On 8/24/2012 12:19 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Aug 2012, at 03:21, Stephen P. King wrote:
Bruno does not seem to ever actually address this directly. It is
left as an "open problem"
The body problem?
I address this directly as I show how we have to translate the body
problem in a pure problem of arithmetic, and that is why eventually we
cannot postulate anything physical to solve the mind body problem
without losing the quanta qualia distinction. Again this is a
conclusion of a reasoning.
OK! But just take this one small step further. Losing the quanta /
qualia distinction is the same thing as loosing the ability to define
one's self. It is the vanishing of identity. This is exactly why I am
claiming that step 8 goes too far! The idea that we can remove the
necessity of a robust physical universe and yet retain all of its
properties is the assumption of primitive substance but just turned
inside-out. Look at the substance article here:
"Substance theory, or substance attribute theory, is an
ontological theory about objecthood, positing that a substance is
distinct from its properties. A thing-in-itself is a property-bearer
that must be distinguished from the properties it bears."
What purpose does substance serve here? By Occam it is unnecessary
and thus need not be postulated or imagined to exist. Primitive matter
would be this notion of substance and as you point out, it is
irrelevant. But the bundle of properties that define for us the
appearance of physical "stuff" cannot be waved away. Reduction to bare
arithmetic as you propose eliminates access to the very properties
required for interaction and this includes the means to distinguish self
from not self.
And AUDA is the illustration of the universal machine tackles that
problem, and this gives already the theology of the machine, including
its propositional physics (the logic of measure one).
But this is ignoring the non-constructable aspects that make out
finite naming schemes have a relative measure zero. What is the measure
of the Integers in the Reals?
There is really only one major disagreement between Bruno and I and
it is our definitions of Universality. He defines computations and
numbers are existing completely seperated from the physical and I
insist that there must be at least one physical system that can
actually implement a given computation.
This is almost revisionism. I challenge you to find a standard book in
theoretical computer science in which the physical is even just
invoked to define the notion of computation.
How about Turing's own papers?
http://www.turingarchive.org/viewer/?id=459&title=1 Without the
possibility of physical implementation (not attachment to any particular
physical system which is contra universality) there is no possibility of
any input or output control. Peter Wegner et al make some some powerful
arguments in terms of interactive computation...
Most notion of physical implementations of computation use the
mathematical notion above. Not the contrary. Deutsch' thesis is not
Sure, but Deutsch is not trying to make computation float free of
the physical world and thus severing its connection to us altogether. If
we follow Kripke's idea of possible worlds, it seems to me that there
would always be a physical system that can implement a given
computation, even one that is the emulation of a very abstract logical
schemata. You, the human being Bruno Marchal, are a good example of just
such a physical system! The fact that I can even vaguely understand your
ideas is my proof.
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