Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 04 Sep 2012, at 21:47, benjayk wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Yes, we simulated some systems, but they couldn't perform the
>>>> same function.
>>> A pump does the function of an heart.
>> No. A pump just pumps blood. The heart also performs endocrine  
>> functions, it
>> can react dynamically to the brain, it can grow, it can heal, it can  
>> become
>> infected, etc...
> That is correct but not relevant. People do survive with pump at the  
> place of the heart, but of course not perfectly, and have some  
> problems through it. This is due to the fact the substitution level is  
> crude for technical reason. That will be the case with artificial  
> brain or parts of the brain, for a very long time, but is not relevant  
> with the issue which assume only truth "in principle".
In any case, an artificial heart is not digital, and the substituted brain
can also not be digital (according to your reasoning), which contradicts the
assumption that there can be a digital substitution.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> And then another, much bigger step is required in order to say
>>>> *everything*/everyone/every part can be emulated.
>>> Indeed. Comp makes this impossible, as the environment is the result
>>> of a comptetion between infinities of universal machine in  
>>> arithmetic.
>>> See my other post to you sent  yesterday.
>> Yes, OK, I understand that.
>> But this also means that COMP relies on the assumption that whatever  
>> is not
>> emulable about our brains (or whatever else) does not matter at all  
>> to what
>> we (locally) are, only what is emulable matters. I find this  
>> assumption
>> completely unwarranted and I have yet to see evidence for it or a  
>> reasoning
>> behind it.
> It is a theory. The evidence for it is that, except for matter itself,  
> non computability has not been observed in nature.
But nature is made of lots of matter, so how can you simply dismiss that as
not relevant?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  It is also hard to make sense of darwinian evolution in a non computable
> framework, as it  
> makes also hard to understand the redundant nature of the brain, and  
> the fact that we are stable for brain perturbations.
I don't see at all why this would be the case. Stability and redundancy may
exist beyond computations as well. Why not?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> If you invoke something as elusive as a non computable effect in the  
> brain (beyond the 1p itself which is not computable for any machine  
> from her point of view), you have to give us an evidence that such  
> thing exists. Is it in the neocortex, in the limbic system, in the  
> cerebral stem, in the right brain?
Again, everywhere. The very fact that the brain is made of neurons is not
computable, because computation does not take structure into account (it
doesn't differentiate between different instantiations). And for all we
know, the structure of the brain *does* matter. It is heavily used in all
attempts to explain its functioning.
Quantum effects beyond individual brains (suggested by psi) can't be
computed as well: No matter what I compute in my brain, this doesn't
entangle it with other brains since computation is classical.

A computational description of the brain is just a relative, approximate
description, nothing more. It doesn't actually reflect what the brain is or
what it does.

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