On 06 Aug 2012, at 10:29, rclough wrote:
Perhaps I am wrong, but I have a problem with the concept of
artificial intelligence and hence artificial life-- at least
according to my
understanding of what intelligence is.
As I see it, intelligence is the ability to make choices completely
on one's own. Autonomously.
Thus intelligence is simply self-determination of some issue. By
self-determination I don't
mean free will, athough that might be a possibility.The "self" could
in memory, (including current perceptions or awareness) or even
anything ever thought of. Darwin tells us that
such choices must be mostly appropriate choices, but sometimes they
might occur mistakenly,
sometimes irrationally, or deceptively. That is, to lie, deception
being quite common in nature.
But a computer program can only make choices that the programmer
So in effect the choices are made by the computer programmer, The
the puppet master.. But such a programmed "robot" cannot be
conscious, for there
is no self to be aware. There is only the presence of electrical
are objective, but no subjectivity.
Thus one might "simulate" life, but one can never create life in a
Materialism has the same fatal defect, for it is completely objective,
and so cannot have a self, which is subjective, to be aware.
But the notion of self and self-determination (and indetermination) is
what computer science explains the best. I'm afraid that you have a
pre-Gödelian notion of machine in mind.
Today we have progress tremendously: we know that we don't really know
what are universal machines, and what they are capable of. They escape
all complete theory, and prevent psychology/theology of reductionism.
Empirically, we have also good reason to bet on comp.
And methodologically it is a good avenue, as this makes it possible to
be able to refute comp one day, if false.
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