On 25 Aug 2012, at 07:53, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 8/24/2012 12:19 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Aug 2012, at 03:21, Stephen P. King wrote:

Bruno does not seem to ever actually address this directly. It is left as an "open problem"


The body problem?

I address this directly as I show how we have to translate the body problem in a pure problem of arithmetic, and that is why eventually we cannot postulate anything physical to solve the mind body problem without losing the quanta qualia distinction. Again this is a conclusion of a reasoning.

Dear Bruno,

OK! But just take this one small step further. Losing the quanta / qualia distinction is the same thing as loosing the ability to define one's self.

I am not talking of someone losing that distinction, but on losing the ability to use the distinction between G and G*, and between Z1 and Z1*, and also the ability to use S4Grz1 in that context.

The interest of using the machine theory of self reference is that we can distinguish between what the machine can say, and what is true wabout what the machine can say, through what I called already the Solovay split.




It is the vanishing of identity. This is exactly why I am claiming that step 8 goes too far!

AUDA comes after UDA, and is in some sense independent. But anyway, I was not alluding to an experience, but to a theory of mind and matter.



The idea that we can remove the necessity of a robust physical universe and yet retain all of its properties is the assumption of primitive substance but just turned inside-out. Look at the substance article here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory

"Substance theory, or substance attribute theory, is an ontological theory about objecthood, positing that a substance is distinct from its properties. A thing-in-itself is a property-bearer that must be distinguished from the properties it bears."

What purpose does substance serve here? By Occam it is unnecessary and thus need not be postulated or imagined to exist. Primitive matter would be this notion of substance and as you point out, it is irrelevant. But the bundle of properties that define for us the appearance of physical "stuff" cannot be waved away.

They are not.



Reduction to bare arithmetic as you propose eliminates access to the very properties required for interaction and this includes the means to distinguish self from not self.

Here you are technically false. If you don't want to the math, read any conclsuoion of papers aroung Gödel 1931. The notion of universal computations, and implementation can be defined in arithmetic, like interaction, etc. The herad things is to derive the interaction as they are described by physics, but that is the result. Then AUDA shapes the general solution.




And AUDA is the illustration of the universal machine tackles that problem, and this gives already the theology of the machine, including its propositional physics (the logic of measure one).

But this is ignoring the non-constructable aspects that make out finite naming schemes have a relative measure zero. What is the measure of the Integers in the Reals?

Which real? An additive measure? What is this question for, as the measure are on the continuum of the infinite histories?

You keep seeing problems where there are none, and not seeing problem where I point on them.





There is really only one major disagreement between Bruno and I and it is our definitions of Universality. He defines computations and numbers are existing completely seperated from the physical and I insist that there must be at least one physical system that can actually implement a given computation.

This is almost revisionism. I challenge you to find a standard book in theoretical computer science in which the physical is even just invoked to define the notion of computation.

How about Turing's own papers? http://www.turingarchive.org/viewer/?id=459&title=1 Without the possibility of physical implementation (not attachment to any particular physical system which is contra universality) there is no possibility of any input or output control. Peter Wegner et al make some some powerful arguments in terms of interactive computation...

It is interesting but it does not concerns us a priori. If if helps you to find a solution please do.






Most notion of physical implementations of computation use the mathematical notion above. Not the contrary. Deutsch' thesis is not Church's thesis.

Sure, but Deutsch is not trying to make computation float free of the physical world

Unlike you in your last post, Deustch does postulate a form of physicalism, through his thesis, but it can be shown inconsistent with comp. Indeed that's an easy consequence of UDA. The quantum many- worlds extend it comp many dreams, and both the collapse and the wave are appearances.



and thus severing its connection to us altogether. If we follow Kripke's idea of possible worlds, it seems to me that there would always be a physical system that can implement a given computation, even one that is the emulation of a very abstract logical schemata.

Kripke discovered a technic. The #* logics have no Kripke semantics. You make terrible jumps.



You, the human being Bruno Marchal, are a good example of just such a physical system!

My bodies are, perhaps, but if comp is true, such bodies are the result of coherent dreams of numbers.

Why is it a problem, given that you agree that physical object are not primitive. But then with have to propose another primitive objects, and with comp anyone defining any universal system (in Turing purely arithmetical sense) will do.

It is only a beginning, the rest, including physics, will result from a competition between all universal numbers, competition in the task of emulating you here and now.



The fact that I can even vaguely understand your ideas is my proof.

We agree that physical is not primitive. So what is the problem?
I show that comp leads to an alternative.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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