On 03 Aug 2012, at 20:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/3/2012 8:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Aug 2012, at 11:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/3/2012 3:55 AM in post "Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is
Dead", Bruno Marchal wrote:
There is no recipe for intelligence. Only for domain competence.
Intelligence can "diagonalize" again all recipes.
A very good point! Intelligence is thus forever beyond a
horizon or boundary within which recursively countable is
possible. This is exactly the idea that I see implied by
"relativizing" the Tennenbaum theorem. For any kind of
"something" ( I do not know what it is named at the moment) there
is always a recursively countable name that that something has for
itself. Recall what Wittgenstein wrote about names:
"According to descriptivist theories, proper names either are
synonymous with descriptions, or have their reference determined
by virtue of the name's being associated with a description or
cluster of descriptions that an object uniquely satisfies. Kripke
rejects both these kinds of descriptivism. He gives several
examples purporting to render descriptivism implausible as a
theory of how names get their reference determined (e.g., surely
Aristotle could have died at age two and so not satisfied any of
the descriptions we associate with his name, and yet it would seem
wrong to deny that he was Aristotle). As an alternative, Kripke
adumbrated a causal theory of reference, according to which a name
refers to an object by virtue of a causal connection with the
object as mediated through communities of speakers. He points out
that proper names, in contrast to most descriptions, are rigid
designators: A proper name refers to the named object in every
possible world in which the object exists, while most descriptions
designate different objects in different possible
worlds. For example, 'Nixon' refers to the same person in every
possible world in which Nixon exists, while 'the person who won
the United States presidential election of 1968' could refer to
Nixon, Humphrey, or others in different possible worlds. Kripke
also raised the prospect of a posteriori necessities — facts that
are necessarily true, though they can be known only through
empirical investigation. Examples include "Hesperus is
Phosphorus", "Cicero is Tully", "Water is H2O" and other identity
claims where two names refer to the same object."
Most machine's possible properties are way beyond the recursively
enumerable. For example the property of being able to compute the
factorial function is itself not computable.
Yes, and this is why properties (resulting from process!) are
"special". Those that are not recursively enumerable form the orbits
(?) within which the Perfect named objects are stable.
A name is "perfect" if it is a recursively enumerable
representation of an object. This definition is required by the
postulate that "reality is that which is incontrovertible" for all
inter-communicating observers". We could define an observer as any
system capable of implementing in its dynamics a computational
simulation of itself. Most objects that exist cannot do this on
their own, a brick for example. But consider that at a deeper
level, a brick is a lattice of atoms that supports an entire level
of dynamics - the electrostatic interactions of the electrons and
protons for example - and at this level there is sufficient
structure to support an organizational equivalent of a computation
of a brick.
This takes your "substitution level" idea another step!
Here you are too fuzzy for me. Sorry. *In* the comp frame, and we
cannot take for granted notion of physical objects.
Yes, we cannot take for granted the notion of physical objects.
In the theory that I am exploring, physical objects are (only!)
those that can be represented by Stone spaces, which are in turn
Stone dual to some Boolean Algebra if we consider only a timeless
presentation. In physics these are represented as "bound systems".
Those that are evolving and have a measure of time are represented
by "Scattering states" of bound systems.
Locally it is plausible that brick "exists" and that they are a
lattice of atoms, but this can only be a local relative description
of how we conceive a brick.
Yes, and I mean my statement in the sense of your remark . It is
only in a local frame of relations that there can exist an exact
simulation of a brick such that the self-simulation criteria can be
With comp, a brick is quite different sort of objects, for which we
have no intuition at all. We can only do the math, as frustrating
as that could seem.
Yes, we have to segregate the idea of a "brink" as appearing in
a 1p (for example as a part of the environment in Moscow or
Helsinki) from a 3p (which is a consensus or commonality of
Even for competence, effective recipes are not tractable, and by
weakening the test criteria, it is possible to show the existence
of a non constructive hierarchy of more and more competent
machines. It can be proved that such hierarchy are necessarily
not constructive, so that competence really can evolve only
through long stories of trial and errors. Intelligence is
basically a non constructive notion. It is needed for the
development of competence, but competence itself has a negative
feedback on intelligence. Competent people can get easily stuck
in their domain of competence, somehow.
