On Wed, Aug 1, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

 >>The problem is I have no conception of free will and neither do you nor
>> does anybody else, at least not a consistent coherent one that has any
>> depth.
> > This contradicts your own definition of free will that you already find
> "much better". It is hard to follow you.

That's because you aren't paying attention.  I said the values of other
definitions of free will were negative  but mine was much more valuable, it
has zero value.

>> 2) Free Will is the inability to always predict ones actions even in a
>> unchanging environment.
>My definition is basically your "2)", and this since the beginning.

And you can restate it as "you don't know what the result of a calculation
will be until you finish it" ; unlike other free will definitions it's
clear and isn't self contradictory, but it also isn't deep and it isn't
useful so its value is zero, but zero is greater than -10 or -100.

> You do the same error as with theology and notions of Gods. You want them
> to be handled only by the crackpots.

Crackpots should have a monopoly on crackpot ideas and theology and notions
of God are crackpot ideas.

>> Intelligence theories  are not nearly as easy to come up with [as
> consciousness theories] but are far far easier to test, its simple to
> separate the good from the bad.

> It is actually very simple. I define a machine as intelligent, if it is
> not  a stupid machine.

I did not ask for a definition I asked for the Fundamental Theorem of
Intelligence that explains how intelligence works and can be proven to be
correct by making a dumb thing, like a collection of microchips, smart.
Hard to come up with but simple to test, it would be the other way around
if we were dreaming up new  consciousness theories.

  John K Clark

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