its properties when removed from its defining context and placed in a void.

If this is relevant for UDA, you should show to me. You start from an assumption of some primitive physical reality.

This makes bisimilarity as an exact equivalence, etc. I am not even trying to "refute comp". I am merely trying to explain that is cannot do what you think it can.

But UDA does not give any choice in the matter, and so if you prove that comp cannot done what he has to do, you refute comp (or UDA, but then please show where is the flaw).

    It does give a choice at the start, via the Yes Doctor. That is where the physical stuff is all hidden.

The physical? Sure. Primitive stuff? Not at all.

If we remove the Yes Doctor portion of UDA then we cannot derive the 1p indeterminacy, because the ability to make copies, faithful or not, vanishes.

Why? Nothing in computer science depends on the physical. See my paper on Planaria to see that embryogenesis, self-reproduction, etc. can be defined in any universal system, and so in arithmetic.

You are glossing over the need to explain interactions. Peter Wegner's research is all about this problem and possible solutions. Please read his papers for yourself.

You don't understand. If there is no flaw in UDA, no amount of literature will ever change that fact. The paper you cite are written by people having not yet realize the existence of the first person indeterminacy, and who rely on some form of physical supervenience thesis which are just incompatible with comp. It is simple stuff which trouble only those who believes they can distinguish a dream from "reality".

    I am trying to point out that the 1p indeterminacy requires the ability to make copies; it requires a persistent media into which plurality can be injected. Absent the media and its externality there is no indeterminacy. There is only a singular 1p if we abstract out the possibility of a space. This argument is just another form of the Penrose-Hawking singularity theorem.

You assume a primitive physical reality. We are not working in the same theory.

One must reach outside of this singularity to escape the automatic solipsism that is induced.

No worry, given that the preliminary results justify we will find quantum physics including a first person plural view of physical reality. 

    Cannot you see that this "plurality" is meaningless in the convention that you are using?


    Many (as implied by the word plural) is not just a number. A plurality of 1p is a mapping function from some domain to some co-domain (or range), no? If there is no distinction between the domain and co-domain, what kind of map is it? Maybe it is an automorphism, but it is not something that allows us to extract a plurality over which variation can occur.


You are talking as if the variation was present but not allowing the means for that variation to occur! The use of the word "plurality" is thus meaningless as you are using it: "first person plural view of physical reality".     You must show first how it is that the plurality obtains without the use of a space if you are going to make claims that there is no space and yet plurality (of 1p) is possible. In the explanation that you give there is discussion of Moscow, Helsinki and Washington. These are locations that exists and have meaning in a wider context. At least there is assumed to be a set of possible locations and that the set is not a singleton (such as {0}) nor does it collapse into a singleton.

This is not relevant, or begging the question.

Of course there is. Arithmetic emulates all possible interactions between all possible computers. That is well known in computer science.

    Yes, but only in an a posteriori sense. It is only immediate to or after the act of experience that we have knowledge of the experience, never prior. In the same way, computations can never be something prior to their specification. Like the Golem that you mentioned in a previous post, one has to have a complete (or partial) list of the task for it to perform generated prior to the Golem's implementation of it. The mere potential of the actions are not sufficient and neither is the potential to name the actions. A string of numbers N that map to NxN are undefined and can only be assumed to have potential properties unless and until they are actual to some non-singular set of entities to whom those actions have some effect, thus the idea that numbers in and of themselves can "do things" is nonsense.


This is even explained in the wiki article on Turing completeness:
"Two computers P and Q are called Turing equivalent if P can simulate Q and Q can simulate P. Thus, a Turing-complete system is one that can simulate a Turing machine;

 That is correct.

    OK. Do you see how this relation is static and fixed as it is being used? I am trying to use the notion of bisimulation as a mutual action, the idea of "becoming similar" as opposed to "is similar". It is potential, not actual, when considered this way.

and, per the Church-Turing thesis, that any real-world computer can be simulated by a Turing machine, it is Turing equivalent to a Turing machine."

That is typical wiki bulshit. probably due to David Deutsch revisionist "Church Turing" thesis, which is wrong in the comp theory. Comp entails the existence of physical processes which are not Turing emulable (but still UD first person recoverable).

    Why are you attacking the medium and not the message? Do I need to quote from your favorite book for you to think about what I am trying to communicate? Why do you not address the " David Deutsch revisionist "Church Turing" thesis" directly? Point out how it fails.

It is a direct consequence of the proof I give to you. You still fail to mention it.

Do us all a huge favor! If you are discussing ideas that somewhere and somehow make contact with the "real world" then of relevance are they? How are they different from the imaginary thoughts of Pink Ponies?