They can get stuck in a recursive loop where they are unable
to "see" outside of their dreams about themselves. Nice example of
solipsism, no? ;-)
That illustrates the "lived solipsism" which we are all living, but
this does not need to make us believe in doctrinal solipsism. We
all feel alone, but we don't have to believe that we are alone.
The trick is to never get stuck in a single point of view of one's
That is a good idea, but it cannot be effective. That would give a
recipe for intelligence, but you agreed there are none.
But is it really a recipe? Think about what I wrote here; it is
not possible to write a precise recursively enumerable version of
it! The state of "getting stuck" can only be defined in a relative
Yes. That is why it is not effective, and not a recipe.
There are an infinite number of possible observational bases, why
only use one?
If by base, you mean the basic ontology,
No. I mean observational basis. For example, measurements that
yield position date are in a position basis.
OK. But with comp we can no more assume observation, position, etc.
we can use only one (like arithmetic) because they are all
Yes, and that is exactly why I am asking you to reconsider the
idea that arithmetic is ontologically primitive! When we reduce a
class to the ontological primitive level (meaning that all else
supervenes upon that class or some subclass thereof), then we make
the relational structure of that class degenerate. We literally
eliminate the meaningfulness of the class if we make it uniquely
primitive. This is why a primitive class is denoted as "neutral". It
cannot be "any particular thing", it is either "Everything" or
"Nothing" or both simultaneously (depending on your pedagogical
I cannot give sense to that paragraph.
Physics and theology/psychology/biology is independent of the
choice of the base.
Yes, but not the names of the objects in them. Consider the
contrary case. Assume that the names of objects within a physics
theory or a theological schemata or a psychology or a biological
taxonomy to be a priori definite or "given by necessity". It would
then be impossible to rename the objects to take into consideration
any novel condition as we can define by diagonalizations. Thus names
cannot be a priori definite. QED.
But the ontology is not concerned by the names given to the object.
Epistemologically, we have the complete opposite. Special systems
get special role, and we have to learn to live with the different
points of view inside us and inside others.
I agree, but this is only in the case when we are considering
the multiple minds of many 1p, each having some non-empty set of
bisimilarity relations with each other.
If you are interested in theoretical study of competence, you
might read the paper by Case and Smith, or the book by Oherson,
Stob, Weinstein (reference in my URL).
I will look for this. As I was checking down links, I found:
"In philosophical arguments about dualism versus monism, it is
noted that thoughts have intensionality and physical objects do
not (S.E. Palmer, 1999), but rather have extension in space."
Except that with comp, extension in space is only an intensional
notion. of course this is highly non trivial, and is a counter-
intuitive consequence of computationalism. With comp, space and
time are intensional notions.
Yes, but only when you are assuming Arithmetic Realism as you
define it. My claim here is that your AR is wrong, objects (whether
material or immaterial) cannot have a priori definite properties!
I assume the audience understand that 2+2 = 4, that 17 is prime, that
phi_i(j) is defined or is not defined, etc. Nothing more.
If AR is wrong, absolutely all theories are wrong, except the
physicalist ultrafinitist one.
"Intensional logic is an approach to predicate logic that extends
first-order logic, which has quantifiers that range over the
individuals of a universe (extensions), by additional quantifiers
that range over terms that may have such individuals as their
value (intensions). The distinction between extensional and
intensional entities is parallel to the distinction between sense
Is not what you are arguing for here in your post exactly what
Intensional logic was found to do?
Er well, trivially once you get the point that incompleteness makes
the correct machine able to justify the existence of (many)
modalities/points of view. I mean that your statement here is very
general. It concerns the whole modal logic approach, not just the
modal approaches forced by comp and computer science. But OK.
Yes, I was making a very general claim.
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