If the digital substitution is at the density of 10^90 pixels per cubic centimeter, as found in string theory, then digital substitution is essentially analog. Richard
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 7:31 AM, benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com> wrote: > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 04 Sep 2012, at 21:47, benjayk wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> Yes, we simulated some systems, but they couldn't perform the >>>>> same function. >>>> >>>> A pump does the function of an heart. >>> No. A pump just pumps blood. The heart also performs endocrine >>> functions, it >>> can react dynamically to the brain, it can grow, it can heal, it can >>> become >>> infected, etc... >> >> That is correct but not relevant. People do survive with pump at the >> place of the heart, but of course not perfectly, and have some >> problems through it. This is due to the fact the substitution level is >> crude for technical reason. That will be the case with artificial >> brain or parts of the brain, for a very long time, but is not relevant >> with the issue which assume only truth "in principle". > In any case, an artificial heart is not digital, and the substituted brain > can also not be digital (according to your reasoning), which contradicts the > assumption that there can be a digital substitution. > > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> And then another, much bigger step is required in order to say >>>>> *everything*/everyone/every part can be emulated. >>>> >>>> Indeed. Comp makes this impossible, as the environment is the result >>>> of a comptetion between infinities of universal machine in >>>> arithmetic. >>>> See my other post to you sent yesterday. >>> Yes, OK, I understand that. >>> But this also means that COMP relies on the assumption that whatever >>> is not >>> emulable about our brains (or whatever else) does not matter at all >>> to what >>> we (locally) are, only what is emulable matters. I find this >>> assumption >>> completely unwarranted and I have yet to see evidence for it or a >>> reasoning >>> behind it. >> >> It is a theory. The evidence for it is that, except for matter itself, >> non computability has not been observed in nature. > But nature is made of lots of matter, so how can you simply dismiss that as > not relevant? > > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> It is also hard to make sense of darwinian evolution in a non computable >> framework, as it >> makes also hard to understand the redundant nature of the brain, and >> the fact that we are stable for brain perturbations. > I don't see at all why this would be the case. Stability and redundancy may > exist beyond computations as well. Why not? > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> If you invoke something as elusive as a non computable effect in the >> brain (beyond the 1p itself which is not computable for any machine >> from her point of view), you have to give us an evidence that such >> thing exists. Is it in the neocortex, in the limbic system, in the >> cerebral stem, in the right brain? > Again, everywhere. The very fact that the brain is made of neurons is not > computable, because computation does not take structure into account (it > doesn't differentiate between different instantiations). And for all we > know, the structure of the brain *does* matter. It is heavily used in all > attempts to explain its functioning. > Quantum effects beyond individual brains (suggested by psi) can't be > computed as well: No matter what I compute in my brain, this doesn't > entangle it with other brains since computation is classical. > > A computational description of the brain is just a relative, approximate > description, nothing more. It doesn't actually reflect what the brain is or > what it does. > > benjayk > -- > View this message in context: > http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34397010.html > Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
