On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

[BM] ? I can be OK, and the "meaning" variates with respect of theuniversal numbers. But from the 1pov, this just make the measureproblem more difficult.[SPK]I am claiming that it is not difficult. It is Impossible. Ameasure zero means a zero chance of finding a specific element.Please correct me if I am wrong on this, as it is the heart of myargument![BM] Yes, a measure zero would be problematic.But I don't see any reason why the measure would be zero. The measureis on the experiences, not on codes representing those experiences.Codes don't have any experiences. Only person have experiences, andthe weight for the measure is related to the infinite computationsgoing trough their states, with a non trivial measure whose "measureone" case already obeys probability (quantum like) logic. So wealready know that the measure is not zero for some class of firstperson events.## Advertising

Dear Bruno,

`The experiences are strictly 1p even if they are the intersection`

`of an infinity of computations, but this is what makes then have a zero`

`measure! A finite and semi-closed consensus of 1p's allows for the`

`construction of diaries and thus for the meaningfulness of "shared"`

`experiences. But this is exactly what a non-primitive material world is`

`in my thinking and nothing more. A material world is merely a`

`synchronized collection of interfaces (aka synchronized or 'aligned'`

`bisimulations`

`<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#3.1>)`

`between the experiences of the computations. I use the concept of`

`simulations (as discussed by David Deutsch in his book "The Fabric of`

`Reality") to quantify the experiences of computations. You use the modal`

`logical equivalent. I think that we are only having a semantical`

`disagreement here.`

`The problem that I see in COMP is that if we make numbers (or any`

`other named yet irreducible entity) as an ontological primitive makes`

`the measure problem unsolvable because it is not possible to uniquely`

`name relational schemata of numbers. The anti-foundation axiom of Azcel`

`- every graph has a unique decoration`

`<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#2.3> - is`

`not possible in your scheme because of the ambiguity of naming that`

`Godel numbering causes. One always has to jump to a meta-theory to`

`uniquely name the entities within a given theory (defined as in Godel's`

`scheme) such that there is a bivalent truth value for the names.`

`Interestingly, this action looks almost exactly like what happens in a`

`forcing <http://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0509616v1.pdf>! So my claim is, now,`

`that at best your step 8 is true in a forced extension.`

-- Onward! Stephen "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.