Hi Bruno Marchal and all, Consider this analogy to the mind/body problem. Let the body or quanta speak only french and the mind or qualia speak only english. Then neither group is capable of understanding the other group, but each group is able to communicate perfectly among themselves in their own language.
In order to get anything done, the french hire a translator (we'll call him Leibniz) who 1) translates each quanta (english) statement into qualia (french), 2) let's them figure out a proper response in french, using proper french grammar, 3) then translates that response into english, using proper english grammar, which he 4) then relates that translated response to the english. This is how the metaphysics of Leibniz can be used to properly treat mind/body issues. Currently the materialists ignore the language barrier and speak english to the french, who do not understand them, and the english them invent what the french must be saying, etc. This is nonsense. Instead, qualia must be discussed by qualia in qualia language, and quanta in quanta language, and communication between them done by a translator. In Leibniz's metaphysics, the translation is done by callling each part of the material world a substance, then translating the qualities and attributes of the material world into the monads of the mind world, performing actions and understanding things properly in the language and grammar of the mind, then doing the reverse translation into body language to understand the result. Roger Clough, [email protected] 8/25/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-24, 12:19:25 Subject: Re: Leibniz's theodicy: a nonlocal and hopefully best mereology On 23 Aug 2012, at 03:21, Stephen P. King wrote: > Bruno does not seem to ever actually address this directly. It is > left as an "open problem" The body problem? I address this directly as I show how we have to translate the body problem in a pure problem of arithmetic, and that is why eventually we cannot postulate anything physical to solve the mind body problem without losing the quanta qualia distinction. Again this is a conclusion of a reasoning. And AUDA is the illustration of the universal machine tackles that problem, and this gives already the theology of the machine, including its propositional physics (the logic of measure one). > There is really only one major disagreement between Bruno and I and > it is our definitions of Universality. He defines computations and > numbers are existing completely seperated from the physical and I > insist that there must be at least one physical system that can > actually implement a given computation. This is almost revisionism. I challenge you to find a standard book in theoretical computer science in which the physical is even just invoked to define the notion of computation. Most notion of physical implementations of computation use the mathematical notion above. Not the contrary. Deutsch' thesis is not Church's thesis. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
