Stephen and Bruno: enjoyable reading. About that darn "intelligence"? I have my roots in Latin so my take is "inter-lego" - to READ between the lines (or words). I add some (believed) points to it: we like to go to the utmost of our 'knowledge - base' with (intelligent-ha ha) thinking and HAVE (hopefully) a chance to "shave off" that borderline towards a bit more. This comes in with 'creativity' as well. So "OUR" (whomever Bruno allows to include for 'us') - not machine - intelligence goes "a bit" beyond the hardware, whatever we postulate for such. (A reason why I deny/ at least doubt/ some "artificial intelligence": we cannot 'program' or even 'read' beyond the limitations of our existing knowledge). Sorry, Bruno, in my (believed!) infinite complexity I must go beyond any 'machine' pattern and if you just include it into your 'universal' qualia I will not call it a 'machine'. But* *this is a 'naming question". Semantics? *Description* vs The *Thing* Itself (if we allow such).
With omniscience there is no intelligence. (J. Mikes) Cheerio JohnM On Fri, Aug 3, 2012 at 2:43 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote: > On 8/3/2012 8:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 03 Aug 2012, at 11:43, Stephen P. King wrote: > > Dear Bruno, > > On 8/3/2012 3:55 AM in post "Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead", > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > There is no recipe for intelligence. Only for domain competence. > Intelligence can "diagonalize" again all recipes. > > > A very good point! Intelligence is thus forever beyond a horizon or > boundary within which recursively countable is possible. This is exactly > the idea that I see implied by "relativizing" the Tennenbaum theorem. For > any kind of "something" ( I do not know what it is named at the moment) > there is always a recursively countable name that that something has for > itself. Recall what Wittgenstein wrote about > names<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naming_and_Necessity>: > > > "According to descriptivist theories, proper names either are synonymous > with descriptions, or have their reference determined by virtue of the > name's being associated with a description or cluster of descriptions that > an object uniquely satisfies. Kripke rejects both these kinds of > descriptivism. He gives several examples purporting to render descriptivism > implausible as a theory of how names get their reference determined (e.g., > surely Aristotle could have died at age two and so not satisfied any of the > descriptions we associate with his name, and yet it would seem wrong to > deny that he was Aristotle). As an alternative, Kripke adumbrated a causal > theory of reference, according to which *a name refers to an object by > virtue of a causal connection with the object as mediated through > communities of speakers. He points out that proper names, in contrast to > most descriptions, are rigid designators: A proper name refers to the named > object in every possible world in which the object exists, while most > descriptions designate different objects in different possible worlds.*For > example, 'Nixon' refers to the same person in every possible world in > which Nixon exists, while 'the person who won the United States > presidential election of 1968' could refer to Nixon, Humphrey, or others in > different possible worlds. Kripke also raised the prospect of a posteriori > necessities — facts that are necessarily true, though they can be known > only through empirical investigation. Examples include "Hesperus is > Phosphorus", "Cicero is Tully", "Water is H2O" and other identity claims > where two names refer to the same object." > > > Most machine's possible properties are way beyond the recursively > enumerable. For example the property of being able to compute the factorial > function is itself not computable. > > > Dear Bruno, > > Yes, and this is why properties (resulting from process!) are > "special". Those that are not recursively enumerable form the > orbits<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orbit_%28group_theory%29#Orbits_and_stabilizers>(?) > within which the Perfect named objects are > stable<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orbit_%28group_theory%29#Invariant_subsets>. > > > > > > A name is "perfect" if it is a recursively enumerable representation > of an object. This definition is required by the postulate that "reality is > that which is incontrovertible" for all inter-communicating observers". We > could define an observer as any system capable of implementing in its > dynamics a computational simulation of itself. Most objects that exist > cannot do this on their own, a brick for example. But consider that at a > deeper level, a brick is a lattice of atoms that supports an entire level > of dynamics - the electrostatic interactions of the electrons and protons > for example - and at this level there is sufficient structure to support an > organizational equivalent of a computation of a brick. > This takes your "substitution level" idea another step! > > > Here you are too fuzzy for me. Sorry. *In* the comp frame, and we cannot > take for granted notion of physical objects. > > > Yes, we cannot take for granted the notion of physical objects. In the > theory that I am exploring, physical objects are (only!) those that can be > represented by Stone spaces, which are in turn Stone dual to some Boolean > Algebra if we consider only a timeless presentation. In physics these are > represented as "bound systems <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bound_states>". > Those that are evolving and have a measure of time are represented by > "Scattering > states<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:i8jAzfFpo-0J:publications.triumf.ca/pub/arch03/pp-03-25.ps+scattering+states+quantum+mechanics&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>" > of bound systems. > > > Locally it is plausible that brick "exists" and that they are a lattice > of atoms, but this can only be a local relative description of how we > conceive a brick. > > > Yes, and