On 23 Aug 2012, at 03:21, Stephen P. King wrote:

Bruno does not seem to ever actually address this directly. It is left as an "open problem"

The body problem?

I address this directly as I show how we have to translate the body problem in a pure problem of arithmetic, and that is why eventually we cannot postulate anything physical to solve the mind body problem without losing the quanta qualia distinction. Again this is a conclusion of a reasoning.

And AUDA is the illustration of the universal machine tackles that problem, and this gives already the theology of the machine, including its propositional physics (the logic of measure one).

There is really only one major disagreement between Bruno and I and it is our definitions of Universality. He defines computations and numbers are existing completely seperated from the physical and I insist that there must be at least one physical system that can actually implement a given computation.

This is almost revisionism. I challenge you to find a standard book in theoretical computer science in which the physical is even just invoked to define the notion of computation.

Most notion of physical implementations of computation use the mathematical notion above. Not the contrary. Deutsch' thesis is not Church's thesis.



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