I mean "good design" not "god design" 2012/9/4 Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>: > At this moment this is true. Another thing is if the computer could > become intelligent enough. It is not easy to admit that the belief in > the possibility of making something intelligent exist well before > computers. Since the industrial revolution, some people believed in > the possibility of making intelligent automatas only with steam, weels > and wires. This seems naive if not stupid not, but the theorical > possibility still holds. > > I wonder how far the theory is from reality in the case of computers. > Up to now, even the most pessimistic previsions have been ridicule. > The gap between computer and a bacteria is inmense, galactic. This is > inherent to the limitations of any rational design in comparison with > the abundance and almost omniscence of natural selection (That I > explained somewhere else). > > Moreover, a natural design is almost impossible to reverse engineer to > the last detail since it don´t attain to the rules of "god design", > because they are rules of "limited design" (explained somewhere else). > > 2012/9/3 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>: >> Hi benjayk >> >> Computers have no intelligence --not a whit, since intelligence requires >> ability to choose, choice requires awareness or Cs, which in term requires >> an aware subject. Thus only living entities can have ingtelligence. >> A bacterium thus has more intel;ligence than a computer, >> even the largest in the world. >> >> >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 9/3/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him >> so that everything could function." >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: benjayk >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-09-03, 10:12:46 >> Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context >>>>>> and >>>>>> ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does >>>>>> not mean >>>>>> that the emulation can substitute the original. >>>>> >>>>> But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. >>>>> >>>>> A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. >>>>> >>>>> As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate >>>>> exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson >>>>> arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of >>>>> Robinson Arithmetic. >>>>> But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove >>>>> its own consistency. That would contradict G鰀el II. When PA uses the >>>>> induction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for the sake >>>>> of >>>>> the emulation without any inner conviction. >>>> I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me >>>> you have >>>> just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, >>>> because >>>> RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases >>>> were PA >>>> does a proof that RA can't do). >>> >>> Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has >>> succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that >>> the RA level was enough. >> Sorry, but it can't. It can't even abstract itself out to see that the RA >> level "would be" enough. >> I see you doing this all the time; you take some low level that can be made >> sense of by something transcendent of it and then claim that the low level >> is enough. >> >> This is precisely the calim that I don't understand at all. You say that we >> only need natural numbers and + and *, and that the rest emerges from that >> as the 1-p viewpoint of the numbers. Unfortunately the 1-p viewpoint itself >> can't be found in the numbers, it can only be found in what transcends the >> numbers, or what the numbers really are / refer to (which also completely >> beyond our conception of numbers). >> That's the problem with G鰀el as well. His unprovable statement about >> numbers is really a meta-statement about what numbers express that doesn't >> even make sense if we only consider the definition of numbers. He really >> just shows that we can reason about numbers and with numbers in ways that >> can't be captured by numbers (but in this case what we do with them has >> little to do with the numbers themselves). >> >> I agree that computations reflect many things about us (infinitely many >> things, even), but we still transcend them infinitely. Strangely you agree >> for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't >> see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-p point >> of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just an >> abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view. >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (� la Hofstatdter), just >>> by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through >>> my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with >>> Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he >>> survives through that process. >> On some level, I agree. But not far from the level that he survives in his >> quotes and writings. >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so >>>> we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some >>>> relative >>>> way, if we are using the result in the right way). >>> >>> Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another, >>> pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the >>> lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite >>> different. >> Which assumes that the world is divided in low-level processes and >> high-level processes. >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture of an >>>> apple >>>> in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context >>>> we can >>>> indeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of an apple >>>> because >>>> we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk >>>> about >>>> apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to >>>> make >>>> sense of it. >>> >>> Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer, >>> and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally different >>> computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same game >>> with the same chess program, despite the computer is totally >>> different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp. >>> Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that level >>> and below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to have >>> some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.). >>> >> Your chess example only works because chess is already played on a computer. >> Yes, you can often substitute one computer for another (though even this >> often comes with problems), just as you can practically substitute apple >> juice with orange juice as a healthy morning drink. You still can't >> substitute it with fuel though, no matter what you do with it. >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their >>> doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and >>> computers. >> OK, but in this discussion we can't assume COMP. I understand that you take >> it for granted when discussing your paper (because it only makes sense in >> that context), but I don't take it for granted, and I don't consider it >> plausible, or honestly even meaningful. >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question of >>>> what >>>> level we think about computation. >>> >>> This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on any level >>> (unlike comp). >> Assuming church-turing thesis ;). >> >> In my opinion that's precisely where it goes wrong. It wants to abstract >> from levels, but really just trivializes computation in the process >> (reducing it to the lowest level aspect of computation). >> >> I think what a computer computes does only make sense in the context of the >> machine. Eg if one turing machine emulates another the emulation just makes >> sense if we consider the turing machine that is emulated. Otherwise we can't >> state that it emulates anything (because its computation doesn't have to be >> interpreted as an emulation). >> This is also an argument against CT: If we take it to be true, the notion of >> emulation ceases to make sense (because emulation is not an absolute >> computational notion, but relates on computation with another). >> >> Even the computation 1+1=2 doesn't make sense apart from context. What do >> one thing and two things even mean if we try to completely abstract from >> things? Nothing. >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulate >>>>> einstein >>>>> (cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able >>>>> to converse with Einstein. >>>> Apart from the question of whether brains can be emulated at all >>>> (due to >>>> possible entaglement with their own emulation, I think I will write >>>> a post >>>> about this later), that is still not necessarily the case. >>>> It is only the case if you know how to make sense of the emulation. >>>> And I >>>> don't see that we can assume that this takes less than being einstein. >>> >>> No doubt for the first person sense, that's true, even with comp. You >>> might clarify a bit more your point. >> Apparently you know what I mean if you say its true from the first person. >> But then considering that this is what we *actually experience*, I don't see >> how it makes any sense to try to abstract from that (postulating a "3-p >> perspective"). >> >> In which way does one thing substitute another thing if actually the correct >> interpretation of the substitution requires the original? It is like saying >> "No you don't need the calculator to calculate 24,3^12. You can substitute >> it with pen and pencil, where you write down 24,3^12=X and then insert the >> result of the calculation (using your calculator) as X." >> If COMP does imply that interpreting a digital einstein needs a real >> einstein (or more) than it contradicts itself (because in this case we can't >> *always* say YES doctor, because then there would be no original left to >> interpret the emulation). >> Really it is quite a simple point. If you substitute the whole universe with >> an emulation (which is possible according to COMP) than there is nothing >> left to interpret the emulation. We couldn't even say whether it is an >> emulation or not (because a computation itself is not an emulation, just >> it's relation with the orginal). If there was something outside the universe >> to interpret the simulation, then this would be the level on which we can't >> be substituted (and if this would be substituted, then the level used to >> interpret this substitution couldn't be substituted, etc....). >> In any case, there is always a non-computational level, at which no digital >> substitution is possible - and we would be wrong to say YES with regards to >> that part of us, unless we consider that level "not-me" (and this doesn't >> make any sense to me). >> >> benjayk >> -- >> View this message in context: >> http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34383322.html >> Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
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