Hi meekerdb 

IMHO Empty strings are not monads, they are just empty strings.
Monads are inextended. Even though they may contain nothing,
empty strings are still extended as I see it.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: meekerdb 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-22, 21:35:56
Subject: Re: Leibniz's theodicy: a nonlocal and hopefully best mereology

On 8/22/2012 6:21 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: 
On 8/22/2012 7:43 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/22/2012 1:09 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: 
On 8/22/2012 2:44 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/22/2012 4:36 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 
Hi Jason,

    Nothing "in the theory" suggests that landscapes are a problem! But that is 
kinda my point, we have to use meta-theories of one sort or another to evaluate 
theories. Occam's Razor is a nice example... My point is that explanations 
should be hard to vary and get the result that one needs to "match the data" or 
else it is not an explanation at all. One can get anything they want with a 
theory that has landscapes. Look! 

"The string theory landscape or anthropic landscape refers to the large number 
of possible false vacua in string theory. The "landscape" includes so many 
possible configurations that some physicists think that the known laws of 
physics, the standard model and general relativity with a positive cosmological 
constant, occur in at least one of them. The anthropic landscape refers to the 
collection of those portions of the landscape that are suitable for supporting 
human life, an application of the anthropic principle that selects a subset of 
the theoretically possible configurations.
In string theory the number of false vacua is commonly quoted as 10500. The 
large number of possibilities arises from different choices of Calabi-Yau 
manifolds and different values of generalized magnetic fluxes over different 
homology cycles. If one assumes that there is no structure in the space of 
vacua, the problem of finding one with a sufficiently small cosmological 
constant is NP complete, being a version of the subset sum problem."

    Boom, there it is! The computation problem!

NP-complete problems, or just N-problems, are ones that consume a lot of 
computational resources for large problems.  But the required resources are 
finite and the problems are solvable.  So what's the problem?


    It is all about how big the finite problems grow to and whether or not 
their demand for resources can be kept up with the load. It seems to me that 
Nature would divide up the labor into as many niches as possible and have a 
distributed "on demand" system rather than a single top down computation system.

But you're trying to explain nature.  You seem to be assuming nature as a 
limited resource in the explanation, thus assuming the thing you're trying to 
explain.  Bruno at least puts his explanation in Platonia where the resources 
are infinite.


Hi Brent,

    Of course I am trying to explain Nature, in the sense of building a 
ontological theoretical framework. If one starts assuming that Nature has 
infinite resources available then one has to ask why is there a finite world 
with all the thermodynamic drudgery? 

How do you know the world is finite?  Most cosmologies allow that the 
multiverse is infinite in extent.

Bruno does not seem to ever actually address this directly. 

Sure he does.  The UD only uses finite resources at any give step - the states 
are countable and are only executed finitely.

It is left as an "open problem". This is why he dismisses the NP-Complete 
problem so casually... It is easy to think that way when thinking in top -> 
down terms. I am assuming the known physical laws, particularly thermodynamics 
and working back down to the ontology. 

Physical laws are never 'known'.  They are models to explain our observations.  
If you assume them, then you've assume the model is correct and the ontology is 
whatever exists in the model.  Why would you do that??

He and I are looking from opposite directions. It does not mean that we 
fundamentally disagree on the general picture.
    There is really only one major disagreement between Bruno and I and it is 
our definitions of Universality. He defines computations and numbers are 
existing completely seperated from the physical and I insist that there must be 
at least one physical system that can actually implement a given computation. 

I think it is probably a consequence of his theory that persons can only exist 
when physics exists and vice versa; but it is difficult to work out the 
implications (especially for me, maybe not for Bruno).

This puts the material worlds and immaterial realm on equal ontological 
footings and joined together in a isomorphism type duality relation because of 
this restriction. 

That means you need a material primitive AND an immaterial primitive.

I care more about the philosophical stuff and he the logical stuff. That a nice 
division of labor. :-) 

Logic is just some rules to keep us from talking self-contradictory nonsense.


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