Stephen and Bruno:
enjoyable reading. About that darn "intelligence"?
I have my roots in Latin so my take is "inter-lego" - to READ between the
lines (or words). I add some (believed) points to it: we like to go to the
utmost of our 'knowledge - base' with (intelligent-ha ha) thinking and HAVE
(hopefully) a chance to "shave off" that borderline towards a bit more.
This comes in with 'creativity' as well.
So "OUR" (whomever Bruno allows to include for 'us') - not machine -
intelligence goes "a bit" beyond the hardware, whatever we postulate for
such. (A reason why I deny/ at least doubt/  some  "artificial
intelligence": we cannot 'program' or even 'read' beyond the limitations of
our existing knowledge).
Sorry, Bruno, in my (believed!) infinite complexity I must go beyond any
'machine' pattern and if you just include it into your 'universal' qualia I
will not call it a 'machine'. But* *this is a 'naming question". Semantics?
*Description* vs The *Thing* Itself (if we allow such).

With omniscience there is no intelligence. (J. Mikes)

Cheerio
JohnM

On Fri, Aug 3, 2012 at 2:43 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:

>  On 8/3/2012 8:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 03 Aug 2012, at 11:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>  Dear Bruno,
>
> On 8/3/2012 3:55 AM in post "Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead",
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>  There is no recipe for intelligence. Only for domain competence.
> Intelligence can "diagonalize" again all recipes.
>
>
>     A very good point! Intelligence is thus forever beyond a horizon or
> boundary within which recursively countable is possible. This is exactly
> the idea that I see implied by "relativizing" the Tennenbaum theorem. For
> any kind of "something" ( I do not know what it is named at the moment)
> there is always a recursively countable name that that something has for
> itself. Recall what Wittgenstein wrote about 
> names<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naming_and_Necessity>:
>
>
> "According to descriptivist theories, proper names either are synonymous
> with descriptions, or have their reference determined by virtue of the
> name's being associated with a description or cluster of descriptions that
> an object uniquely satisfies. Kripke rejects both these kinds of
> descriptivism. He gives several examples purporting to render descriptivism
> implausible as a theory of how names get their reference determined (e.g.,
> surely Aristotle could have died at age two and so not satisfied any of the
> descriptions we associate with his name, and yet it would seem wrong to
> deny that he was Aristotle). As an alternative, Kripke adumbrated a causal
> theory of reference, according to which *a name refers to an object by
> virtue of a causal connection with the object as mediated through
> communities of speakers. He points out that proper names, in contrast to
> most descriptions, are rigid designators: A proper name refers to the named
> object in every possible world in which the object exists, while most
> descriptions designate different objects in different possible worlds.*For 
> example, 'Nixon' refers to the same person in every possible world in
> which Nixon exists, while 'the person who won the United States
> presidential election of 1968' could refer to Nixon, Humphrey, or others in
> different possible worlds. Kripke also raised the prospect of a posteriori
> necessities — facts that are necessarily true, though they can be known
> only through empirical investigation. Examples include "Hesperus is
> Phosphorus", "Cicero is Tully", "Water is H2O" and other identity claims
> where two names refer to the same object."
>
>
> Most machine's possible properties are way beyond the recursively
> enumerable. For example the property of being able to compute the factorial
> function is itself not computable.
>
>
> Dear Bruno,
>
>     Yes, and this is why properties (resulting from process!) are
> "special". Those that are not recursively enumerable form the 
> orbits<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orbit_%28group_theory%29#Orbits_and_stabilizers>(?)
>  within which the Perfect named objects are
> stable<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orbit_%28group_theory%29#Invariant_subsets>.
>
>
>
>
>
>     A name is "perfect" if it is a recursively enumerable representation
> of an object. This definition is required by the postulate that "reality is
> that which is incontrovertible" for all inter-communicating observers". We
> could define an observer as any system capable of implementing in its
> dynamics a computational simulation of itself. Most objects that exist
> cannot do this on their own, a brick for example. But consider that at a
> deeper level, a brick is a lattice of atoms that supports an entire level
> of dynamics - the electrostatic interactions of the electrons and protons
> for example - and at this level there is sufficient structure to support an
> organizational equivalent of a computation of a brick.
>     This takes your "substitution level" idea another step!
>
>
> Here you are too fuzzy for me. Sorry. *In* the comp frame, and we cannot
> take for granted notion of physical objects.
>
>
>     Yes, we cannot take for granted the notion of physical objects. In the
> theory that I am exploring, physical objects are (only!) those that can be
> represented by Stone spaces, which are in turn Stone dual to some Boolean
> Algebra if we consider only a timeless presentation. In physics these are
> represented as "bound systems <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bound_states>".
> Those that are evolving and have a measure of time are represented by 
> "Scattering
> states<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:i8jAzfFpo-0J:publications.triumf.ca/pub/arch03/pp-03-25.ps+scattering+states+quantum+mechanics&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>"
> of bound systems.
>
>
>  Locally it is plausible that brick "exists" and that they are a lattice
> of atoms, but this can only be a local relative description of how we
> conceive a brick.
>
>
