I mean "good design" not "god design"

2012/9/4 Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>:
> At this moment this is true.  Another thing is if the computer could
> become intelligent enough. It is not easy to admit that the belief in
> the possibility of making something intelligent exist well before
> computers. Since the industrial revolution, some people believed in
> the possibility of making intelligent automatas only with steam, weels
> and wires. This seems naive if not stupid not, but the theorical
> possibility still holds.
>
> I wonder how far the theory is from reality in the case of computers.
> Up to now, even the most pessimistic previsions have been ridicule.
> The gap between computer and a bacteria is inmense, galactic. This is
> inherent to the limitations of any rational design in comparison with
> the abundance and almost omniscence of natural selection (That I
> explained somewhere else).
>
> Moreover, a natural design is almost impossible to reverse engineer to
> the last detail since it don´t attain to the rules of "god design",
> because they are rules of "limited design" (explained somewhere else).
>
> 2012/9/3 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>:
>> Hi benjayk
>>
>> Computers have no intelligence --not a whit,  since intelligence requires
>> ability to choose, choice requires awareness or Cs, which in term requires
>> an aware subject. Thus only living entities can have ingtelligence.
>> A bacterium thus has more intel;ligence than a computer,
>> even the largest in the world.
>>
>>
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> 9/3/2012
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
>> so that everything could function."
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> From: benjayk
>> Receiver: everything-list
>> Time: 2012-09-03, 10:12:46
>> Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
>>>>>> not mean
>>>>>> that the emulation can substitute the original.
>>>>>
>>>>> But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on.
>>>>>
>>>>> A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.
>>>>>
>>>>> As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
>>>>> exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
>>>>> arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of
>>>>> Robinson Arithmetic.
>>>>> But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove
>>>>> its own consistency. That would contradict G鰀el II. When PA uses the
>>>>> induction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for the sake
>>>>> of
>>>>> the emulation without any inner conviction.
>>>> I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me
>>>> you have
>>>> just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic,
>>>> because
>>>> RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases
>>>> were PA
>>>> does a proof that RA can't do).
>>>
>>> Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has
>>> succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that
>>> the RA level was enough.
>> Sorry, but it can't. It can't even abstract itself out to see that the RA
>> level "would be" enough.
>> I see you doing this all the time; you take some low level that can be made
>> sense of by something transcendent of it and then claim that the low level
>> is enough.
>>
>> This is precisely the calim that I don't understand at all. You say that we
>> only need natural numbers and + and *, and that the rest emerges from that
>> as the 1-p viewpoint of the numbers. Unfortunately the 1-p viewpoint itself
>> can't be found in the numbers, it can only be found in what transcends the
>> numbers, or what the numbers really are / refer to (which also completely
>> beyond our conception of numbers).
>> That's the problem with G鰀el as well. His unprovable statement about
>> numbers is really a meta-statement about what numbers express that doesn't
>> even make sense if we only consider the definition of numbers. He really
>> just shows that we can reason about numbers and with numbers in ways that
>> can't be captured by numbers (but in this case what we do with them has
>> little to do with the numbers themselves).
>>
>> I agree that computations reflect many things about us (infinitely many
>> things, even), but we still transcend them infinitely. Strangely you agree
>> for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't
>> see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-p point
>> of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just an
>> abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (� la Hofstatdter), just
>>> by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through
>>> my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with
>>> Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he
>>> survives through that process.
>> On some level, I agree. But not far from the level that he survives in his
>> quotes and writings.
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
>>>> we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some
>>>> relative
>>>> way, if we are using the result in the right way).
>>>
>>> Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,
>>> pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the
>>> lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite
>>> different.
>> Which assumes that the world is divided in low-level processes and
>> high-level processes.
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture of an
>>>> apple
>>>> in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context
>>>> we can
>>>> indeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of an apple
>>>> because
>>>> we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk
>>>> about
>>>> apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to
>>>> make
>>>> sense of it.
>>>
>>> Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer,
>>> and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally different
>>> computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same game
>>> with the same chess program, despite the computer is totally
>>> different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp.
>>> Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that level
>>> and below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to have
>>> some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.).
>>>
>> Your chess example only works because chess is already played on a computer.
>> Yes, you can often substitute one computer for another (though even this
>> often comes with problems), just as you can practically substitute apple
>> juice with orange juice as a healthy morning drink. You still can't
>> substitute it with fuel though, no matter what you do with it.
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their
>>> doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and
>>> computers.
>> OK, but in this discussion we can't assume COMP. I understand that you take
>> it for granted when discussing your paper (because it only makes sense in
>> that context), but I don't take it for granted, and I don't consider it
>> plausible, or honestly even meaningful.
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question of
>>>> what
>>>> level we think about computation.
>>>
>>> This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on any level
>>> (unlike comp).
>> Assuming church-turing thesis ;).
>>
>> In my opinion that's precisely where it goes wrong. It wants to abstract
>> from levels, but really just trivializes computation in the process
>> (reducing it to the lowest level aspect of computation).
>>
>> I think what a computer computes does only make sense in the context of the
>> machine. Eg if one turing machine emulates another the emulation just makes
>> sense if we consider the turing machine that is emulated. Otherwise we can't
>> state that it emulates anything (because its computation doesn't have to be
>> interpreted as an emulation).
>> This is also an argument against CT: If we take it to be true, the notion of
>> emulation ceases to make sense (because emulation is not an absolute
>> computational notion, but relates on computation with another).
>>
>> Even the computation 1+1=2 doesn't make sense apart from context. What do
>> one thing and two things even mean if we try to completely abstract from
>> things? Nothing.
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulate
>>>>> einstein
>>>>> (cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able
>>>>> to converse with Einstein.
>>>> Apart from the question of whether brains can be emulated at all
>>>> (due to
>>>> possible entaglement with their own emulation, I think I will write
>>>> a post
>>>> about this later), that is still not necessarily the case.
>>>> It is only the case if you know how to make sense of the emulation.
>>>> And I
>>>> don't see that we can assume that this takes less than being einstein.
>>>
>>> No doubt for the first person sense, that's true, even with comp. You
>>> might clarify a bit more your point.
>> Apparently you know what I mean if you say its true from the first person.
>> But then considering that this is what we *actually experience*, I don't see
>> how it makes any sense to try to abstract from that (postulating a "3-p
>> perspective").
>>
>> In which way does one thing substitute another thing if actually the correct
>> interpretation of the substitution requires the original? It is like saying
>> "No you don't need the calculator to calculate 24,3^12. You can substitute
>> it with pen and pencil, where you write down 24,3^12=X and then insert the
>> result of the calculation (using your calculator) as X."
>> If COMP does imply that interpreting a digital einstein needs a real
>> einstein (or more) than it contradicts itself (because in this case we can't
>> *always* say YES doctor, because then there would be no original left to
>> interpret the emulation).
>> Really it is quite a simple point. If you substitute the whole universe with
>> an emulation (which is possible according to COMP) than there is nothing
>> left to interpret the emulation. We couldn't even say whether it is an
>> emulation or not (because a computation itself is not an emulation, just
>> it's relation with the orginal). If there was something outside the universe
>> to interpret the simulation, then this would be the level on which we can't
>> be substituted (and if this would be substituted, then the level used to
>> interpret this substitution couldn't be substituted, etc....).
>> In any case, there is always a non-computational level, at which no digital
>> substitution is possible - and we would be wrong to say YES with regards to
>> that part of us, unless we consider that level "not-me" (and this doesn't
>> make any sense to me).
>>
>> benjayk
>> --
>> View this message in context:
>> http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34383322.html
>> Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.
>>
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