On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[BM] ? I can be OK, and the "meaning" variates with respect of the
universal numbers. But from the 1pov, this just make the measure
problem more difficult.
I am claiming that it is not difficult. It is Impossible. A
measure zero means a zero chance of finding a specific element.
Please correct me if I am wrong on this, as it is the heart of my
Yes, a measure zero would be problematic.
But I don't see any reason why the measure would be zero. The measure
is on the experiences, not on codes representing those experiences.
Codes don't have any experiences. Only person have experiences, and
the weight for the measure is related to the infinite computations
going trough their states, with a non trivial measure whose "measure
one" case already obeys probability (quantum like) logic. So we
already know that the measure is not zero for some class of first
The experiences are strictly 1p even if they are the intersection
of an infinity of computations, but this is what makes then have a zero
measure! A finite and semi-closed consensus of 1p's allows for the
construction of diaries and thus for the meaningfulness of "shared"
experiences. But this is exactly what a non-primitive material world is
in my thinking and nothing more. A material world is merely a
synchronized collection of interfaces (aka synchronized or 'aligned'
between the experiences of the computations. I use the concept of
simulations (as discussed by David Deutsch in his book "The Fabric of
Reality") to quantify the experiences of computations. You use the modal
logical equivalent. I think that we are only having a semantical
The problem that I see in COMP is that if we make numbers (or any
other named yet irreducible entity) as an ontological primitive makes
the measure problem unsolvable because it is not possible to uniquely
name relational schemata of numbers. The anti-foundation axiom of Azcel
- every graph has a unique decoration
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#2.3> - is
not possible in your scheme because of the ambiguity of naming that
Godel numbering causes. One always has to jump to a meta-theory to
uniquely name the entities within a given theory (defined as in Godel's
scheme) such that there is a bivalent truth value for the names.
Interestingly, this action looks almost exactly like what happens in a
forcing <http://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0509616v1.pdf>! So my claim is, now,
that at best your step 8 is true in a forced extension.
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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