>     Yes, and I mean my statement in the sense of your remark . It is only
> in a local frame of relations that there can exist an exact simulation of a
> brick such that the self-simulation criteria can be satisfied.
>
>
>
>  With comp, a brick is quite different sort of objects, for which we have
> no intuition at all. We can only do the math, as frustrating as that could
> seem.
>
>
>     Yes, we have to segregate the idea of a "brink" as appearing in a 1p
> (for example as a part of the environment in Moscow or Helsinki) from a 3p
> (which is a consensus or commonality of intercommunication observers).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  Even for competence, effective recipes are not tractable, and by
> weakening the test criteria, it is possible to show the existence of a non
> constructive hierarchy of more and more competent machines. It can be
> proved that such hierarchy are necessarily not constructive, so that
> competence really can evolve only through long stories of trial and errors.
> Intelligence is basically a non constructive notion. It is needed for the
> development of competence, but competence itself has a negative feedback on
> intelligence. Competent people can get easily stuck in their domain of
> competence, somehow.
>
>
>     They can get stuck in a recursive loop where they are unable to "see"
> outside of their dreams about themselves. Nice example of solipsism, no?
> ;-)
>
>
> That illustrates the "lived solipsism" which we are all living, but this
> does not need to make us believe in doctrinal solipsism. We all feel alone,
> but we don't have to believe that we are alone.
>
>
>     I agree.
>
>
>
>
>
>  The trick is to never get stuck in a single point of view of one's
> world!
>
>
> That is a good idea, but it cannot be effective. That would give a recipe
> for intelligence, but you agreed there are none.
>
>
>     But is it really a recipe? Think about what I wrote here; it is not
> possible to write a precise recursively enumerable version of it! The state
> of "getting stuck" can only be defined in a relative 1p sense.
>
>
>
>
>  There are an infinite number of possible observational bases, why only
> use one?
>
>
> If by base, you mean the basic ontology,
>
>
>     No. I mean observational 
> basis<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basis_%28linear_algebra%29#Expression_of_a_basis>.
> For example, measurements that yield position date are in a position basis.
>
>  we can use only one (like arithmetic) because they are all equivalent,
> ontologically.
>
>
>     Yes, and that is exactly why I am asking you to reconsider the idea
> that arithmetic is ontologically primitive! When we reduce a class to the
> ontological primitive level (meaning that all else supervenes upon that
> class or some subclass thereof), then we make the relational structure of
> that class degenerate. We literally eliminate the meaningfulness of the
> class if we make it uniquely primitive. This is why a primitive class is
> denoted as "neutral". It cannot be "any particular thing", it is either
> "Everything" or "Nothing" or both simultaneously (depending on your 
> pedagogical
> <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pedagogical>stance).
>
>
>  Physics and theology/psychology/biology is independent of the choice of
> the base.
>
>
>     Yes, but not the names of the objects in them. Consider the contrary
> case. Assume that the names of objects within a physics theory or a
> theological schemata or a psychology or a biological taxonomy to be a
> priori definite or "given by necessity". It would then be impossible to
> rename the objects to take into consideration any novel condition as we can
> define by diagonalizations. Thus names cannot be a priori definite. QED.
>
>
>  Epistemologically, we have the complete opposite. Special systems get
> special role, and we have to learn to live with the different points of
> view inside us and inside others.
>
>
>     I agree, but this is only in the case when we are considering the
> multiple minds of many 1p, each having some non-empty set of bisimilarity
> relations with each other.
>
>
>
>
>  If you are interested in theoretical study of competence, you might read
> the paper by Case and Smith, or the book by Oherson, Stob, Weinstein
> (reference in my URL).
>
>
>     I will look for this. As I was checking down links, I 
> found<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intensionality>:
>
>
> "In philosophical arguments about dualism versus monism, it is noted that
> thoughts have intensionality and physical objects do not (S.E. Palmer,
> 1999), but rather have extension in space."
>
>
> Except that with comp, extension in space is only an intensional notion.
> of course this is highly non trivial, and is a counter-intuitive
> consequence of computationalism. With comp, space and time are intensional
> notions.
>
>
>     Yes, but only when you are assuming Arithmetic Realism as you define
> it. My claim here is that your AR is wrong, objects (whether material or
> immaterial) cannot have a priori definite properties!
>
>
>
>
> and further <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intensional_logic>:
>
> "Intensional logic is an approach to predicate logic that extends
> first-order logic, which has quantifiers that range over the individuals of
> a universe (extensions), by additional quantifiers that range over terms
> that may have such individuals as their value (intensions). The distinction
> between extensional and intensional entities is parallel to the distinction
> between sense and reference."
>
>     Is not what you are arguing for here in your post exactly what
> Intensional logic was found to do?
>
>
> Er well, trivially once you get the point that incompleteness makes the
> correct machine able to justify the existence of (many) modalities/points
> of view. I mean that your statement here is very general. It concerns the
> whole modal logic approach, not just the modal approaches forced by comp
> and computer science. But OK.
>
>
>     Yes, I was making a very general claim.
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
> ~ Francis Bacon
>
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