Define "real world", without mentioning the physical, as that would beg the question.

Logically, solipism is still a possible drawback of comp, but this has to be shown. You do not invalidate an argument by speculating on future drawback of a theory.

    If the computer is defined as a closed system then solipsism automatically follows.

It is not define as a close system. that is even why it is natural (but conceptually wrong) to put the infinite tape in the definition of the universal machine. But the universal numbers are open in a lot of sense. Now, even a closed computer, with a finite non extensible memory, can emulate a plurality of observers, defeating solipsim locally, if its memory is enough big.

    Ah! Exactly! "...even a closed computer, with a finite non extensible memory, can emulate a plurality of observers, defeating solipsim locally, if its memory is enough big." YES! Defeating solipsism locally. That is exactly what I am trying to discuss with you, that is what the verbosity about "local measures" is trying to convey. The "memory" is a resource, it is the computer's version of space. It is where the plurality is necessary.

In arithmetic the computer (universal number) have all the memory needed.

    Let us recap the idea so far: A Computer, defined abstractly, is a closed system.

Not really. A computer needs input and outputs, but he can be close when doing a computation, ... or sleeping.

It must be closed if it has a fixed point identity (ala Kleene theorems) ,

This dos not make sense.

 but this closure causes it to be solipsist.

Why. Only when he dreamed or is alone, which is rarely the case, even in arithmetic.

It cannot name anything or have knowledge of anything that is not within the span of its being.

True, but that being does not need to be primitively physical.

How do we solve this problem? We first have to accept the problem. Like the alcoholic that wants rehabilitation, we must accept that we are - as observers - solipsists, but there is a chance that we are not doomed to this misery. If the memory of the computer is "big enough" then there is a non-zero chance that the memory of a separate and different computer has a state of its memory that is identical. This allows for a partial bisimilarity to exist between the two computers.     My idea is that if there is sufficient bisimilarity between a disjoint pair of closed computational systems and if there is a smooth transformation that allows homomorphisms of arbitrary states within a memory, then the appearance of plurality of computational observers is possible. The Stone duality then implies that if a homomorphism between a pair of Boolean algebras exists then there is a transformation between a pair of Stone spaces that exists. If physics can be defined in terms of Stone spaces and abstract computations in terms of Boolean algebras then the mind-body problem is solved. There is no need to "reduce" the mind-body problem to a body or a mind problem (in the singular sense). There is a reduction to a Minds (plural) or Bodies (plural) problem, and this is the interaction problem that I am trying to explain. If you would only read that article on the Concurrency Problem in Wiki, this might have been an easier journey.

I read it when ypu asked before, and I didn't see any relevance for the point I make. I ask you to make it, but give only more reference and philosophical jargon.

This is already in the texts. It has just been overlooked because no one, until you, has considered "machine psychology" in a formal way.

Andrew Soltau's work, IMHO, is an exploration of this escape.

    What I have been proposing is that the illustration in your SANE04 paper "Physical stuff" -> 1 map that you have is the dual of a 1 -> "Physical Stuff" map as per the Stone Duality. The duals both emerge simultaneously from a neutral primitive: "Nothingness" as per Russell Standish's definition. The ambiguous statement of this emergence is: Everything emerges from Nothing as Dual aspects.

This is too much vague and wordy. Some interpretations of those words can fit very well the comp theory, and others might contradict it/ You might elaborate on this. The term "nothing" is very ambiguous on this. The duality you mention is already recovered in the arithmetical points of view. You still avoid the argument per se, also.

    The word "Nothing" as I am using it is faithful to the definition that Russell Standish gives in his book. I have been elaborating on it for several years now. You seem to just not see the Gestalt of it.

You are too much vague. Sorry. I have no problem with words like "everything" or "nothing" at some metalevel, to justify or motivate more precise technical definitions, but not as explanation by itself, and still less as invalidating a deductive reasoning. I have no clue on the point you make, except that it seems that you accept a primitive physics, in my sense of primitive. But then it is up to you to show where you might think the flaw can be. But instead, you never mention the reasoning and always start from the consequence like if I was assuming it. I don't.

    Maybe I am just asking for you to make too many leaps of faith. I am trying to explain my self in spite of my terrible writing. I hope that you can understand that I am not against you in any way, I just see that there is a mistake that needs to be corrected.

Take the time to find it. I see you try in the other post. But I do think that you have a problem with the mathematical notion of computation. You don't seem aware that the notion of computations and implementations are purely arithmetical notions.


This is not to say that there are not many mistakes in my own ideas!http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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