On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[BM] ? I can be OK, and the "meaning" variates with respect of the universal numbers. But from the 1pov, this just make the measure problem more difficult.
I am claiming that it is not difficult. It is Impossible. A measure zero means a zero chance of finding a specific element. Please correct me if I am wrong on this, as it is the heart of my argument!
Yes, a measure zero would be problematic.
But I don't see any reason why the measure would be zero. The measure is on the experiences, not on codes representing those experiences. Codes don't have any experiences. Only person have experiences, and the weight for the measure is related to the infinite computations going trough their states, with a non trivial measure whose "measure one" case already obeys probability (quantum like) logic. So we already know that the measure is not zero for some class of first person events.

Dear Bruno,

The experiences are strictly 1p even if they are the intersection of an infinity of computations, but this is what makes then have a zero measure! A finite and semi-closed consensus of 1p's allows for the construction of diaries and thus for the meaningfulness of "shared" experiences. But this is exactly what a non-primitive material world is in my thinking and nothing more. A material world is merely a synchronized collection of interfaces (aka synchronized or 'aligned' bisimulations <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#3.1>) between the experiences of the computations. I use the concept of simulations (as discussed by David Deutsch in his book "The Fabric of Reality") to quantify the experiences of computations. You use the modal logical equivalent. I think that we are only having a semantical disagreement here. The problem that I see in COMP is that if we make numbers (or any other named yet irreducible entity) as an ontological primitive makes the measure problem unsolvable because it is not possible to uniquely name relational schemata of numbers. The anti-foundation axiom of Azcel - every graph has a unique decoration <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#2.3> - is not possible in your scheme because of the ambiguity of naming that Godel numbering causes. One always has to jump to a meta-theory to uniquely name the entities within a given theory (defined as in Godel's scheme) such that there is a bivalent truth value for the names. Interestingly, this action looks almost exactly like what happens in a forcing <http://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0509616v1.pdf>! So my claim is, now, that at best your step 8 is true in a forced extension.



"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to