On 23 Aug 2012, at 03:21, Stephen P. King wrote:
Bruno does not seem to ever actually address this directly. It is
left as an "open problem"
The body problem?
I address this directly as I show how we have to translate the body
problem in a pure problem of arithmetic, and that is why eventually we
cannot postulate anything physical to solve the mind body problem
without losing the quanta qualia distinction. Again this is a
conclusion of a reasoning.
And AUDA is the illustration of the universal machine tackles that
problem, and this gives already the theology of the machine, including
its propositional physics (the logic of measure one).
There is really only one major disagreement between Bruno and I and
it is our definitions of Universality. He defines computations and
numbers are existing completely seperated from the physical and I
insist that there must be at least one physical system that can
actually implement a given computation.
This is almost revisionism. I challenge you to find a standard book in
theoretical computer science in which the physical is even just
invoked to define the notion of computation.
Most notion of physical implementations of computation use the
mathematical notion above. Not the contrary. Deutsch' thesis is not
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