I mean my statement in the sense of your remark . It is only > in a local frame of relations that there can exist an exact simulation of a > brick such that the self-simulation criteria can be satisfied. > > > > With comp, a brick is quite different sort of objects, for which we have > no intuition at all. We can only do the math, as frustrating as that could > seem. > > > Yes, we have to segregate the idea of a "brink" as appearing in a 1p > (for example as a part of the environment in Moscow or Helsinki) from a 3p > (which is a consensus or commonality of intercommunication observers). > > > > > > > Even for competence, effective recipes are not tractable, and by > weakening the test criteria, it is possible to show the existence of a non > constructive hierarchy of more and more competent machines. It can be > proved that such hierarchy are necessarily not constructive, so that > competence really can evolve only through long stories of trial and errors. > Intelligence is basically a non constructive notion. It is needed for the > development of competence, but competence itself has a negative feedback on > intelligence. Competent people can get easily stuck in their domain of > competence, somehow. > > > They can get stuck in a recursive loop where they are unable to "see" > outside of their dreams about themselves. Nice example of solipsism, no? > ;-) > > > That illustrates the "lived solipsism" which we are all living, but this > does not need to make us believe in doctrinal solipsism. We all feel alone, > but we don't have to believe that we are alone. > > > I agree. > > > > > > The trick is to never get stuck in a single point of view of one's > world! > > > That is a good idea, but it cannot be effective. That would give a recipe > for intelligence, but you agreed there are none. > > > But is it really a recipe? Think about what I wrote here; it is not > possible to write a precise recursively enumerable version of it! The state > of "getting stuck" can only be defined in a relative 1p sense. > > > > > There are an infinite number of possible observational bases, why only > use one? > > > If by base, you mean the basic ontology, > > > No. I mean observational > basis<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basis_%28linear_algebra%29#Expression_of_a_basis>. > For example, measurements that yield position date are in a position basis. > > we can use only one (like arithmetic) because they are all equivalent, > ontologically. > > > Yes, and that is exactly why I am asking you to reconsider the idea > that arithmetic is ontologically primitive! When we reduce a class to the > ontological primitive level (meaning that all else supervenes upon that > class or some subclass thereof), then we make the relational structure of > that class degenerate. We literally eliminate the meaningfulness of the > class if we make it uniquely primitive. This is why a primitive class is > denoted as "neutral". It cannot be "any particular thing", it is either > "Everything" or "Nothing" or both simultaneously (depending on your > pedagogical > <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pedagogical>stance). > > > Physics and theology/psychology/biology is independent of the choice of > the base. > > > Yes, but not the names of the objects in them. Consider the contrary > case. Assume that the names of objects within a physics theory or a > theological schemata or a psychology or a biological taxonomy to be a > priori definite or "given by necessity". It would then be impossible to > rename the objects to take into consideration any novel condition as we can > define by diagonalizations. Thus names cannot be a priori definite. QED. > > > Epistemologically, we have the complete opposite. Special systems get > special role, and we have to learn to live with the different points of > view inside us and inside others. > > > I agree, but this is only in the case when we are considering the > multiple minds of many 1p, each having some non-empty set of bisimilarity > relations with each other. > > > > > If you are interested in theoretical study of competence, you might read > the paper by Case and Smith, or the book by Oherson, Stob, Weinstein > (reference in my URL). > > > I will look for this. As I was checking down links, I > found<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intensionality>: > > > "In philosophical arguments about dualism versus monism, it is noted that > thoughts have intensionality and physical objects do not (S.E. Palmer, > 1999), but rather have extension in space." > > > Except that with comp, extension in space is only an intensional notion. > of course this is highly non trivial, and is a counter-intuitive > consequence of computationalism. With comp, space and time are intensional > notions. > > > Yes, but only when you are assuming Arithmetic Realism as you define > it. My claim here is that your AR is wrong, objects (whether material or > immaterial) cannot have a priori definite properties! > > > > > and further <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intensional_logic>: > > "Intensional logic is an approach to predicate logic that extends > first-order logic, which has quantifiers that range over the individuals of > a universe (extensions), by additional quantifiers that range over terms > that may have such individuals as their value (intensions). The distinction > between extensional and intensional entities is parallel to the distinction > between sense and reference." > > Is not what you are arguing for here in your post exactly what > Intensional logic was found to do? > > > Er well, trivially once you get the point that incompleteness makes the > correct machine able to justify the existence of (many) modalities/points > of view. I mean that your statement here is very general. It concerns the > whole modal logic approach, not just the modal approaches forced by comp > and computer science. But OK. > > > Yes, I was making a very general claim. > > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." > ~ Francis Bacon > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.