On 25 Aug 2012, at 07:53, Stephen P. King wrote:

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On 8/24/2012 12:19 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 23 Aug 2012, at 03:21, Stephen P. King wrote:Bruno does not seem to ever actually address this directly. It isleft as an "open problem"The body problem?I address this directly as I show how we have to translate the bodyproblem in a pure problem of arithmetic, and that is why eventuallywe cannot postulate anything physical to solve the mind bodyproblem without losing the quanta qualia distinction. Again this isa conclusion of a reasoning.Dear Bruno,OK! But just take this one small step further. Losing thequanta / qualia distinction is the same thing as loosing the abilityto define one's self.

`I am not talking of someone losing that distinction, but on losing the`

`ability to use the distinction between G and G*, and between Z1 and`

`Z1*, and also the ability to use S4Grz1 in that context.`

`The interest of using the machine theory of self reference is that we`

`can distinguish between what the machine can say, and what is true`

`wabout what the machine can say, through what I called already the`

`Solovay split.`

It is the vanishing of identity. This is exactly why I am claimingthat step 8 goes too far!

`AUDA comes after UDA, and is in some sense independent. But anyway, I`

`was not alluding to an experience, but to a theory of mind and matter.`

The idea that we can remove the necessity of a robust physicaluniverse and yet retain all of its properties is the assumption ofprimitive substance but just turned inside-out. Look at thesubstance article here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory"Substance theory, or substance attribute theory, is anontological theory about objecthood, positing that a substance isdistinct from its properties. A thing-in-itself is a property-bearerthat must be distinguished from the properties it bears."What purpose does substance serve here? By Occam it isunnecessary and thus need not be postulated or imagined to exist.Primitive matter would be this notion of substance and as you pointout, it is irrelevant. But the bundle of properties that define forus the appearance of physical "stuff" cannot be waved away.

They are not.

Reduction to bare arithmetic as you propose eliminates access to thevery properties required for interaction and this includes the meansto distinguish self from not self.

`Here you are technically false. If you don't want to the math, read`

`any conclsuoion of papers aroung GĂ¶del 1931. The notion of universal`

`computations, and implementation can be defined in arithmetic, like`

`interaction, etc. The herad things is to derive the interaction as`

`they are described by physics, but that is the result. Then AUDA`

`shapes the general solution.`

And AUDA is the illustration of the universal machine tackles thatproblem, and this gives already the theology of the machine,including its propositional physics (the logic of measure one).But this is ignoring the non-constructable aspects that make outfinite naming schemes have a relative measure zero. What is themeasure of the Integers in the Reals?

`Which real? An additive measure? What is this question for, as the`

`measure are on the continuum of the infinite histories?`

`You keep seeing problems where there are none, and not seeing problem`

`where I point on them.`

There is really only one major disagreement between Bruno and Iand it is our definitions of Universality. He defines computationsand numbers are existing completely seperated from the physicaland I insist that there must be at least one physical system thatcan actually implement a given computation.This is almost revisionism. I challenge you to find a standard bookin theoretical computer science in which the physical is even justinvoked to define the notion of computation.How about Turing's own papers? http://www.turingarchive.org/viewer/?id=459&title=1Without the possibility of physical implementation (not attachmentto any particular physical system which is contra universality)there is no possibility of any input or output control. Peter Wegneret al make some some powerful arguments in terms of interactivecomputation...

`It is interesting but it does not concerns us a priori. If if helps`

`you to find a solution please do.`

Most notion of physical implementations of computation use themathematical notion above. Not the contrary. Deutsch' thesis is notChurch's thesis.Sure, but Deutsch is not trying to make computation float free ofthe physical world

`Unlike you in your last post, Deustch does postulate a form of`

`physicalism, through his thesis, but it can be shown inconsistent with`

`comp. Indeed that's an easy consequence of UDA. The quantum many-`

`worlds extend it comp many dreams, and both the collapse and the wave`

`are appearances.`

and thus severing its connection to us altogether. If we followKripke's idea of possible worlds, it seems to me that there wouldalways be a physical system that can implement a given computation,even one that is the emulation of a very abstract logical schemata.

`Kripke discovered a technic. The #* logics have no Kripke semantics.`

`You make terrible jumps.`

You, the human being Bruno Marchal, are a good example of just sucha physical system!

`My bodies are, perhaps, but if comp is true, such bodies are the`

`result of coherent dreams of numbers.`

`Why is it a problem, given that you agree that physical object are not`

`primitive. But then with have to propose another primitive objects,`

`and with comp anyone defining any universal system (in Turing purely`

`arithmetical sense) will do.`

`It is only a beginning, the rest, including physics, will result from`

`a competition between all universal numbers, competition in the task`

`of emulating you here and now.`

The fact that I can even vaguely understand your ideas is my proof.

We agree that physical is not primitive. So what is the problem? I show that comp leads to an alternative. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.